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CHAPTER I 
AN mTRODUCTION 
A. The problem stated. 
The problem of this dissertation is to defi.ne in-
dividuality in Bernard Bosanquet•s philosophy of religion 
and o~ society; to note some of the sources from which he 
derived his concepts; to trace the development of his views 
of individuality; to show the chief influence of his thought 
in Europe and America; finally, to attempt to evaluate his 
view of individuality in the light of other systems o~ 
thought. 
B. Sources of the data. 
The principal sources are the ritings of Bernard 
Bosanquet listed in the hibliography. 
Other sources of wide variety have also been used. 
Indispensable has been the Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society. Same valuable articles have been found in the 
Proceedings of the British Academy. Mrs. Bernard Bosan-
quet's life of her husband, as well as her own literary 
activity in collaboration with or independent of her hus-
band, has been freely consulted. Dr. Muirhead's collection 
of Bernard Bosanquet 's correspondence with his friends has 
been found to be of great help in examining Bosanquet's 
1 
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thought at different stages of his career. 
Much time has been given to a study of' the Nee-
Hegelian literature written by Bosanquet's teachers, contem-
poraries, and close associates, a. g., the works ofT. H. 
Green, F. H. Bradley, A. E. Taylor, F. R. A. Hoernle and 
R. L. Nettleship. 
Theses and dissertations on Bernard Bosanquet have 
been examined, with attention given to any light from them 
on the problem of individuality. Two of these dissertations 
were written in America (Cornell and Ohio State Universities} 
and one in SWeden. 
Lastly, the author has consulted every book or article 
listed in the bibliography to discover ori tic.isms, interpre-
tations, and evaluations of the thought of Bernard Bosanquet. 
C. Previous investigations of the problam. 
Three dissertations have been written on Bosan~uet~s 
philosophy. These are here listed with brie,f summaries of 
each. 
1. Marion Crane Carroll, The Principles of Absolutimn in the 
Metaphysics of Bernard Bosanquet (Ithaca: privately printed, 
1.91.6). Three chapters were published in the Phil.osophical 
Review and printed together (1921.). The complete disserta-
tion is typewritten and available through the Cornell Univer-
sity library. 
Bosanquet's method of idealism rests, according to 
Carrol~ on faith in a responsible ~d intelligible universe, 
on an urge to seLr-transcendence through degrees of perfec-
tion, and on a coherent, rationalistic monism. The concrete 
universal, that is individuality, is a process of synthesis 
in which active consciousness and physical structure are both 
necessary. In society the universaL is made up of conscious 11 
individuals who uniquely reflect the whole. Conduct is regu-
lated by a whole greater than the finite self. 
The norm for individuality is a synthetic whole where 
differences fit. In this inclusive process distinctions are 
increased by reflection and adjustment. Finite selves tend 
toward the absolute; they are not isolated from the concrete 
universal. In finite selves there is always a contrast be-
tween the ideal of individuality and the actual imperfect 
accomplishment. 
Self-transcendence is grounded in the transition from 
lower to higher with responsiveness to thought and relevance 
everywhere. The rational hole functions through the particu-
lar, with determinateness within nature, and with the truest 
individuality in the highest experience. Self-transcendence 
is to live for and in another·. Four forms of the experience 
of self-transcendence are especially stressed by Bosanquet: 
(a) knowledge or reflective judgment; (b) aesthetic appreci-
====#======-=--=--- ---
,, 
ciation or creation; {c) human relations as a molding process; 
and (d) religious experience which is highest and rooted in 
self-transcendence. 
Even in nature not blind mechanics but regulative 
principles prevail. This teleological structure panpsychism 
can never explain; neither can it show the tensions of people 
striving for completion. Adaptations in body, trees, plants 
must be in the absolute. 
Value judgments also point to an absolute. Fragments 
cannot be evaluated without the whole. New ethics appear as 
the larger group is loved. All is valued by individuality. 
Ultimate also, for Bosanquet, is the distinction of 
finite-infinite. United in the individual are two natures, 
one fragmentary, limited and changing, the other continuous 
and allied to greater purposes. True individuality and formal 
personality are distinguished by Bosanquet in this fashion; 
yet the finite has the whole at work within it. 
In her final chapter on "The Nature of the Absolute ••• " 
Mrs. Carroll shows Bosanquet's positive, not agnostic, view 
of a single world of spirit in which are tensions involving 
self-sacrifice. 
2. alter s. Gamertsfelder, Thought, Existence and Reality 
as viewed by F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanguet (Columbus: 
Ohio State University, 1920). 
4 
'I 
In this comparison of the metaphysics of Bradley and 
Bosanquet, Gamertsfelder first shows that for both thought 
and reality are reciprocally related. For the former, feel-
ing, with which all life starts, is below thought. Bosanquet 
regards feeling as a part of thought; in fact Bosanquet av-
oids Bradley's faculty psychology by viewing mind as thought, 
II 
I 
feeling, ~d will. All knowledge is given in sensuous ex- :1 
perience, but judgment extends this givenness into an orga-
nized whole. In this view of thought Bosanquet follows Hegel 
more closely than Bradley; he is also in accord, Gamertsfel-
der thinks, with modern psychology which sees quality and so 
relation in all experience. 
Is immediate experience a whole of knowledge? Bradley 
says that feeling is "the experience of the whole~1 without 
relations; that when thought is experienced unity is broken. 
Contact with reality is, in Bradley's view, a peephole ex-
perience below consciousness. Bosanquet, on the other hand, 
sees immediate experience in everything as part of the con-
scious process. 
Both Bosanquet and Bradley agree on identity-in-
difference. They differ, however, in that Bradley tends to 
abandon the compl~entary view of identity and difference and 
1. Bradley, AR, 162. 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
5 
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to separate existence from content. Bosanquet tends to 
obviate this difficulty, by insisting that thought, though 
abstract, is not divorced from reality. Inasmuch as reality 
is one, analysis of differences is necessary before a syn-
thesis of reality. Contradiction is a negative ronm of con-
sistency; and in th1s consistent unity is the principle of 
individuality. Bosanquet follows Hegel's view of the dia-
lectic; thought begins in the abstract and develops to the 
concrete and universal; nothing is lost in the process. 
Consciousness transcends itself in reaching for the concrete 
universal. Bradley rejects Hegelts dialectic for truth seeks 
a whole that is inclusive, harmonious, united, but without 
relations; there can be no individuality until relations are 
lost in the whole. Bosanquet refutes Bradley by saying that 
uniqueness of indivi~uals depends on completion and not 
designation. Thought in Bradley is relational, discursive, 
outward, incidental and partial; in Bosanquet thought is in-
ward, whole, and comprehensive. 
How does the mind know an objective world? Both 
Bradley and Bosanquet hold to a principle of coherence, with 
I 
mind in the midst of things from the beginning. Every mental 11 
state has matter for its object and is continuous with other 
mental states. Consciousness is not abstract but of a system 
in which the distinction between mind and its objects is 
indispensab~e. Gamertsf'elder shows that Nee-Realists, by 
insisting on some external reLations, are worsted by Bradley 
and Bosan~uet who insist on internal relations f'or all enti-
ties; nevertheless they tail to see all the reLations sug-
gested by Neo-Realists. Bosanquet especially stresses the 
wholeness or mind which for him is individuality. Nee-
Realists have many tiny absolutes, whereas Bradley and Bosan-
quet have one inclusive absolute. · 
After reviewing the theories of knowledge, for the 
most part previously discussed in TER, Gamertsfelder shows 
the systematic and individual character of reality as viewed 
by Bradley and Bosanquet. Bradley relies on immediate ex-
perience, non-contradiction, and increasing unity. Bosan-
quet differs from Bradley not simply in his .interpretation 
of' immediate experience, but of' the nisus of' consciousness 
toward a world or concrete universal; he also subordinates 
the analytic to synthetic. This, in brief, is the doctrine 
of' negativity. 
Gamertsfelder concludes his book with comparisons of 
Bradley and Bosanquet regarding the absolute. Reality, in 
Bradley's thought, is a single, harmonious, individual ex-
perience above all relations. ith these Bosanquet is en-
tirely in accord. Furthermore, the absolute in the thinking 
7 
I 
'I 
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of both is "a single, all inclusive, perfect Experience.~2 
For Bradley this is absolute experience, for Bosanquet, in-
dividuality. 
3. Berti Pfannenstill, Bernard Bosanguet's Philosophy of 
the state (Lund: Hakan Ohlsson, 1936). 
Pfannenstill describes the juridico-normative, socio-
logical, and ethieo-nor.mative methods o~ approach to politi-
cal philosophy. The historical sources of Bosanquet's poli-
tical thought are traced through Plato and Aristotle, the 
concepts of ci~-, world-, and nation-state in Greek and 
Roman. thought, the power state of Machiavelli, Hob be a and 
Spinoza, the influence on Bosanquet of Rousseau's Contrat 
Social, German idealistic thought through Kant, Fichte, and 
Hegel, English individualism through Ad~ Sm~th, Benthmn, 
Mill, Spencer; and lastly the neo-Hegelianisn of T. H. Green 
and D. G. Ritchie. 
Bosanquet's many-sid~d philosophy is reviewed as a 
background for his ' theory of the state. His views of thought, 
reality, concrete universal, epistemology, value, and the 
absolute are discussed to show that for Bosanquet the state 
2. Gamerts·felder, TER, 94. 
8 
'I 
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requires both mind and material bases, and that value arises 
from the real organic relations of the whole. 
Finally, Pfannenstill develops Bosanquet 1 s philosophy 
of the state. Freedom is found only in the truly real or 
·j whole. The genera1 Will is a concrete universal possessing 
,, 
I 
three aspects - psychological, logica1, and ethical. The 
state as an ethical unity has both an outward reality in the 
group will and a conscious regulative experience in the indi-
viduals that make up the state. 
D. ~tations of previous investigations. 
1. No dissertation or book has been written on Bosan-
quet's view of individuality. 
2. The likenesses and differences between Bosanquet's 
philosophy of individuality and that of F. H. Bradley, A. E. 
Taylor, Mary Calkins, ~osiah Royce, and other contemporaries 
have not been collected end presented in one approach to the 
problem. 
3. Criticisms of Bosanquet's view of individuality 
have been made by individuals but these have not been brought 
together in one connected whole. 
4. No writer has attempted to show the development 
of Bosanquet•s thought from early to late periods in his 
career. Only one short biography (that by his wife) has 
9 
/I 
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been written, and this does not attempt to show the develop-
ment of his philosophical system. 
E. Procedure. 
The methods used in approaching this problem are 
varied. First of all, an examination has been made of his 
thought in the many fields of his interests. Facts concern-
ing his life have been gathered from many sources, including 
records of his activity and leadership in the Aristotelian 
Society and the British Academy. Comments, facts, and cor-
respondence from his wife and friends supplement facts of 
his life which come from his life, books, and letters. All 
shades of opinion, appreciation, or criticism have been 
sought in books and magazines. 
F. Organization. 
Sections on the philosophy of religion and on social 
philosophy bulk large (of necessity) in this dissertation. 
In Chapter II, brief stlmrnaries are given of Bosanquet • s 
philosophy as a whole. In the same chapter are also pre-
sented the psychological factors and influences which led 
to his views on individuality. The influence of Bosanquet's 
philosophy on later writers, as well as criticisms and sum-
11 mary of his thought, is r~served for the closing chapters. 
II 
10 
II 
II 
CHAPTER II. 
BERNARD BOS.ANQUET: HIS LIFE AND WORK. 
A. His life. 
1. Early experiences. 
Bosan~uet's early life peculiarly prepared him both 
for a life of speculation and for a practical application 
of his philosophical prineiples. Born June 14, 1848, he 
inherited the British and Ger.man thought of the immediately 
preceding decades. Bernard was the youngest of five1 sons 
of the Reverend R. f. Bosanquet of Rock Bill, Northumberland. 
The family had an ancient tradition, the Bosanquet's being 
of Huguenot descent, and his mother a MacDowell of Scottish 
tame. His home training was unusually cultural. His mother 
loved Homer, Greek history and poetry, and Shakespea!e• 
His father devoted rare gifts to his children. During va-
cations he usually spent an hour each day with the boys in 
studying Latin prose and verse, Greek plays, Venetian his-
tory, and Euclid. He was fond of recreation, and often 
visited art galleries, theatres, and churches. He also en-
joyed travel both in England and on the continent. Thus in 
Bernard's own home on a large Northumbrian far.m Bernard was 
1. Others were Charles, Holford, Day, and George. 
11 
II 
" 
12 
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! 
acquainted with many cultural currents which led to fUrther 
development of his philosophy of individuality. Here was an 
experiment of co-operative will in a kind neighborhood. 
Bosanquet entered Harrow 1n 1851 where he was recog-
nized ~or his brilliant scholarship . He made strong friend-
ships with a few individuals, including the headmaster2 and 
3 three who later went to Oxford with him. As an indication 
of his scholarly ability he received on Speech Day, June 28, 
4 1866, twenty-seven books and a ten pound medal. 
a. At Oxford (1867-1881}. 
hile in the Oxford environment Bosanquet was led 
into many deep experiences of thought and friendship. 
He came to Oxford to study for the ministry. He was 
religious by nature and training and 'tnever lost his. hold 
upon the ultimate realities of faith." 5 But due to Oxford 
influences Bosanquet turned from the sacred orders.6 
Friends at Oxford other than his Harrow Associates 
were: F. H. Peters, an intimate friend and student of phi-
a. H. Montagu Butler. 
3. R. G. Latton, T. G. Rooper, and c. B. Heberden. 
4. Bosanquet, BB, 22. 
5. Ibid., 25. 
6. So also did his three friends from Harrow. 
losophy; c. J. Faulkner, an artist; Willi~ Morris, a leader 
in social refonn7 ; c. s. Loch, a lifelong intimate friend 
and associate in London; E. Harrison, and later on his cou-
sins, Morris Sterling and David Dundas. As a result of the 
meetings of these friends Bosanquet was led to "a growing 
interest in social work.~8 
Teachers who left the deepest impressions on him 
were T. H. Green, Benjamin Jowett, and • H. Newman. Green's 
Neo-Hegelianimn is reflected in all of Bosanquet's works. 
Jowett's critical philosophy caused Bosanquet to leave old 
ecclesiastical and theological ruts. Especially did Jowett 
aid him in appreciating Greek thought. The manuscripts of two 
books of essays were written by Bosanquet for his ~tors. 
Many of these undergraduate topics were suggested by Green 
and involved the application of philosophy to current social 
and political problems . Due largely to this Oxford training 
Green is reported to have said that Bosanquet was'tthe best 
9 10 
equipped man in eollege,~ or "of his generation." 
From 1871 to 1881 Bosanquet was a fellow and tutor 
at University College, Oxford. Here he studied Greek history 
7. Bradley and Haldane, BB, 2-3. 
8. Ibid., 3. 
9. Ibid., 1. 
10. Bosanquet, BB, 28. 
13 
II 
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and philosophy. He lectured on the "History of Logic'~ and 
on the ~istory of Moral Philosophy from Locke to Kant.tt 
In 1872·, T. H. Green, when his work was interrupted, invited 
Bosanquet to teach "Aristotle's Ethics.t Bis interests 
during these years were by no means conrined to the class-
room. We are told, for instance, that he ~et a class once 
a fortnight to study Shakespeare.11 
Bosan~uet was an impressive lecturer. He rarely 
consulted his notes. Wffe al.ways seemed to be thinking 
12 
rather than reading." Questions were welcome. He weighed 
both sides of a probl~. His sense o~ humor was keen. His 
hearers were impressed by his ttpower, originality, and sin-
oeri ty, t 13 high idealism and lofty charac tar·, 14 dignity and 
reserve.15 Important for the pro.blem of individual! ty is the 
conviction that these "'Oxford l.ectures contained the germ of 
his later thought and teaching. tt16 
Bosan~et left Oxford in 1881, oaring neither for a 
professorship nor a teaching function at the University. 
This decision had a variety of causes. Students enjoyed 
athletics more than learning. The number of students reading 
11. Bradley and Haldane, BB, a-3. 
12. Bosan~uet, BB, 31, ~oting W.E.Platu's letter. 
13. Bradley and Haldane, BB,2. 
14. Lac. cit. 
15. Bosanquet, B~, ~29-30. 
16. Ibid., 31. 
======~====~=-=~~~-=-~-~-. ---- -------~-~============~==============~ 
for honors 1n philosophy was small. ork at Oxford was not 
taxing. Abhorrent to him was the attempt of professors to 
till their classrooms at the tLme of matriculation. OUtside 
of a few close friends he found little congeniality. Bosan-
quet yearned for "intercourse with the men which is at once 
social and intellectual. 17 He desired more time for writ-
ing. Furthermore, Bosanquet had been influenced by the socia~ 
emphasis of john Ruskin and illiam Morris, and by the teach-
18 ing and example of T. H. Green and Arnold Toynbee." Impor- 1 
tant also in Bosanquet's leaving Oxford for London was the 
combination of a ~ractical and theoretical interest in 
19 philosophy. 
3. At London (1881-1897). 
The practical side of Bosanquet's nature drew him to 
London. There Morris and Hyndman had founded the Democratic 
ao 
Federation in 1880. Soon after this, the Fabian Society 
ttpledged to state or municipal Socialism"21 was organized. 
At about the same time the Charity Organization Society 
(c.o.s.) was formed to co-operate in raising the status ot 
17. Bosanquet, BB, 33. ~uoted from a letter to 
F. Peters. 
18. Muirhead, BHF, 46. 
19. Loc. cit. ~uoted from Bosanquet, BB, 55. 
20. Muirhead, BHF, 47. 
~u. Loc. cit. 
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individual and family life. Less anti-socialist than the 
c.o.s., and so more appealing to BosanQuet, was the London 
Ethical Society (L.E.s.). Associated in this were Mr. E. 
22 Peters, chairman, and Professor Edward Caird of Glasgow, 
president of the Society. 
Bosanquet, a member of the first committee of the 
L.E.s., warned against semi-ecclesiastical organization and 
moral suasion (as in the pattern o~ the American Ethical 
Society) and urged the members to ~new resources in life, 
intellect, and feeling in order that persons might help 
themselves. 23 
During this period BosanQuet was active in the ris-
totelian Society. Re became a member in 1886. Although the 
Society had been rounded in 1880, there were no skilled 
philosophers in the early years. illiam ~ames joined in 
1883, but even then it was more a students' club dominated 
by S. H. Hodgson, an anti-Hegelian. A distinguished group 
including Alexander Bain, G. J. Ramanes, Aubrey Moor, D. G. 
Ritchie, s. Alexander, G. F. Stout, • R. Sorley, B. Russell, 
G. E. Moore, H. Rashdall and A. F. Shand, joined soon after 
Bosanquet. 
22. 
23. 
These transfor.med the group into a professional 
Father of F. Peters. 
Muirhead, BHF, 48. 
II 
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society. H. i~don Carr was elected secretary and a vote 
was taken to publish proceedings. 
It was during the period fram 1886 to 1900 that 
Mr. Bosanquet was most closely associated with us, regular 
in attendance and assiduous in our councils. In 1888 he was 
I 
II 
elected a vice-president, and from 1894 to 1898 was president. 
He brought into our society a spirit and attitude towards the 
problems of philosophy which were essential to our success."24 
Bosanquet looked more on philosophy as a problem to be sol.ved 
than a 25 octrine to be taught. He tried to bring out the 
truth on both sides of a question; to this end he compelled 
memhers of the Society to express their views clearly. 
Several notable books and articles ere written by 
Bosanquet in this period, for the most part in the field of 
logic and aesthetics. In 1882 appeared an article on ~ogic 
as the Science of' Knowledge,~ in ESsays in Philosophical 
Criticisn.26 Knowledge and Reality (1884) showed his agree-
ment with and dissent from Bradley's Principles of Logic. 27 
The first edition of Bosanquet's Logic or the Morphology of 
Knowledge (1888) gave his most complete syst~ of thought 
24. Carr, ~In Memoriam, Bernard Bosanquet," 
Proc. Arist. Soc., 23 (1923), 267-268. 
25. Hodgson's method. 
26. Seth and Haldane, editors. 
27. Published in 1883. 
Ul 
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before Bradley's Appearance and Reality. 28 Between 1884 and 
1888 Bosanquet translated Hegel's Aesthetic and wrote an in-
troduction. A pioneer in its field was Bosanquet's History 
of Aesthetic (1892), 
Many activities during this period combined his 
interest in philosophy of religion and social philosophy. 
He became chairman of the Administrative Committee o~ the 
Charity Organization Society. Frequent lectures were given, 
usually from notes. Some of these, however, were printed in 
small volumes, e. g. A Companion to Plato's Republic (1895) 
and Essentials of Logic (1895). A volume of Essays entitled 
The Civilization of Christendom appeared in 1893. In collab-
oration with friends, Aspects of the Social Problem was writ-
ten. Philosophical books were reviewed by him in the ~­
chester Guardian and Pall 1mll Gazette. He was at this time 
examiner for the Indian Civil Service. In 1892 Bosan~uet 
substituted for illiam allace in a series of lectures at 
the Plymouth (Massachusetts) Summer School of Ethics. His 
marriage in 1895 to Miss Helen Dendy, a sociologist of note, 
increased Bosanctuet 's participation in social reform. .Just 
before leaving London for Caterham he finished The Psychology 
of the Moral Self. 
28. Published in 1893. 
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4. At Caterham and Oxshott (1897-1903). 
Bosanquet's main interest during the two years at 
Caterham as his preparation of The Philosophical Theory of 
the State. This project was in mind when he wrote to F. 
Peters in February, 1898: ~r am going to recast some lec-
tures to make a book on Political Philosophy; this is to take 
29 
not more than a year.~ 
time { 1899) • 
The book appeared on scheduled 
hile their home was at Caterham, Mr. and Mrs. Bosan-
quet visited Greece, ~the chief source of his intellectual 
and spiritual interests.~30 His nephew, R. c. Bosanquet, 
of the British School at Athens, had interested Dr. Bosanquet 
in the bearing of archeological discoveries on the cLassical 
records. His impressions of this experience are recorded 
- 31 
in "A Moral from Athenian History." 
Bernard and Mrs. Bosanquet moved September, 1899, into 
a home built at Oxshott where most of their future activities 
were to center. Here aesthetic experiences were many and 
varied. He enjoyed the trees, birds, and flowers. An un-
failing source of delight was the garden with its roses and 
fruit trees which he watered and pruned. From 1899 to 1903 
29. Bosanquet, BB, 75. 
50. Ibid., 75. 
31. See Bosanquet, 511, chap. XII. 
Bosanquet's literary activity was great but the output small. 
One ~ook, The Education of the Young in the Republic of Plato, j 
was publi~ed during this period. Frequent papers ere 
ritten for the Aristotelian Society. 
The winter of 1901-1902 was spent in Rone. This visit 
to Italy was distinguished from others by a devoted study of 
the antiquities of _Rome and especially of the Italian lan-
guage, an experience ~which stood him in good stead when 
32 twenty years later he crune to study Italian philosophy.~ 
5. At St. Andrews (1903-1908). 
For a brief period Dr. Bosanquet as again in univer-
sity work. At the suggestion of Lord Haldane, Bosanquet was 
invited in 1903 to the chair of moral philosophy in the uni-
versity of St. ~drews. Here he was an effective lecturer. 
Plato~s Republic and Greek texts bearing on the life and work 
of Socrates received his special attention. He was fond of 
long philosophical discussions. In 1904 Bosanquet with others 
discussed university business with the Prime Minister. In 
the faculty of Arts and of the United College, ~his practical 
sagacity and experience of affairs were often of great ser-
33 
vice. 1 
32. Bosanquet, BB, 104. 
33. Bradley and Haldane, BB, 6. Quoted from the 
minutes of the Senatus Academecies of 
.July 15, 1908. 
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life. 
6. Later life (1908-1923). 
This as the most productive literary period of his 
34 He delivered two series of Gifford Lectures. In 
1913 he published The Distinction between Mind and Its Ob-
jects. Books followed in quick succession: a second edition 
of The Essentials of Logic (1914}; Three Lectures on Aes-
thetics (1915}; Social and International Ideals (1917); 
Some SUggestions in Ethics (1918); Croce's Aesthetics (1919); 
What Religion Is {1920); Implication and Linear Measurement 
(1920}; The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy 
{19al). Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind (1923), pub-
lished posthumously, was but part of a longer work, What Is 
Mind?, left uncompleted on his desk. 
To the end of his life Bosanquet kept his contact 
with the Aristotelian Society. For years he was its first 
vice president. hen Mr. Balfour, the president in 1914-1915, 
was unable to give his inaugural address because of his dutiesl 
in the government, Bosanquet took his place on short notice. 
The last meeting of the Society attended by Bosanquet was in 
1918, when in a symposium with Pringle-Pattison, Stout, and 
Haldane, he defended his theory of the adjectival nature of 
34. Princi le of Individualit and 
and Value and Destiny of the ' 1913). 
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finite individuality. An article, "In Mamori~, Bernard 
Bosanquet," written by Carr after Bosanquetts death, pays 
this tribute to htm by the Aristotelian Society: 
Mr. Bosanquet belongs to the world ot philosophy 
generally, and not in any special way to the 
Aristotelian Society, but we may justly pride 
ourselves that one who, some of us think more 
than anyone else ot this generation, will live 
in history as representative ot a great English 
philosophical movement should have been through-
out his active lite so closely associated with 
us.35 
After a short illness Bosanquet died February 8th, 1923 
at Hampstead, to which he had moved a tew months b.efore. 
35. Proc. Arist. Soc., 23, N.s., (1923), 270. 
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R. His work. 
1. Historical development of his philosophy. 
a. Logic. 
Bosanquet's early thought is most inclined toward 
logic, although all periods in his life are greatly affected 
by it. 
His ~ogic assumes that ~the truth is the whole" in a 
II connected rational universe where judgments are possible. 
Consciousness is a coherent unity in which extension, that is 
realized and realizable content, and intension, or universal 
meaning, are compl~entary. Judgments in individuality are 
graded, 1 with identity and difference high stages in com-
parison. In such comparisons generic judgments predicate 
universa1 connections and purely hypothetical judgments, 
a larger systematic nexus to individuality. Furthermore, 
true distinctive judgments deal with individuality as a whole 
content or system in which are all connections. 2 In the 
alternatives of this system are choice and freedom. Coher-
ence is experienced in modality which progressively incorpo-
rates content with the understanding. 3 Inference is a medi-
1. Bosanqaet, LOG, I, 89, 90. 
2. Ibid., 327. 
3. Ibid., 382. 
23 
ated reference to reality wherein all distinctions and re-
lations are parts of the absolute as a concrete universal. 
Enmnerative or mathematical induction is the mechanical 
aspect of the whole. Scientific induction is inference of 
the whole from observation and experiment. Through defini-
tion, rather than designation, one is able through degrees 
of individua1ity4 to approximate coherence in the absolute. 
5 Logic and metaphysics are one. 
b. Epistemology. 
Epistemology was one of Bosan~uet's earliest philoso-
phical interests; yet as late as The Meeting or Extremes in 
Contemporary Philosophy (192l) he was trying to reconcile 
Neo-Hegelianism and Nee-Realism through his concept of indi-
viduality. 
Briefly, his views are these: The given comes to us 
in sense perception to be interpreted. An object has being 
and val..ue but more than one person can perceive 1 t. Further-
more, a common world is shared by finite minds. Bosanquet 
leans toward the critical realist in . maintaining the unity 
of the world of thought rather than a world of ~elf-existent 
sense." 
6 
4. Bosanquet, LOG, II, 253ft. 
5. Bosanquet, LOG, I, 223. 
6. Bosan~uet, MECP, 11. 
Relativity (as in Whitehead, CN) is impossible without 
some reference to mind, either active, receptive, or selec-
tive; the assumption is strong that the universe is per.meated 
by mind. Bosanquet (in accord with Whitehead) sees no event II 
isolated; every object observed is in a system reflecting the 
unity of the universe. The mind as a focus or experiences 
7 
consists ~or what it does and experiences;" herein is 
mental enjoyment. 
8 The mind is ~the active form of totality:~ its 
positive content is drawn from nature. Our minds are not 
se~-sufficient apart from nature for "nature lives in the 
9 life or conscious beings." The runction of finite mind is 
10 to be a ""living copula of nature and the Absolute." 
A principle of organ~sm is thus present as a conscious finite 
being finds himself in the midst of a concrete whole or to-
tality which includes his physical body. 
Instead of interaction Bosanquet advocates a theory 
of equivalence to account for the relationships between body 
and mind. In equivalence there is ""the constancy of energy~1 
in a t .otality. Dif~erentiation, as well as tendencies and 
12 
capacities are "transmitted through the bodily arrangement." 
7. Bosanquet, MECP, 25. 
8. Bosanquet, PIV, 367. 
9. Ibid., 3'71. 
10. Loc. cit. 
11. Ibid, 159. 
12. Ibid., l7I .. 
- -----
Physica1 and psychical states cannot be disassociated. 
Mu1tiplism, ra.the-r than dualism, or monism, is the 
obvious truth. But this is more apparent than real inasnuch 
as finite beings,though imperfect fragments, affirm the 
absolute. 13 
o. Aesthetics. 
A second period in Bosanquet's literary activity is 
marked especially by an interest in aesthetics and ethics. 
The aesthetic feeling, for Bosanquet, is pleasant, 
permanent, relevant, and embodied in an organized community. 
The feeling of semblance is valued higher than that of rea1-
ity.14 In aesthetic feeling are many degrees of insight 
15 into connections which give form to individuality. 
In aesthetic imagination reality is revealed and 
finite mind is "at work pursuing and exploring the possibi-
16 li ties suggested by the connection of its experience. '1 
In the fulness of this imaginative experience comes aesthetic 
enjoyment. 
Individual.! ty aids in the embodiment or- aesthetic 
1
1 
attitudes. Simple feelings have a priori forms as cubes, 
squares, simple melodies, etc. Nature enters aesthetics as 
13. Bosanquet, PIV, 372. 
14. Bosanquet, TLA, 10. 
15. Ibid., 16. 
16. Ibid., 26. 
I 
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the living external world" which we relive imaginatively. 
An ideal in art is enfeebled ·when it omits character and 
17 individuality. Highest in expression is music. 
Bosanquet criticizes Croce's view that beauty is for 
and in the mind only. Intuition, for Croce, is a vision 
within. But this is his blunder for "embodiment is necessary 
to feeling;~18 otherwise all is fallacy. Things and ninds 
must complement each other even in art. Through ages of 
adaptation end application all arts, feelings, and embodi-
19 
ments become fused and blended, for example, a brush atroke. 
Mental life without bodily life is nothing. In the fusion of 
expression (body) and feeling (soul) there is the double pro-
cess of creation and contemplation found in the aesthetic 
• attitude. II 
jl 
ll 
Beauty has degrees of insight. Easy beauty is aes-
thetically pleasant, as, for example, a rose, a youthfUl 
20 face. A wider beauty demands fixed attention or "high 
tension feeling,• 21 as in comedy here contrasts must be 
seen in a topsy-turvy world without losing a center. 22 
Invincible ugliness is false individuality. It is 
isolation of details from a central purpose, as in a story 
17. Bosanqu.et, TLA, 64. 
18. Ibid., 67. 
19. Ibid., 71. 
20 • Ib id • , 84. 
21. Ibid., 89. 
2:2. Ibid. J 93. 
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without a point. Ugliness mistakes the real. It embodies 
a feeling ~d frustrates it, as, for example, musical dis-
cords, or flickers of a light. Ugliness is not a product of 
nature but of man only. 23 Apparent ugliness in Bosanquet's 
thought may be beauty for the next step. Through a process 
of aufgehoben ugliness is lifted out of its independence to 
a harmonious relation in a larger whole or individuality. 24 
d. Ethics. 
Ethics deman.ds impersonal values (tor example, love 
2.5 
and justice) as "imperatives or notes of perfection," 
found in the absolute. ·Even to live for others is to have 
sufficient value to offer. Through values personalities are 
reshaped and t .rue a1 truism (mutual give and take} is given 
worth to individuals. 26 
Individual morals are, in Bosanquet's thought, rooted 
in social fUnction, that is, in individuality. The welfare 
of others concerns each individuality. Indeed justice is 
the faithful performance of one's station and duties. Truth, 
beauty, goodness, religion are supreme values for the good 
of civilized society. The goal of society is to achieve 
a coherent communal life in which these values interpenetrate 
23. 
24. 
Bosanquet, TLA, 108. 
Bosanquet, nAesthetic Theory of Ugliness,tt 
Proc. Arist. Soc. 1, Pt. 1, No. 3 (1887-1891},39• 
25. 
2.6. 
Bosanquet, SSE, 11. 
See ibid., 23. I 
il 
through the 27 ho~e. No injustice can be found where 
"a perfect system of valuesn28 guides m.ants total life. 
Values are akin to mind and reality,"29 and so 
throw ~ight on individuality. They seem to be what a person 
really wants or approves. In values are recognized affir-
mation, reinforcenent, unity, completeness, harmony. Truth 
means "to be ••• organized as a spiritual being should be"; 
30 to appreciate beauty one is "quiet, sane, and harmonious." 
Each value presupposes all the rest as in a complete per-
sonality. Failure to see such a world of values is the nar-
rowness of finite individuals; personalities expand with the 
31 
consciousness of values in the whole of being. Further.more, 
no man can complete his own work; others must do this for him 
in view or "the general indivisible spirit of things."32 
Hence man relives in countless ways a life "infinitely great-
33 
er than his own.~ Evil is blindness to the whole; sal-
vation is in "achieving the highest values and the best life 
for all. r 34 
How does Bosanquet's conception of individuality help 
one to know what to do? First, one should use one's capac1-
27. Bosanquet, SSE, 35, 39. 
28. Ibid., 44. 
29. Loc. cit. 
30. Ibid., 61. 
31. Ibid., 65. 
32. Ibid.' 85. 
• 
33. Ibid.' 87, 
34. Ibid., 124, and see also 112. 
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ties in one's assignable place in this ~connected system o~ 
35 
goods.~ The best elue is success in exercising the good 
will. One's policy should be coherent. Sacrifice is ~plied 
36 but not ~continued selr-enjoy.ment. Each can respond to 
37 
the good; each life colors all as it contributes to the 
~bonum. A person should beware of the uncriticized 
38 
attitude of complacency, expectancy and despair; by them 
intrinsic and instrwnental values are reversed. Stupidity 
is man's blindness to worth or va~ue. In punishment bad 
39 personal Wills are repressed by social good will. The 
right ••• is essentially a choice in the light of the hole.~40 
Thus an enlightened conscience comes from a social process 
~in hich a right appreciation of the values of life is 
predominant." 41 
e. Metaphysics. 
Metaphysics was dominant in Bosanquet's earliest 
writing hen logic and metaphysics ere one. He freely ad-
mitted his close kinship to Bradley whose Ethical Studies 
55. Bosanquet, SSE, 133. 
36. Ibid.' 148. 
37. Ibid., 150. 
38. Ibid., 172:t:r. 
39. Ibid.' 195. 
40. Ibid.' 251. 
41. Ibid.' 258. 
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(1876) and Appearance and Reality (1893} so greatly helped to 
~old his own thought. Bosanquetts greatest metaphysical 
contributions were, his Gifford I.ectures (PIV and VDI) where, 
he expounded most fully his views of individuality and the 
absolute. To these frequent reference will be made in suc-
ceeding chapters. 
Metz rightly says that ~etaphysics is the beginning 
and end of Bosanquet's thought, and also all that lies be-
42. 
tween. All that one encounters in thought, ethical liv-
ing, in the State, in art, religion, and philosophy lead to 
his theory of the absolute. 
Briefly stated, Bosanquet centers his thought of 
individuality in the absolute. Individuality cannot be com-
pletely expressed in peculiar and unique individuals. It is 
anticipated in human personalities and in groups which have 
some general will. Personality and individuality are not 
identical for the latter is a whole or concrete universal, 
whereas the former is a sort of candidate for individuality 
through the experience of self-transcendence. Man is ex-
clusively neither nature nor absolute; he is finite-infinite 
as he rises through the hazards an·c:. hardships of soul-making 
toward stability and security in the absolute. 
42. Metz, HBP, 353. 
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r and g. Social Philosophy and 
philosophy of religion. 
Inasmuch as Chapter IV of this dissertation is given 
to a discussion of Bosanquet's social philosophy and Chap-
ter V to a rather long trea~ent or his philosophy of reli-
gion the reader is referred to those sections for an exposi-
tion of Bosanquetts thought on these topics. 
2. Problems arising out or- his philosophy of 
individua~ity . 
In this section a few crueial questions will be 
stated~ hat does Bosanquet mean by individua~ity and abso-
lute? Does he adopt Bradley's views without radical change? 
In his view of concrete universaL how distinct are indivi-
duals? How can he make much of consciousness in lower de-
grees of individuality and think, of individuality as uncon-
scious when conceived as the absolute? Is individuality an 
organic process? Why does he refuse to identify God with the 
absolute? hy does he decline to apply personality to God? 
Does he have two or more views of freedom, one of which is 
more friendly to Theism? How do Bosanquetts views change 
at different periods in his life? Can Bosanquet be thought 
of as a mediator who is attempting to hold the fundamentals 
of absolute idealism but adapt them especially to realism 
and personalism? What has been his influence? 
basic criticisms of his system? 
hat are 
33 
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and personalism? What has been his inf~uence? 
basic critic i.sms of his system? 
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III. PRELIMmARY STATEMENT OF 
BOS.ANQ,UET 'S DEFmiTIONS OF INDIVIDUALITY. 
A. As finite mind. 
Inasmuch as this topic is more fully developed in 
Chapter V only a brief statement will be made here. 
1 
According to Bosanquet "the clue to true individuality" 
is found in itself. 
Consciousness fluctuates and is intermittent as with 
the ebb and flow of the tides . But this experience is an 
effort by a finite self to seize and make one's own the 
va1ue and significance of a world beginning with some s~ple 
min~um of experience and extending far beyona.~2 This ten-
dency of man to extend his finite experience beyond what he 
has actually achieved in time needs a universal. ftHis indi-
viduality, his self-identity, lie outside him as he presents 
htmsel~ in time.~3 Conscioua life, though it varies in 
degree, is nevertheless a participation in the universal self 
or individuality. 
Furthermore, the line between self and nature is not 
fixed. By nature is meant 
the world in space and time, with all its secondary 
qualities, and moreover, with all the interpretations 
and emotions b{ which in our experience it is taken 
and qualified. 
1. Bosanquet, PIV, 269. 
2. Ibid., 372. 
3. Ibid., 259. 
4. Ibid., 359. 
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From nature as thus conceived the self draws its material for 
self-hood; but the seLf is also making the environment. Nature 
as environment cannot be ~less than the whole detail of thing 
and fact which enters into the world of the selr.tt5 Can one 
set bounds to the self and nature by drawing a line between 
them? Bosanquet thinks not. Not only is the finite self 
soaked in nature, 'but it expands i .n nature and becomes a elue 
to the wholeness or indiviQuality in nature. 
Freedom in finite mind is not isolation, solipsisn, 
or subjectivism. On the contrary, freedom is the use or the 
powers and trends of the finite self to transform "externality 
6 
into inwardness.~ . Through freedom man, as a part of a living 
hole or individuality, can c ·eate, and, at the same time, be 
sustained by the absolute in the struggle for unity and co-
herenee. 
Nor is there reason to believe that man at his highest 
finite development has achieved individuality. He is still 
fragmentary. Yet man's worth cannot be measured in terms of 
actual finite self-hood. It is evident to Bosanquet that 
the height . of indi vidua·li ty is to be looked for in 
experiences hich raise to the acutest pitch the 7 
sense and tact of identity with man, nature, and God. 
5. Bosanquet, PIV, 360. 
6. Ibid.' 32.6. 
? • Ibid., 271. 
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Man's value is dependent on the degree to which he embodies 
1 ~the principLe of individuality - the completeness, coherence, 
or self-containedness of the universe. 8 
B. As logicaL compLeteness. 
Every judgment is related to all knowledge inasmuch as 
it is ~oddfied by the whole and yet modifies it. In order to 
attain this, finite individuals must experience self-sacrifice 
in order to perfect stabili~y in self-completion. No process 
of ~ere succession can ever attain self-completion for suc-
cession does not mean a connected whole. Knowledge is only 
possible far living bodies. 
Logical completeness is thus a key to the principle 
of individuality. It provides a creative initiative by which 
a satisfactory finite experience is connected with the sta-
bility and power of self-maintenance in the whale. In this 
experience of the "spirit of totality is ~aund ~the clue to 
reality, value, and freedam." 9 
Logical completeness is nat a mark of imperfection in 
the supreme being. Rather it is the mark of completion in 
individuality that individuals should go out to others seeking 
there completion or reality; in this way "the Divine spirit 
8. Bosanquet, VDI, xix. 
9. Basanquet, PIV, 23. 
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maintains its identity."10 In this yearning for the whole, 
11 this clamoring for completion,is to be found the universal 
nexus of inventive individuality. 
I· Are there degrees of logical completeness in indi vidu- I 
- -- --
ality? Bosanquet affirms that this is true and that the high-
er achievement is in the more concrete or inclusive experience. 
The lowest forms are in a minimum mental state of self-trans-
cendence. A higher state of logical completion may be induced 
by reflecting upon art and poetry in order to apprehend the 
absolute individuality. 
The experience of logical completion is the identifi-
cation of the private self with perfection or true individual-
!· ity. In the strugg~e for completion the finite self says: 
"I am bona fide other, and this self, though I am it, I reject 
and disown." 11 
c. As perfection. 
In Bosanquet's philosophy there is some good in all 
ends but complete good in none. Choice is thus essential in 
selecting that which is good and that for which one should 
sacrifice. But how shall one know what to choose? Bosanquet's 
view of individuality as perfection will help at this point. 
io. Bosanquet, PIV, Z43. 
11. Bosanquet, WRI, 48-49. 
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Reality or individuality is perfect hen it has univer-
I 
I 
sal life and power. 
Its shape at any moment is the idea of perfection 
working in experience down to that moment, as a 
striving after the completest harmony possible 
under all the conditions, in other words after 
what we really want.l2 
I ll 
Ultimately the idea of perfection will expand beyond everyday 
experience and become the idea of the. absolute. Herein is 
perfection and supreme unity o:t supreme good . 
hat is right? No finite person can know absolute 
rightness. 1 th what result? Pessimism! The best rightness 
e can hope for is that which is right ~or us under all our I 
conditions and limitations. In each problem is a concreteness 
which is a universal center. "'At every stage our idea of per-
fection represents our best construction of the whole . 13 
SUpreme good must ultimately include all aspects of perfec-
tion.14 Inasnuch as the absolute needs us and we the absolute 
we can experience ~the harmonization of a total world .~5 
Perfection, in Bosan~uet's thought, can have no strife, 
16 
no tension. Hence a finite individual can never be perfect, 
for .joy and sorrow, success or failure, good and evil struggl 
in individuals. But in individuality as perfection reality 
12. B.osan~uet, SP. 21.2. 
13. Ibid., 220. 
14. Ibid.' 221. 
15. Ibid., 222. 
16. Bosanquet, PIV, 17. 
jl 
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transcends the striving microcosms. Heart and will become 
absorbed in this greater reality.17 
Is the absolute characterized by imperfection rather 
than by perfection? Bosanquet saves himself from inconsis-
tency by saying that error is absorbed in God. Different 
conditions prevail for different realities. By rearrangement 
and readjustment error can be transformed into truth and ~-
18 perfection into perfection. 
D. As concrete universal. 
Every general rule includes and illuminates the con-
text and so tends to the completion of knowledge into a coher-
ent whole which is truth. Freedom is "the logic of individu-
19 
ality and as remote as possible from contingency;" and this 
freedom is found in the expansion and interpretation of 
thought. But a general rule is identity without diversity and 
so is not a concrete world or individual whole. 
More truly, a concrete universal is an organism, a 
system, a whole of parts, a world. It is "a diversity recog-
nized as a unity, a macrocosm constituted by microcosms,n20 
in which each microcosm is also a world. A finite concrete 
universal is "an abstract identity distributed through s~ace 
17. Bosan~uet, SEE, 102. 
18. Bosanquet, VDI, 213. 
19. Bosanquet, PIV, 80. 
20. Ibid., 38. 
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and time.n21 All members have diversity, nevertheless all 
members are connected in their aspiration to be a whole and 
"by a differentia ted response to organic necessities. tt22 
Thought, feeling and wi~l function unitedly in all their 
varied forms as radii leading to a common center and adjusting 
23 themselves differently to the center. 
A concrete universal is an individual whole and so a 
type of universality. It is a system in which truth cannot 
, be contradicted for it is the whole. In this individual whole 
"is'• and "'is not't are differents and not contraries because 
judgments are on the basis of fragments and not of worlds. 
Contradiction is confusion in what is comparatively complete. 
Non-contradiction invo~ves a world or who~e in which the con-
tradictory elements become harmonious. In an individual 
whole being is developed with determinateness {self-mainten-
ance). On this view of truth as a whole no dividing line can 
be drawn between necessary and contingent truth inasmuch as 
every true proposition cannot be contradicted by the harmony 
of the whole of experience. 
Bosanquet contends that the concrete universal is 
"the clue to individuality" because 1 t tt·embodies the nisus of 
21. Bosanquet, KR, 10. 
22. Bosanquet, PIV, 38 n. 
23. Ibid., 39, 40. 
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thought to individua~ity."a4 Thought-determinations give 
value and meaning to all sorts of experience, · and "the ulti-
ll 
j' mate tendency of thought •••• is not to generalize, but to con-
II sti tute a world. n 25 Two essential features of individuality I 
I! 
I 
" I 
mark this tendency: (a) an impulse from the given self toward 
the whole; (b) a return to the given self for a fuller, more 
rounded experience in every detail of being. Thus, for 
Bosanquet, thought is concrete, not abstract, for the higher 
its experience the greater its appreciation of a self-contained 
world. 
For.m, interdependence, significance, self-completeness 
are characters as of thought at its best, so of vi-
tality at its highest. This is the general character 
by which a concrete universal gives the . clue to the 
individual ••• It (thought) is the active for.m of 
totality, present in all and every experience of a 
rational being - perhaps, in a degree, in every ex-
perience in the universe.26 
Thought and freedom are handmaidens 27 in all thought, love, 
and work. 
On the basis of Bosanquet's view of the concrete uni-
versal he ventures to define individuality. 
Individuality is the ultimate completeness of that 
character of wholeness and non-contradiction which 
e first generalized under the name of logical 
stability. It is all one whether we make non-
24. Bosanquet, PIV, 52, 54ft. 
25. Ibid., 55. 
26. Ibid., 59. 
27. For Hegel as well as Bosanquet. 
I ,, 
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contradiction, who~eness or Individual+ty our 
criterion of the ultDmately real. e mean by it 
••• that whi~h must stand; that which has nothing 
without to set against it, and which is pure self-
maintenance within.28 
Individua~ity is positive not negative; it consists, not 
simply in being uniquely oneself, but in completeness with 
other selves. Thus purpose which expresses a wanted object 
must arise from "a profound necessity of a highly organized 
29 
11 wor~dt' of individuality. Purposes thus make or mar indi-
I 
viduality. A concrete untversal as individuality is therefore 
infinite, but as an organism, not as a series. It is a co-
herent and complete whole with identity and difference. In 
re~ity the concrete universal can be but one individuality. 
Individuality in a concrete universal is both inward 
and outward. It reso~ves the anti thesis· between nature as 
purpose~ess externality and the inward mental processes of 
finite individua~s. One without the other would be empty or 
meaningless. 
Inwardness, when meant to be the equivalent of 
Individuality or the character of spirit, should be 
taken as a type of experience superior to externality 
and including it.30 
There can be no spiritual center without a circumference of 
nature, as for example, the body as a basis and complement of 
28. Bosanquet, PIV, 68. 
29. Ibid., 70. 
30. Ibid., 74. 
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the sou~. So individuality as inwardness has the characteris-
tics of a world, and as externality has value in the total 
life. 
How does Bosan~et illustrate the concrete universal? 
Each individual has connections of the social whole within.3~ 
Bosanquet prefers art and religion to history as the type of 
\I 
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the soul. So individuality as inwardness has the characteris-
tics of a world, and as externality has value in the total 
life. 
How does Bosanquet illustrate the concrete universal? 
Each individual has connections of the social whole within.31 
Bosanquet prefers art and religion to history as the type of 
concrete universal. History is a hybrid form of experience 
for it combines contingency and concreteness. Not so in art 
and religion! A work of art is a self-contained whole needing 
no additional meaning or explanation. "Every point in it 
carries the burden, or lives with the life, of the whole."32 
In religion, as for example in Christianity, is a world of 
experience, a concrete universal, in which individuals share 
their experience in its organic life. Herein, at least, is 
found something of the ultimate experience of individuality. 
The higher the type of art, or religion, the greater is the 
harmony which prevails in the concrete universe. 
E. As the absolute. 
Most completely, individuality may be defined as the 
,, 
II 
absolute. By this Bosanquet means a universe which is an •I 
all inclusive, non-contradictory whole, a concrete universal 
uniting all in a single identity, yet retaining all differ-
31. Bosanquet, PTS, 175. 
32. Bosanq_uet, PIV,. 58. 
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ences in a system or macrocomn. In the absolute nothing is 
abstract, but all concrete. The absolute is perfection, 
sel~-completeness, self-containedness, infinity. Inasmuch 
33 
as the absolute is whole and not part it is· not purpose, will, 
good or evil. 
The absolute is reality and present th~oughout the 
universe. It is reve~ed in all selves, being incarnate in 
them. All the yearning for completion and the satisfact.ion 
afforded these struggling souls is the absolute. 34 In the 
absolute is all the content of mind. 35 e all of us experi-
ence the Absolute because the Absolute is in everything . n 36 
The absolute is thus a sort of hound of heaven constantly 
driving us and never leaving us alone for a single moment. 
, The absolute pe~eates all and holds together such opposites 
as good and evil, human and divine. In the absolute is a 
37 ftperfect union of mind and nature.n From the absolute 
comes immediate knowledge. 38 The absolute is a "divine beingn 
enced by imperfect finite selves better than anything else 
because it is in all even though it transcends ~. 
33. Bosanquet, PIV, 391. 
34. Ibid., 340. 
35. Ibid., 33.7. 
36. Ibid., Z7. 
37. Ibid., 382. 
38. Ibid., 389. 
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Bosanquet has this general formula ror the absolute 
as individuality: 
the transmutation and rearrangement of particular 
experiences, and also of the contents of particular 
finite mindsA by inclusion in a complete whole of 
experience.3~ . 
Such an absolute is the individual, or individuality, in which 
all finite selves live, move, and have their being. 
39. Bosanquet, PIV, 373. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INDIVIDUALITY AND SOCIETY 
Bosanquet has a special meaning for the term 
Ttindividuality" in social philosophy. He says: 
An Individual may be 'individual' or indivisible 
because he has so little in him that you cannot 
imagine it possible to break him up into lesser 
parts; or because, however full and great his 
nature, it is so thoroughly one, so vital and 
so true to itself, that, like a work of art, 
the whole of his being cannot be separated into 
parts without ceasing to be what it essentially is. 
In the former case the 'individual' is an 'atom'; 
in the latter case he is 'a great individuality.' 
The sense in which we shall make use of the notion 
of the individual, so far as we use it at all, will 
be the latter and not the former.l 
A. Sources of Bosanquet's Social Ideals. 
1. Greek Citizenship. 
Individuality in the Greek city states ~akes the form 
of a national mind. This mind is "the world taken as alive 
and focussed," 2 as in Pericles' funeral oration. Individuals 
are not isolated in their care of families, of property, and 
3 
in vocations. Poor people are those "without means," and 
are to be put back to work as soon as possible. All unite 
for defense, and vow neither to disgrace their shields nor 
desert their fellow-soldiers. Government and justice are 
1. Bosanquet, PTS, 74-75. 
2. Bosanquet, Sll, 261. 
3. Bosanquet, PTS, 297. 
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administered by the people. In short: 
Citizenship was obviously and visibly a life, 
your hole life, with common dangers, common 
responsibilities, common enjoyments, and 
common ambitions.4 
In Greece, for the first time in human history, ~the problem 
of uniting public authority with individual freedom was 
All · this is fUndamental to Bosanquet's view of 
individuality which he would see embodied in a Christian 
6 Hellenism devoted to all mankind, and not simply to one state. 
2. Socrates, ' P~ato and Aristotle. 
These three men affect Bosanquet deeply and he is 
adept in interpreting their phi~osophy. 
7 
Socrates, a great pioneer in the ttreflective movement," 
shifts the scene from the outer, partial or finite, to the in-
ner, total, or infinite world wherein universals are real. 
Furthermore, Socrates is so loyal, patriotic, and law-abiding 
that his duty compels him to accept with generous spirit, and 
to his own hurt, the decisions of his city. 8 Socrates' ideas 
are thus good grist for Bosanquet's theory of individuality. 
Bosanquet interprets the fund~ental political philos-
ophy of Plato and Aristotle in terms of individuality: 
4. Bosanquet, ASP, 4. 
5. Bosanquet, EA, 5. 
5. Ibid., 52-53 
7. Bosanquet, PTS, 246. 
8. Bosanquet, Sll, 5,8. 
47 
The human mind can only attain its fUll and proper 
life in a community of minds, or more strictly in 
a community pervaded by a single mind, uttering 
itself consistently though differently in the life 
and action of every member in the community.9 
For them individual life can never achieve its true self-hood 
in isolation; the life of the State enriches the life of the 
individual; nevertheless each person has his distinctive place 
in the state • 
Bosanquet sees in Plato every sound theory of political 
philosophy. The central idea in Plato's theory is this: 
that every class of persons in the community - the 
statesman, the soldier, the workman - has a certain 
distinctive type of mind which fits its members for 
their functions, and that the community essentially 
consists in the working of these types of minds in 
their connection with one another, which connection10 constitutes their subordination to the common good. 
In education Plato tea~hes that 
the principle of the growth and nourishment of 
a living creature, not a body plus a mind, but a 
unity in which the physical life passes upwards 
into t~e mental - can never cease to be signifi-
cant.l 
P1ato sees continuity between the relations of finite selves 
12 
and the cosmic order. The mind of man is "superlatively 
13 
natural," and when it "does what, as a whole, it wills ••••• 
9. Rosanquet, PTS, 6. 
10. Loc. cit. 
11. Bosanquet, EYRP, 22.. 
12. Bosanquet, PTS, 19. 
13. Ibid., 123 n. 
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it fee~s free.n14 Inasmuch as law is a product of right 
reason, it must be obeyed or retribution follows. 15 In a 
living organism, in which persons of every type of trade 
or vocation mirror the whole, higher modes of individuality 
16 
spring. Plato makes no distinction between the state and 
society; in either case he sees the relations of individua~s 
not limited to city-states. 
Foundational for Bosanquet's view of individuality is 
Plato's description of an expert. An expert is a craft~an 
or technician; he also knows what is worth living for. Not 
in a democracy in which liberty is "construed as the total 
absence of principle, proportion, selection,"17 will experts 
be found. Rather, in Plato's state, each citizen incarnates 
to some degree universal experience and so is a microcosm o~ 
the whole; he is a statesman in miniature with rights and 
duties which satisfy his nature. In this capacity all talents 
of citizens can be used, with the two sexes sharing equally 
in affairs of state.18 In an organic society both craftsmen 
and statesmen need to be trained. In Plato's thought the 
interests of subjects and rulers will be one and cohesive 
14. Bosanquet, PTS, 132. 
15. Ibid., 122-123, 208. 
16 • Ibid. , 7 , 30 • 
17. Bosanquet, "Plato's Criticism of a Democracy." 
Proc. Arist. Soc., N.S., 9 (1909), 62. 
18. Ibid., 64. 
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except as "proportioned to the degree of political imperfec-
tion.n19 
A state is master of itself; at the same time it con-
trols the meaner desires of its subjects. Thus the state is 
a har.mony "in which the subjects are as willing to obey as 
20 the governors are to rule.n Essential to the very life of 
the state is morality. 
Bosanquet acknowledges Aristotelian influence in the 
eoncept of individuality . Man's true nature, according to 
Aristotle, is to be seen in his maturity. 21 A State has its 
purpose; it first is created ''for the sake of life, tt but 
later, and more truly, 11 for the sake of the good life. '•22 
What a thing ought to be therefore is embodied in the state. 
Like Plato, Aristotle saw in the state a living organism in 
23 
which there is both plurality and unity . Aristotle would 
have an ethical system made up in part of a political science, 
with justice appertaining to the state alone. 
Thus in both Plato and Aristotle Bosanquet finds his 
principle of individuality in 
a living and growing creature, in which man's 
nature expands itself from more to more, having 
its own essence progressively communicated to it.24 
19. 
20 . 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Bosanquet, PTS, 69 n . 
Plato, Rep., 432 . See 
Bosanquet, PTS, 122'f. 
Ibid . , 274 n. 
Ibid., 30; 42 ff. 
Ibid., 123. 
Bosanquet, PTS, 52 . 
See Aristotle, POL., 1:2. 
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3. Hobbes and Spinoza to Hegel. 
The doctrines of Spinoza contributed quite directly 
to Bosanquet's philosophy of individuality. In Spinoza's 
thought the Jus Naturae is identical with Potentia and 
"is for every natural object and so for man, its God-given 
rule of existence and claim to a place in the Universe." 25 
Hence Spinoza thought that man is not to be condemned but 
studied, inasmuch as the good and bad in man's nature are both 
necessary ror the state. Every human being wants a State; but 
no person can avoid responsibility for the power or efficiency 
of the state. Furtheremore, power in Spinoza's state does not 
rest wholly on a naturalistic basis; thus he can arrive at 
"an idealistic law based on reason."26 At this point Bosan-
quet can accept Spinoza against Gree~ for the latter did not 
see that the relation between might and right rests in "the 
I idealistic philosophy of the state." 27 
I A further influence on Bosanquet can be traced to 
Machiavelli through Spinoza. This is "the principle that the 
civil rule and moral laws which are binding upon a citizen in 
private life are not binding upon a State in its dealings with 
other States.tt 28 Bosanquet interprets this to mean that the 
tasks of a state and those of a person are quite different. 
25. Bosanquet, PTS, xiii. 
26. Pfannenstill, BPS, 51. 
27. Loc. cit. 
28. Bosanquet, PTS, XIV. 
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Both Machiavelli and universalistic political philosophy see 
the state as self-existent, with laws, acts and reason of its 
own. But they differ on their views of individuality. ·ia-
chiavelli teaches egoism. Bosanquet and others see the state 
uphol.ding that which is best for individuals; the state is 
. 29 
"the guardian of the whole moral world.~ 
Bosanquet sees in Rousseau a "refoundertt30 of the 
idealistic theory of the state. Plato and Aristotle are re-
vived by hDn to make strong a universalistic philosophy. lm-
portant, as will be pointed out later, is Rousseau's conception 
of individual liberty and the general will of a state. But 
questions arise for Rousseau. How are individual freedom and 
general wil.l to be reconciled? Must politics and morals be 
divorced? How can individua1ism and universalism be reconciled 
Does Rousseau sol.ve his own paradox, "that law itself must be 
created by the social spirit which it aims at creating?"31 
Rousseau's answer is in his Contrat Social. His theory ttrests 
ultimately on the idea of the supreme and final value o~ the 
32 
autonomy of the good will.u The good will of the individual 
must be kept free. To this end the State , by force if neces-
sary, is to repel force and hindrance hostile to freedom. 
29. Bosanquet, Sll, 2?8. 
30. Barker, PTST, ?0. 
31. Bosanquet, ~s, 38. 3a. Barker, PTST, ??. 
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Rousseau's earlier works reveal a pronounced individualism; 
his later and greater works stress collectivistic and univer-
salistic tendencies . 33 This latter view, which did not lose 
sight of the importance of the individual) influenced Hegel's 
political philosophy and the British I eo-He gelianism of T. H. 
Green and B. Bosanquet . 
Hegel's social ethics (Sittlichkeit) of the state 
reconciles both external law and inward m.orali ty . ~Iere con-
tract doesn't cover this for it is only concerned with property 
Regel's state has a two- fold function: 
In the first place it main.tains the individual as 
a person, and not only maintains him., but promotes 
his. welfare and protects the minor groups of family 
and social life in which he partially seeks his 
welfare: in the second place • •• •• it sustains 
personality , and it t eaches personality to transcend 
itself by g iving its devotion to something beyond 
itself . 34 · 
The state is thus looked upon as divine, and in a state of war 
as omnipotent in its individuality. After individuals go out 
from "families to the Bourgeois socie ty, the state i s required. 
I Patriotism arises as naffec tiona te loyal tyn and ffpoli tical 
insightn35 which takes form in loyalty to one's duties . 
Mind i s characteristic. of individuality in the state . Never -
theless , individua~ity is not complete. 
33 . Pfannenstill , BPS , 56-5? . 
34 . Barker , PTST , 28 . 
35 . Bosanquet, PTS , 87 . 
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The State is no work of art, it stands in the wor~d , 
that is, in the sphere of caprice, accident, and 
error; e!vil behavior is able to mar it in many 
respects. But the ug~iest human being, a crimina~, 
a sick man, or a cripple, is ~1 the same a ~iving, 
human being; the affirmative, his life, persists in 
spite of the defect, and this aff'irmative is what 
we are concerned with here.36 
In Hegel's universalism the individual's freedom and welfare 
are recognized so that identity and difference both find their 
places in the absolute. 
4. Contemporaries. 
Bosanquet saw in Mill's writings a partial view of 
individuality. Mil~ appreciated the fUmess and comp~etion 
of life~ but did not conceive of this as being nourished by 
society. 
To individuality should belong the part of life in 
which it is chiefly the individual that is inter-
ested; to society, the part which chiefly interests 
society.37 
Furthermore, an inconsistency is noted by Bosanquet in Mill 's 
phi~osophy when he draws a distinction between morality and 
~iberty. "No person," he says, "ought to be punished simply 
for being drunk; but a soldier or policeman should be punished 
for being drunk on duty. ' 38 The reason, 1~11 claims, is that 
such a case has to do with law, not liberty. BY these and 
36. Quoted by Bosanquet, PTS, 232, from Hegel 
Phi~. & Rechts, 313. 
37. uoted by Bosanquet, PI'S, 58, from Mill , 
On Liberty, ch. IV. 
38. Ibid., 59, from loc. cit. 
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similar statements Mill limits (so Bosanquet) the notion of 
individuality. 
The teacher to whom Bosanquet was most indebted, and 
to whom reference will frequently be made, is T. H. Green. 
In his Lectures on the Principle of Political Obligation39 
Green posits an eternal self-consciousness behind the state 
which communicates to the state through its citizens the idea 
of the social good. From the liberty or human consciousness 
citizens seek this good and Christian citizenship is the re-
sult. From liberty come rights, which, in turn, demand the 
state. Green builds on Kantts autonomy of the Will; of most 
value is the good will, i. e. ideal rights, or the obligation 
to observe moral duties. Green ould resolve the paradox, 
ttthe state uses force to create freedom," by thinking of de-
mocracies as founded on will and so a rule of law to be obeyed. 
A state is a "society of societies," and as such is to be ad-
justed to other states in accordance with universal brotherhood. 
ar is but an attribute of imperfect actuality, and so never 
absolutely (only relatively) right. As the state becomes more 
perfect wars should cease. Indeed all disputes, Green thinks, 
should be settled at an international court. The state's 
fUnction is negative, i. e. to make freedom possible and oppose 
39. Published during the winter of 1879-1880. 
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the will of the criminal. Positive good in the state comes 
,: 
'• from man's free will. An individual is not an atom but a mem-
I 
II 
I 
ber of society to will ideal objects common to all wills. In 
these views Bosanquet finds rich ore for his thought on in-
dividuality. 
B. The general will. 
1. Preparation. 
Hobbes and Locke prepare the way for Bosanquet's 
concept of the general will. Hobbes contends that political 
society is united in a community which "is more than consent 
or concord, it is a real unity of them all in one and the same 
person. n 40 This, Bosanquet thinks, is not a general will, but 
merely substituting "the will ••••• of a certain individual or 
certain individuals for the will of the community or moral 
41 person as such. n Hobbes thus has a verbal conception of the 
personality of the state, but not a social content for the 
general will. 
Locke views government as a trust given through the 
power of the whole community, a power which may withdraw the 
trust at will. The will of the people is here not an actual 
will and society is not a unity, an individuality. 
Bosanquet compares the theories of Hobbes and Locke 
40. ~uoted by Bosanquet, PTS, 97, from Leviathan, 
pt. II, ch. xvii. 
41. PTS, 97. 
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in a search for his o1n. 
For Hobbes ••••• political unity lies in a will which 
is actual, but not general; while for Locke it lies 
in a will which is general, but not actual. If the 
two are pressed to extremes, the former theory 
annihilates "self," and the latter annihilates 
"government." For the former there is no true 
right, because the will of the state is related 
as mere force to the actual individual will; for 
the latter there is no true right, because the 
individual's will remains a mere natural cla~, 
which is never thoroughly transformed by social 
recognition and adjustment.42 
A union of the logic of Hobbes and the political content of 
Locke give to Bosanquet the promise of a solution for the 
problem of society. This union he perceives in Rousseau. 
Rousseau clearly distinguishes between the will of 
all and the general will. Of this he says: 
There is often a great difference between the will 
of all and the general will; the former looks to 
private interest, and is nothing but a sum of 
individual wills; but take away from these same 
wills the plus, and minus, that caused one another, 
and there remains 1 as the sum of the differences, 
the general will.~3 
For Rousseau sovereignty and general will are practically 
identical, indivisible and indestructible. This g~neral will 
is right~ but individuals may evade the general will by voting 
for the private, not .the public good. But good the general 
will is in any sense for it is the extension by intelligent 
citizens of good will to the common good. 
42. Bosanquet, PTS, 98-99. 
43. Quoted by Bosanquet, ASP, 319, From Rousseau, 
Contrat Social, Book ii, ch. i, iii. 
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Bosanquet accepts Rousseau's distinction between the 
general will and the will of all, but sees in Rousseau's sug-
gested solutions some grave dangers. For instance, Rousseau, 
in order to determine the general cause growing out of public 
interest, would have all citizens vote independently and 
without communication on matters of society. This procedure, 
Bosanquet thinks, is not false, but inadequate, in that each 
question is decided by a plebiscite. Furthermore, the curbing 
of discussion of public questions would make a complicated 
legislation t'feeble or impossible." The best legislator would 
then be a sort of statistician who would turn the expression 
of public interest, i. e. general will , into a system of laws. 
Bosanquet grants that in society there is "no social 
brain other than and separate from the brain of individuals.~4 
But he finds 
it difficult to believe that the action of any 
community is a mere sum of the effects of wholly 
independent causes operating on a number of 
independent minds.45 
He is thus conscious of the pro.blem of relating the two wills 
in developing his theory of individuality. 
How does Bosanquet connect the two wills? The starting 
point he finds in hbnself. There is in an individual a unity II 
44. Bosanquet, ASP, 321. 
45. Ibid.' 319. 
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of the self toward which private good is directed. But that 
which makes possible one's own unity, e.g. language, thought, 
etc., also extends beyond the trivial, momentary, or indivi-
dual self to a common, general or universal sel~. Hence the 
good of each becomes extended to the good of all. 
Both Rousseau and Bosanquet distinguish between a judg-
ment of allness arid a universal judgment. In the former case 
a vote may be unanimous, but the motive for voting be the ex-
pected consequences to each as a private self. The decision 
46 is, in the words of Rousseau , ~a sum of particular wills.~ 
Each person is satisfied by considering no aim higher 0r beyond 
his own private good. In the case of universal jud~ent, 
however, each individual looks beyond his own to the good of · 
others. The distinguishing characteristic of the universal 
judgment is not the number of wills, but the oneness of de-
cision for the common good, for the larger individuality . 
Rousseau inconsistently holds to both the will of all and to 
the general will . Bosanquet consistently develops his view of 
individuality on the principle of the general will. 
2. Association and organization. 
A fundamental problem presents itself. How can the 
varying wi~l of a finite individual be identified with the 
46. Bosan~uet, PTS, 104. 
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general lill and not disappear? And what light will this 
throw on individuality? 
Given a multitude of persons , two connections are 
possible, viz . a ssociation and organization . 
Association differs from society in that the former 
ttimplies the intentional coming together of units which have 
been separate , and which may become separate again, tt47 whereas 
society is applied to a ttnatural grouping which •• ••• we do not 
normally think of as purposely put together and liable to be 
48 
dissolved again . " 
Association also applies to elements of mind so that 
the presence of one implies the other . However , the elements 
of mind in association are not essential to each other, and 
if these elements are separated no serious results follow. 
Association, however , is not so simple . nEvery associ-
ation, hether of comrades or of ideas , is a connection between 
qualities, and there is a general connection bet~een natures 
of the related terms . • 49 
At best, Bosanquet thinks, such association is casual 
and largely determined by chance . The connection is between 
units hich are not essentially changed by association . The 11 
effect of units upon units is momentary . If a crowd acts as 
4? . Bosanquet, PTS, 14? . 
48 . Loc. cit . 
49. Ibid . , 148 . 
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one body, consciousness and will are low-grade. Intelligent 
united effort is not possible because there is no general will. 
Another and truer type of connection between indivi-
duals and society is organization in which the whole is depen-
dent upon the nature of every unit. For instance, an ar.my is 
a whole in which units are not much influenced by neighbors; 
the generalts plan regulates the movements of the whole. 
By organization then, as opposed to association, 
we mean determination of particulars by the scheme 
or general nature of a systematic group to which 
they belong, as opposed to their determination by 
immediate links uniting them with what, relatively 
speaking, are other5Barticulars in casual juxta-position with them. 
In the mind, also, organization is higher than asso~ 
ciation. Inasmuch as every idea has countless connections, 
it can tend in as many directions. A "universe of discourse~ 
prescribes a direction in which ideas will be guided. This 
direction develops into a dominant intellectual system. One 
51 
can thus say that "selection ••••• is at the same time creationtt 
in new surroundings. The new experience is thought or deeds 
never before produced. Each new thought or deed 'tis a uni-
versal tendency, a scheme partly defined, and in process of 
further defining itself by moulding the material presented to 
it.n52 Basic principles of individuality are thus found in 
50. Bosanquet, PTS, 151. 
51. Ibid.' 154. 
52. Loe. cit. 
~he organization of individual minds orking with one 
53 in a group and creating a life for each and all. 
c. Liberty . 
1. The nature of liberty. 
Liberty, Bosan~uet asserts, is "the condition of 
individuality. 54 .when in self-government, the self and 
others are opposed, liberty is negative and individuals are 
abstract. hen 
the average individual ••• sees, or thinks he sees, 
nothing in life but his own private interests and 
runusements, - this average individual is no 5onger 
accepted as the real self or individuality.5 
' The experience of liberty is an affirmation or assertion of 
a larger whole than a finite individual and so makes 
I 
II a transition from the private self into the great communion 
56 
of reality." This is a:. feeling of the distinctiveness of 
individuality wherein a self is conscious of itself, its re-
11 lation to others, and even its opposition to others. In free-
dom are connections to ever higher wholes wherein external 
influences are included and assimilated. 
II Free selves are like the different parts in a machine, 
each contributory to the whole. "It is in the difference 
53. ~osanQuet, ASP, 325. 
54. Bosanquet, PTS, 116 . 
55. Ibid., 117. 
56. Ibid. , 118 
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which contrihutes to the whole that the sel~ feels itself at 
home and possesses its individuality." 57 The real self, i. e. 
individuality, is greater than any private achievement, and 
individuals are conscious of reality only to the degree in 
which they identify themselves with a larger whole. 
More specifically, how is this conception of indivi-
duality related to liberty? ~iberty ••••• is the condition of 
58 
our being ourselves." But the condition of selfhood, of 
individuality, of our being ourselves, cannot be static. 
It must be a condition relevant to our continued 
struggle to assert the control of something in us, 
which le recognize as imperative upon us or as our 
real self, but which we only obey in very imperfect 
degree.59 
This imperative ithin man's nature is forcing hDa to be free. 
He strives for logical coherence and unity. Dnpelling a man 
to transcend himself for a higher unity, liberty causes one 
"to be made and won. n 60 Hence citizens may bow before law 
and order and thereby assert their true selves, even though 
the private restraints are painful and resented. Inasmuch as 
this system of force or governoent is an affirmation by re-
bellious and imperfect selves of what ought to be, it is self-
government. By this system Bosanquet means that people govern 
themselves, not by being subject to all others, but by 
I --~----~~~~-5?. Bosanquet, PTS, 118. 
58. Loc. cit. 
59. Loc. cit. 
60. Bosanquet, PIV, 338. 
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all of us as casual private units , being subject 
to an order which expresses, up to a certain point, 
the rational self or will which, as rational beings, 
we may be assumed to recognize as imperative.61 
In a living society man grows as he receives from the society 
a progressive communication of itself. The whole of nature 
enriches the parts as does society the private selves which 
compose it . , Freedom cannot be fully possessed until selves 
have matured , i. e. have become the best they can become. The 
central principle of liberty is determinateness which is 
II "fullest in the Absolute and in God." 62 Thus in the finite 
self which cannot stand alone,»63 and in the higher freedom 
which sees life as a whole the conditions of individuality are 
I) 
II 
II 
found in Bosanquet's view of liberty. 
2. Individuality in the historic 
ideas of freedom. 
The notion of individuality may be seen in the histo-
ric ideas of freedom. Freedom had its source in the status 
of freemen who had no restraint and needed no government . 
This is an inadequate conception of liberty, Bosanquet thinks. 
A more advanced conception is that of citizens' rights in 
political liberty by which is meant 
61. Bosanquet, PTS, 119. 
62. Bosanquet, PIV, 342. 
63. Bosanquet, PTS, 236. 
II 
64 
a certain determinate security for the positive 
exercise of activities affecting the welfare of 
the social whole, and some such security is always 
understood to be involved in the notion of political 
liberty.64 
This view is nearer Bosanquet's definition of individuality. 
But neither juristic nor political liberty can be secure "un-
less that system is moulded by the whole compass of individu-
65 
ality which society contains." 
Nature, as conceived by Plato and Aristotle, supports 
Bosanquet's theory of liberty. For them, nature involves 
maturity, i.e. "what we are born ·for, our true, or real, or 
complete nature.n 66 On the basis of this view liberty is not 
restraint through any form of force, actual or threatened, or 
even the removal of restraint. The self by nature is both 
free and unfree. To yield to a will within us which we disown 
is to be a slave; to conquer this disowned will is to be a 
freeman. "When the mind does what, as a whole, it wills, 
as Plato implies, it feels free." 67 Thus the conditions of 
fulfilled in Greek conceptions of liberty. I individuality are 
,, 
I 3. The ideal of liberty. 
I The ideal of liberty is this: "The free will is the 
will that wills itselr.n68 But a distinction must be made 
64. Bosanquet, PTS, 127. 
65. Ibid., 128. 
66. Ibid., 122. 
67. Ibid., 132. See Republic, ix, 577E. 
68. Ibid., 136. 
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between the real and the actual will. The former is an indi-
vidual's true or whole self; the latter is made up of feelings 
or thoughts antagonistic or indifferent to the real selr. 69 
Freedom is found in the continuity from the actual to the real 
self in the organized life of the absolute. 70 Bosanquet's 
explanation of this view of liberty is in terms of individu-
ality: 
We always want what we will, but what we will 
is not always what would satisfy our want. 
A will that willed itself would be a will that 
in willing had before it an object that would 
satis~! its whole want, and nothing but its 
want. 
The will to liberty must attempt to adjust the frag-
ments of our rational being to the whole of reality. ill is 
not purely voluntaristic, i.e. "the blind underlying impulse 
of all change, life and action.'t?2 Rather, will must have 
thought for a systematic whole and for self-determination. 
This leads to a logical whole as na conclusion to premises." 73 
74 Furthermore, the logic of liberty is rooted in love, is 
75 
constructive, and is a social imperative or constraint which 
"furthers our self-determination to a higher whole.u 76 
69. Bosanquet, PTS, 137; Pfannenstill, BPS, 210. 
70. As against Bussey, "Dr. Bosanquet's Doctrine of 
Freedon," Proc. Arist. Soc., 16, N.s. (1916}. 
?1. Bosanquet, PTS, 136. 
72. Bosanquet, VDI, 123. 
73. Bosanquet, PIV, 335. 
?4. Ibid.' 341~ 
?5. Bosanquet, CC, 76. 
76. Pfannenstill, BPS, 209. 
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How does this will to_ liberty apply to a concrete 
situation? If we take sensual passion, as an example, the 
momentary impulse can give no abiding satisfaction. The 
passion points to needs outside the immediate experience of 
the self. In family life the sex impulse becomes 
both disciplined and expanded. The object 
presented to the will is transformed in 
character. Lawlessness is excluded; but, 
in place of a passing pleasure, a whole orld of 
affections and interests, extending beyond the 
individual life, is offered as a purpose and 
a stimulus to the self.?? 
Herein is family ~ife at its best. 
Thus man as a rational being finds in his nature a 
claim upon him of a real or rational will. herever man sees 
institutions in which he finds "on the whole, the conditions 
essential to affirming such a ill, in objects of action such 
as to constitute a tolerably complete life,"78 the claim is 
upon him to be loyal and obedient in the exercise of his 
\ liberty. Thereby man fulfills the conditions of individuality. 
4. The real will and the state. 
That the real or rational Will is the state, has been 
the prevailing theory since Rousseau. The state, according to 
this theory, has the same relationship to individuals and 
??. Bosanquet, PTS, 138. 
?8. Ibid., 139. 
6? 
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groups as the family to ~an's impulses. 
By its help, we find at once discipline and 
expansion, the transfiguration of partial 
impulses, and something to do and care for, 
such as the nature of a human self demands.79 
The state conceived as real will embodies all the institutions 
of the state, e.g. family, church, factory, university, as 
living structures giving to and receiving ai~ from the state. 
The State •••.• is thus conceived as the operative 
critic ism of all institutions - the. modification 
and adjustment by which they are capable of 
playing a rational part in the object of human 
will ••• The State ••••• is, above all "l things, not 
a number of persons, but a working conception 
of life.80 
The state is thus an individua~ity. But the real will of the 
state is not the whole of individuality inasmuch as all the 
capacities and purposes of human beings must be included in 
the complete embodiment of real will. 81 
How can the state exercise force and at the same time 
fulfil the condition of liberty in individuality? Through 
force the state criticizes and adjusts its institutions. 
This it can do as the instrument of the minds of citizens 
extended beyond the consciousness of any individual or group 
of individuals. 
79. Bosanquet, PTS, 140. 
80. Ibid., 140-141. 
81. Ibid., 141. 
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Not only is the conduct of life as a whole 
beyond the powers of the average individual 
at its average level, but it is beyond the 
powers of all the average individuals in a 82 society taken together at their average level. 
The real will of the state is, then, not the daily average of 
individuals with their limited range of consciousness; it is 
the whole body of citizens adding to their own rational insight 
"the laws, customs, writings , and institutions devised by the 
83 
ages." Thus each individual unit fin ds a greater self, 
the state, transcending and reinforcing the limitations of 
individuals, while at the smne time it is enriched by them. 
Of this real will, this concrete universal, this individuality, 
the finite mind at its best approves. 
D. Individuality in the state. 
1. The state as organism. 
The state, for Bosanquet, is an organism. It is a 
powerful, intimate concrete "type of corporate be1ng,n84 
It is a *union of the universal purpose with the particular 
85 interest of mankind,tt and nincarnates the general will . 
10re specifically, Bosanquet describes "the organism of the 
State, i.e. in as far as we feel and think as citizens, 
feeling becomes affectionate loyalty, and explicit conscious-
82. Bosanquet, PTS, 142. 
83. Loc. cit. 
84. Bosanquet , Sll, 295. 
85. Bosanquet, PTS, 261. 
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ness becomes political insight." The great power of a state 
comes from an ~immense orbit of its elements" in which family 
and individual interests are intensified. 87 There is an 
88 
"executive organ" in which the community spirit comes to 
consciousness. In this fuller type of consciousness than is 
possible in individuals there is both identity and difference. 
Individuals are limited and isolated in many 
ays. But their true individuality does not lie 
in their isolation, but in that distinctive act 
or service hy hich they Dass into unique contri-
butions to the universal.89 
Unless revolution is pressing the state as a social system 
represents the general will and higher self 
as a whole and can only stand by virtue of that 
representation being recognized.90 
The state may thus be called a whole or individuality, in 
which the relations of individuals and individuality are 
organic. 
2. Purpose and function. 
The state has for its ultimate goal the same as that 
of the individual, i.e. "the realisation of the best life," 91 
92 
of life embodying supreme values.n Through its ~orking 
conception of life"93 every citizen is to be aided in perfor.m-
86. Bosanquet, PTS, 26.2 . 
87. Ibid., 261. 
88. Bosanquet, Sll, 307. 
89. Boaanquet, PTS, 170. 
90. Ibid., 186. 
91. Ibid., 169. 
92. Bosanquet, Sll, 311. 
93. Ibid.' 14l. 
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ing his function. Inasmuch as the state is a unit, yet made 
up of a plurality of units, the state must fulfil the function 
of an absolute as "ultimate Arbiter and regulator of claDlis~94 
and the lawful use of force. The state can appeal to the will 
by intelligence and persuasion, but this is not the distinct-
ive power or purpose. The coercive power of the state deals 
with the external world only to make freedom workable. The 
legislation of a state is an instrument to larger liberty 
through providing hindrance to hindrances. 
The State is in its right when it forcibly 
hinders a hindrance to the best life of 
cosmic good. In hindering such hindrances 
it will indeed do positive acts.95 
Indeed each person has some degree of "rebellion, indolence, 
96 incompetence or ignorance" in his nature, and it is the 
state's function to restrain in order to liberate the human 
spirit. 
Two essential functions of wholeness or individuality, 
97 
as in a state, are comprehensiveness and rationality. As 
society develops into the state, comprehensiveness develops 
and with it a wider ttrange of possible actions presented to 
the individual for his choice. tt 98 Liberty is thus increased. 
94. Bosanquet, PTS, 174-175. See also ibid., 172, 18?. 
95. Ibid.' 1?8. 
96. Ibid. , 18?. 1', 9?. Bosanquet, CC, 368 ff. 
98. Ibid., 368. I 
But with the larger life are larger restrictions which 
are simply conditions and results of immense 
extensions of life, ~ense e~~argements of 
the range of possible action. 
Thus state legislation supports liberty by its restrictions. 
A second function of wholeness is rationality, and this on 
the part of individuals who in free· discussion and the for-
mation of their owm .opinions adapt their conduc.t "to the 
particular definite shape and balance of civilized life, so 
as to support it, and not interfere with 1t.n100 Through 
this principle of rationality the state learns by experience 
the needs and functions of the whole , e.g. educational system, 
state church, factory acts, taxation. Every honest judgment 
made which concerns one's relation to his neighbor aids the 
state. In fact every person with physical and intellectual 
101 powers is an agent of the state. 
e thus see that the purpose and function of a state 
are grounded in the concrete universality of its nature. 
3. Limitations. 
The state has its limitations as a concrete universal. 
First of all, the state feels its inadequacy in using for ce 
as a means in dealing with the end of virtue and character. 
99. Bosan~uet, CC, 3?0. 
100. Ibid., 3?4-375. 
101. Ibid., 380-381. 
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It 
is unable to determine that the action shall 
be done from the ground or motive which alone 
would give it immediate value or durab±02cer-tainty as an element in the best life. 
The real question for the state is this: nrs the proposed 
measure bona fide confined to hindering a hindrance, or is it 
attempting direct promotion of the common good by force?n 103 
The state can thus never properly attempt to deal with the 
higher type of action, i.e. ttintelligent volition" which lies 
in individual wills. No coercion by the state is t herefore 
justifiable unless "it liberates resources of character and 
intelligence'' or opens "new possibilities to self-conscious 
104 development.n 
4. Claims and obligations. 
Claims are related to obligatio~.and both claims and 
obligations to the state as individuality. Claims (or rights) 
are really "the organic whole of t he outward conditions neces-
sary to the rational life,n or "that which is real.l.y necessary 
to the maintenance of material conditions essential to the 
t d f ti f h l ·t "105 Th exis ence an per ec on o urnan persona 1 y. e 
ground of c~aims is in a universal purpose to develop the best 
in human capacities. Claims are thus the claims of tta common 
102. Bosanquet, PTS, 176. 
103. Ibid., 178. 
104. Ibid., 180. 
105. ~uoted by Bosanquet, PTS, 189, from Krause and 
Henrici, cit. by Green, PPO, 35. 
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go d 11,106 " h 1 o upon ••••• a as a w o e State-maintained order" 
is recognized, "in its connectedness as a @ingle expression 
of a common goo~ or will, in so far as such a good can find 
107 
utterance in a system of external acts and habits." 
"Obligations" is a twin brother of "claims." Both 
are conceived in the womb of individuality, and each comes 
forth grasping the heel of the other. The feeling of obli-
gation has its source 
in the fact that the logic of the whole is operative 
in every part, and consequently that every part has 
a reality which goes beyond its ·average self, and 
identifies it wi"th the whole, making demands upon 
it in doing so. 08 
Rebellion against the state is a right only when it is an ob-
ligation to correct a defect in the state which stands radi-
cally in need of correction in view of the whole value. 
5. Rewards and punisrunents. 
Bosanquet provides a place for rewards and punishments 
in his principle of individuality. To justify their existence 
rewards and punishments must increase the goodness of persons. 
Bosanquet sees no place for disciplinary punishment when the 
state adopts the principle of forcible improvement of an in-
dividual without his consent. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
Bosanquet, PTS, 201. 
Ibid., 189. 
Ibid., 195-196. 
See also ibid., 195. 
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There is no 
an offender 
shares, and 
an offender 
his hostile 
true punishment except where one is 
against a system of rights which he 
therefore against himself. And such 
has a right to the recognition of 
will .l09 
Such a recognition of rights by a person is a sharing of indi-
viduality. 
In retributive punishment by the state a guilty person 
is realizing his true will. 
Compulsion through punishment and the fear of it, 
though primarily acting on the lower self, does 
tend, when the conditions of true punishment exist 
(i.e. the reaction of a system of rights violated 
by one who shares in it), to a recognition of the 
end by the person punished, and may so far be re-
garded as his own will, implied in the maintenance 
of a system to which he is a1~5rty, returning upon himself in the form of pain. 
This view of re·tributi ve punishment is consistent with the 
organic view of the state as a concrete universal. 
The highest form of punishment by the state is deter-
rent or preventative punishment in whioh the rights of citizens 
are protected. This form of punishment, as well as discipli-
nary and retributive punishment, is to maintain "the system 
of rights instrumental to the fullest life.nill 
Rewards have little place in Bosanquet's theory of 
individuality. Inasmuch as his system depends on the good will 
of intelligent citizens, and the good will is its own reward, 
109. Bosanquet, PTS, 20?. 
110. Ibid., 211. 
111. Ibid., 216. 
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rewards shou~d tend to disappear in the achievement of the 
good life. 
6. Patriotism and individuality. 
Bosanquet examines three views of patriotism in order 
to relate it to his system of individuality. First, he finds 
in Regel 's theory of the state •~"not the machine of government, 
but a~l that fulfils in the actual community the individual's 
112 
mind and i~l.~ In the state man finds elements which 
unite him with others. Your country thus expresses 
the whole form of ~ife for which you stand, and 
therefore, within that, your moral attitude to 
humanity and the world in general.ll3 
In each country the general will is the will of the "body, 
mind, and sentiment"114 of all the people of the state. hen 
the general wi~ls of states conflict there is no universal 
mind to which appeal can be made. ttRight is might, n and the 
first duty of a nation is to be efficient in arms, for war is 
the only arbiter. Each state is separate and absolute , 
responsible for all choices, and "at every atep ••• is making 
115 
a new world ." Loyalty given to such a state is grounded 
on contingency and accident. 
second theory of patriotism is that in which "supreme 
116 
values within its (the state's) own good" are lost. Reason, 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
116. 
Bosanquet, IC, 135. 
Ibid., 154. 
Ibid., 135. 
Ibid., 138. 
Ibid., 145. 
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in this case, has fai~ed to provide for a general will which 
functions for the good of a~l . The result is a desire for 
military supremacy to be used in the promotion of national 
interests. 
third view of patriotism is that of the state as in-
dividuality. According to this theory the state functions for 
the good of all, and all for the good of the state. ars can 
then arise only because of internal disorganization within the 
state. Distractions at home lead to external conflicts . 
" ars belong to a state, then, ultimately, not in so far as 
it is a state, but in so far as it is not a state ."117 The 
road to peace is to ''seek ••• first the Kingdom of God and His 
118 
righteousness." True patriotism is love of the intrinsic 
II values of life, e. g . beauty, truth, by which the common life 
of a people is purged and unified. If the state has a just 
sense of life's values it will unite the citizens wi th all 
mankind. Real patriotism is daily loyalty to the commonwealth, 
and through it service to humanity. 119 
11 Bosan~uet dares to hope for the creation of "a genuine 
120 international moral world ." Through such a super-national 
consciousness may be developed a general will freed from re-
sentment and united harmoniously in aims and methods . Looking 
11 -----:::1:-::1-=7:-.-;::-B-o san que t , I C , 145 • 
. , 118. Q,uoted by Bosanquet, SII, 312, from Hatt. 6:33. 
119. Bosanquet, SII, 12, 15. 
120. Bosanquet, IC, 150. 
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beyond the strife and hatred of the world war he hopes for a 
society of nations in which German intellect, ethical teach-
I 
ing , and national possibility shall not be humiliated. This 1' 
magnanimity is consistent with his philosophy of individuality. l 
So, too, is his summons to the British nation to examine itself 
for war guilt because of violations of its best criteria of 
values. Concluding an address on rtpatriotism in the Perfect 
State," Bosanquet describes the individuality that cannot be 
:1 limi ted by nationalism: 
\! 
The patriotism we have attempted to portray implies 
and demands that we should desire for our country, 
not a triumph of vanity and self-interest, but a ,I 
share in such a solid work of organization as shall 
be most favourable to the performance of a true 
state's function in every community of Europe. 
Thus alone can we deserve well of our country, and 
our country of the world.121 
E. Institutions as ethical ideas. 
Bosanquet sees in social institutions an incarnation 
of his principle of individuality. 
Institutions represent more or less permanently the 
meetLng points of experiences and purposes of individual 
minds in the social whole. Barker, commenting on Bosanquet 
at this point, says: 
All the institutions of a country, so far as they are 
effective,are not only products of thought and crea-
tions of mind; they~ thought, and they~ mind. 
Otherwise we have a building without a tenant, and 
a body without a mind. 22 
IZI. Bosanquet, IC, 154. 
122. Barker, PTST, 74. 
78 
So Parliament, a Trade Union, Oxford University have individu-
ality. Each is greater than the sum of its members . Its 
mind is a group-mind, with a distinctive quality. ~It takes 
123 
the whole world to call out the whole mind ." 
The monogamous family is "a natural union of feeling 
1
,1 124 with ideal purpose." It is founded on "a universal animal 
f t "125 ac , 126 and "has a hold like no other upon the \"lhole man . " 
Broad interests make for unity and permanence. Every family 
meal is a sacrament. ~ithal , 
the natural ethics of the family have an indis-
pensable logical hold upon the more e!~~icit 
common good known to the social will. 
Especially does the true family have the function of equip-
ping and training human beings for participation in the af-
fairs of the state or world. Mor~over, the institution is 
characterized by reciprocal interest. Civilization is not 
conceivable without the family. Its members are indispensable 
for society, and uniquely contribute to it. On the other hand, 
each member of the family group, and the group itself, needs 
128 the protection and aid of the larger whole, e.g. state. 
,, 
II Or take property. Its institutional nature, if ethical, 
must be conceived in terms of individuality in which a connect-
II-~ 123. Bosanquet, PTS, a??. 
I 
124. Ibid., 279. 
125. Ibid., 283. 
126. Ibid., 2?9. 
12?. Ibid., 280. 
128. Ibid., 2?9, 280. 
?9 
I 
ed system "binds together the necessary care for food and 
clothing with ideas of making the most of our life and of the 
129 
lives dependent upon us." In households the burden may rest 
on a single individualized will or on a group of mature per-
sons. Furthermore, Bosanquet contends that industry cannot 
I be built on grabbing and cheating; in its place should be 
"creative management," in which property is "a means of expres-
II 
II 
130 I 
sian of the will." And in order to have the group mind ef- 1 
fective in industry Bosanquet advocates a strong representation 
131 
of labor in management. 
Charity is folly, says Bosanquet, if lives are not 
built up by it. PreYention of the need through self-help is 
more essential than remedial methods. Thrifty and sober 
people are the product of education; so are the spendthrifts 
and drunkards. To make men dependent is a hopeless social 
process. For people ttto depend upon the government as a child 
132 
upon an indulgent parent" is social waywardness. Each case 
of need is different; whatever else happens, family ties should 
be strengthened. Vital to the administration of charity 1s an 
orderly and friendly organization which unites rich and poor. 
Better it is to make one family self-supporting than to scatter 
help; to do this, concerted action is needed, and that in ac-
11 ----=-~-=--129. Bosanquet, PTS, 282. d 
I 1 130. Bosanquet, SII, 222, 224. I 131. Ibid., 239. 
I 132. Bosanquet, In Darkest England, 38. 
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cordance with tta plan based upon respect for character, tt or 
11 "faith in that ideal which is the essence and controlling 
133 force of the real." Indeed Paul had the proper view o'f 
charity when he saw it living and organized as Plato saw the 
11 living community. 
A higher unity of l~fe than that of the family is the 
district or potential neighborhood. Neighbors come and go 
and one is compelled "to take up some mental attitude towards 
134 
them.'t This is organic. Furthermore, a nest of concentric 
common interests surround each district, and, 
all these are moral and physical needs, which, like 
our household necessities, draw us out of ourselves 
as cases of a larger mind.l35 
Each locality is thus a body with a mind hich pictures the ll 
world as a neighborhood. "All ~he necessary elements~ of socia~ 
'I 
II 
living enter into each district, which , in turn, becomes "a II 
microcosm of humanity,nl36 in which close human relations call 
for charity and courtesy. To disregard ethical purpose in these 
close physical contacts is to take away from the neighborhood 
13? 
vitality, strength, and beauty. In the intimacy of indi-
viduals in a neighborhood where people walk by sight, universal 
law and representative good are impossible. Nevertheless the 
neighbors give flesh and blood to the organism of modern nations 
133. Bosanquet, BSP, 250, 249. 
134. Bosanquet, PTS, 283. 
135. Ibid., 285. 
136. Ibid., 286. 
137. Ibid., 28?. 
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A person's class is the group in which he is called 
distinctively to serve humanity. The class takes one beyond 
the family and district and de·eper into one's real self. In 
the class, individual service becomes the social mind and 
138 
thus ttapproaches very near the centre of one's ind.i viduali ty. n 
In the uniqueness of service there is present in a modified 
fonn the consciousness of the whole of society. Through his 
service each individual becomes a term of connection in the 
social system; to fail in this connection is evil. One is 
trained by society for distinctive functions; to use this 
training in service is to incarnate a social idea. The logic 
of the social whole demands tt-the highest degree of indi vidu-
139 
ality and specialization" which one is qualified to fill. 
All of life is thus the reciprocity of unique services. 
The individual •• is unique, or belongs to a unique 
class, not as an atom, but as a case of a law, or 
term of a connection. This is what is meant by 
individuality in the true sense; the character of a 
unit which has a great deal that , being his very self, 
cannot be divided from him; not one which has so 
little that there is nothing by subtraction of which 
he can be imagined less. Such individuality is in a 
sense the whole ethical idea, but more particularly 
is embodied in the idea of a vocation.l40 
138. Bosanquet, PTS, 291. 
139. Ibid., 292. 
140. Ibid., 292-293. 
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F. Social idealism. 
1. Bases for social idealism. 
hat does Bosanquet mean by an ideal? It is "a per-
i 
faction which includes imperfection."141 Ideals make people 
142 become alive; everything speaks. Somehow mind is to tri-
umph; herein is found Bosanquet•s view of idealism. "It is 
143 to achieve the best we can think, to make a new world. It 
Optimism for society means the best possible world; the belief, 
however, must have the courage to face the problems of life 
with faith that the good will prevail. The universe is indeed 
a vale of soul-making wherein values are appreciated and main-
tained.144 Pessimism shares with optimism the appreciation of 
values, but inclines to see the worst. The true idealist com-
bines reason and love 
in the yearning for completeness, for the escape 
from contradiction; the longing to find something 
which aci~gves or expresses the consummation 
we want. 
dealism, in Bosanquet, is never appropriately called "pure" 
or 'tlofty,'t but ttthorough" (i.e. inclusive) and "comprehensive" 
(i,e~ understanding); the basis of distinction is that ideal-
i~ is organic in its view of reality, and never seeks escape 
146 from it. 
141. Bosanquet, SII, 105. 
142. Ibid., 88. 
143. Ibid., 85. 
144. Ibid., 48, 89, 50. 
145. Ibid., 91. 
146. Ibid., 90, 88. 
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The ideal is not made up of words ; it is 
made up of lives. It is the single spirit 
in them which outlives the perishing in-
dividuals .14? 
Furthermore, idealism must face the problem of evil. Bosan-
quet's view is that evil can be neither sustained nor ignored 
by idealism. Evil must be included in the ideal "but •••••. by 
148 
transmutation." For instance, purity is founded on an indi-
vidual's strength, but adapted to his weakness in actual 
temptation. 149 
Social ideals are present as a set of values for 
society. These values are good and practicable guides for 
150 human living if understood and coeperated with . Finite 
selves have their own lives, bodily and spiritual, to be 
! sacrificed and surrendered for these values. Only by this 
relationship to values can true satisfaction come to a person, 
providing also that the "management" springs "directly or in-
151 directly, from himself." Society really wants justice sa tis-
fied and public welfare guaranteed through individual effi-
152 
ciency. Labor is instinctively conscious that "their 
creative activity •••• their vigour and intuition alone can 
14?. Bosanquet, SII, 108. 
148. Ibid., 100. 
149. Ib~d., 102. 
150. Ibid., 245. 
151. Ibid., 205. 
152. Ibid., 229. 
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t . t n153 0 1 f t ti regenera e soc1e y. n y rus ra on can come from strong 
demands on others and paltry sharing with others. 154 Inequality; 
which for Bosanquet is the deprivation of individuals of self-
government , can never be an instrument for the best life of 
men. Only self-management makes for social progress which is 
the whole solid world of life, breaking out into 
bud and branches at every point, and including 155 
while transforming the growths of previous years . 
Bosanquet sees new creations emerging everywhere in the social 
process as a result of ineradicable values in the social con-
sciousness. 
To what extent, then, may a community or state be 
called individuality? Persons are defective in individuality. 
No one 
I of the 
human being can "be inspired by the whole living system 
156 
communal mind . u Supreme values are attained in a 
state which exercises freedom in molding itself. Imposed 
upon persons are the purposes and standards of the group to 
which they belong; shared by individuals are the dangers and 
hopes of the group . This is individuality. And this indivi-
duality increases as individuals become more and more identi-
157 fied with the completeness of the communal mind, while at 
the same time maintaining their distinctness in the social 
153. B~sanquet, SII , 194. 
154. Ibid., 192. 
155. Ibid., 244. 
156. Ibid., 289. 
15? • Ib i d • , 281. 
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, whole. So conceived, individua~ity in society is not perfect. 
~ II "But it is the best v,re have, and infinitely more to be trusted 
than the theory of any individual." 158 
2. Organiza tion as a living whole. 
Social organization, Bosanquet contends, is a living 
thing . For example, take charity. Does organization kill it? 
11 ~as the critic right who said t hat Paul should have added 
another verse to I . Cor. 13, and said, "Charity cannot be or-
11 ganizedrt? Bosanquet 's answer is that without organization 
charity is dead . Central to cha rity or ganiza tion 
I 
I~ 
is the complete organic point of view, which 
labours to promote new growths and responses 
of mind, backed by adequate institutions such 
that the rough emergencies will be dealt with 
and transformed by a new attentiveness and sensr 
of responsibility on the part of all concerned. 59 
Anything that is not organized must be more 
brute than the brutest matter.l60 
11 persons of good will , Bosanquet hopes, will ork out 
together life's complete ideal. To the degree in hich society 
becomes an organization embodying this ideal in a living wh ole 
it is an individuality. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
Bosanquet, II, 15?. 
Ibid., 146. 
Ibid., Q6. 
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3 . orld states as individuality • 
. I Bosanq_uet sees individuality in a system of states . 
I 
Individual states are to make possible the fullest develop-
ment of all persons in the territory allotted to it by his-
161 
tory . But for the best Life co8peration is needed, and this 
not for material things alone . Peace and rich q_uality of life 
would be found in such a system wnere each state organized its 
162 
own work and recognized its own relations with other states . 
A general will can only come from '"a high degree of common 
163 
experience, tradition, and aspiration . " A world so ar ganizea 
would be individuality . A par t ial approach to a world state 
would be na system of nation-states or comrn.onwealths • •• • each 
internally well- organized . rt164 Certainly devotion to individu-
ality as a kind of best life is not devotion to a crowd , but 
to a quality of life . Hence , until the organism of the world 
is actual , the best values of life can be better served by 
loyalty to the highest communities than by devotion to world 
states . At present humanity is not a concrete universal or 
individuality for it is not an organism with necessary connec-
tions . 165 
161 . Bosanq_uet, ''Function of the State in Promoting 
the Unity of IJiankind,n: Proc . Arist . Soc ., 
l? (1916 - 1917) , 38 . 
1.62 . Bosanq_uet , SIT , 296. 
163 . Proc . Arist . Soc ., l? , N. S., (1.91?}, 50 . 
See note 161 . 
1.64 . Ibid., 51. . 
165 . Bosanq_uet , II , 288, 291 . 
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V. INDIVIDUALITY AND RELIGION . 
A. F'in1 te mind. 
1. The soul of self. 
Bosanquet had a two- fold view of the finite self. 
On the one hand the soul is crystallized out of ~the col~ective 
soul of nature or society" and so is infinite in that in the 
soul is "the nisus towards absolute unity and self-completion.~ 
In the soul externality is concentrated as a ttfragment of the 
2 absolute.~ On the other hand, the soul shapes itse~f by being 
free and creative. It seeks to "work out its nisus to the 
vvhole, n and to struggle "towards self-consistency and self-
realization. tt3 In the self is an ~impulsen to individuality 
4 
or the whole . Finite selves are thus tt-fragments of a vast 
continuum" in individuality5 and so are inspired toward :per-
fection. 
A finite self is not an illusion. Each self is a 
reality which the whole has conditioned, and through which it 
works . Finiteness is thus essential for infinity yet it 
cannot be coherent apart from the whole or individuality. 6 
1. Bosanq_uet , VDI, 1, 4 . 
2. Ibid., 4. 
3. Ibid.) 6. 
4. Ibid . , 7. 
5. Ibid., 11, and see 12. 
6. Ibid. ' 14. 
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a. Shaped by the universe. 
~hat does Bosanquet mean by the 'tvale of soul-making?tt 
Finite souls , though imperfect and not necessarily similar, 
are nevertheless "elements in self-expression in \'lhich the 
' Absolute consists, tt and through Vlhich the absolute affirms 
itself. 7 The individuality of the whole nfalls outside our 
actual experienced being. tt8 
II 
Two processes of soul -~aking are at work , the life of 
nature and a society of minds . 
Natual se~ection develops a partial individuality. 
Herein lies a ttsculpturing process" whereby the whole shapes 
the part. The result is a "true organism of experience" which 
is capable of adaptation to all situations ! Individuality can 
only arise from living being ~if it is capable of responding 
and reacting to a world of surroundings, and, by accepting 
correction from it, of adjusting itself to that vorld's re-
quirement . 9 A finite living being is more sensitive in a 
concrete universal than is nature and so able to adapt, unify, 
and differentiate externality. Thus the circumference of 
a living being is the whole .rorld where in no arrest or ad-
vance of the finite life can be its private concern. 10 The 
7. BosanQuet , VDI, 67. 
8. Ibid., 68. See Ch. III for definitions of 
indi vi duality . 
9. Ibid., 73. 
10. Ibid., 74. 
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process of soul-making begi ns with life which is: 
a self-maintaining system, consistent and coherent 
in the main when taken together with the environment 
to whi ch it is adapted, and whi ch, taking present and 
past as a single system, has di ctated its form.ll 
Life through natural selection is, according to Bosanquet, 
a partial individuality, n 12 or rtrela ti ve individuality .'~13 
By rejecting whatever is out of harmony with self-maintenance, 
life, as an early finite existence, tends to be non-contradic-
tory which ""is the principle of individuality. tt14 
11 Finite souls are founded in ttthe gradual concentration 
of forms of sensitiveness in a living being.n15 Intelligent 
centres parallel to centres of life are formed. An omni-
11 potential principle of life and mind is seen as "an active 
16 principle or totality."' By this process of individuality, 
I 
1 organs or an organism may be restored to its accustomed normal 
development. 
Panpsychism. 
I Panpsychism is the theory that "soul is the essen~e 
I of all existing things,"17 that plants, animals, and even the 
smallest bits of matter have souls or psychical quality. 
vith this view Bosanquet is not in entire agreement. In his 
11. Bosanquet, VDI, ?6. 
12. Ibid., ?5. 
13. Ibid., ?6. 
14. Loc. cit. 
15. Loc. cit. 
16. Ibid., ?8. 
1?. Knudson, PP, 224. 
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thought panpsychism is not enough to account for souls, for it 
is an abstract and not a concrete view . It fails to see pur-
pose everywhere as a concrete universal . Bosanquet thinks of 
panpsychistic monadism as based on kinship ithout inter-
relation . In contrast to panpsychism Bosanquet regards mind 
and nature as complementary to each other . In this principle 
of concretion mind shapes externality and maintains identity 
in difference . Lower animals are then but half-way houses to 
. . 18 ind1vidual1ty . In conscious beings the mind is at work in 
11 nature as is impossible on the lower stages . And this higher 
form of individuality, in which the whole has its inter connec-
tions, is not possible in panpsychism. 
Conscious souls exhibit individuality as "non-contra-
dictory self-maintenance . n19 This stage of individuality 
depends on the degree of organic structure elicited . Know-
ledge is an imperfect system and so only partially individual 
and modifiable . It resembles a living organism . 20 Through 
knowledge is shown 
a highly articulate individual whole arising out of 
an environment that contains no tra ce of it, by the 
principle of non- contradiction in and upon such an 
environment . 21 
18. BOSanquet , VDI , 79, n . 2 . 
19 • Ibid , 80 • 
20 . Ibid., 80 , 81 . 
21 . Ibid., 81 . 
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In the process of soul-molding human individuality stands at 
the climax of complete finite intelligence. 22 In this achieve-
ment mind has inherited a fulness of instincts, habits, nervous 
structure. But in mind is an orderliness not present to the 
same degree in nature. And this orderliness is communicated 
to the soul by the demands of a concrete whole in the environ-
ment . 
II 
Finite mind is also a product of a social whole . 
"Mind is the environment of Mind."23 It lives by reciprocal 
social recognition. Imitation is not enough. The best ap-
proach to recognition is coBperation in achieving a common 
purpose , and of "being equal to the si'tuation." 24 
Individuality comes to new light in spiritual centers 
or personalities . A deeper harmony now appears in which 
"the individual centres begin to be adapted as members of an 
individuality transcending their own." 25 t this stage finite 
minds begin to resemble the absolute. In this individuality 
of minds is an intercommunication of members in a greater 
unity which bursts particular centres. This group mind trans-
cends a plurality of persons and tends to subordinate or absorb 
~articular oentres. 26 
II 
I 22. Bosanquet, VDI, 82. 
23. Ibid., 84. 
24 . Ibid., 88, and see 8?. 
I 25. Ibid., 90. I 26. Ibid., 92. 
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b. Yet shapes itself. 
Finite mind also molds or shapes itself by "the miracle 
of will ." By this Bosanquet means that the soul as a self'-
conscious microcosm tends "to form a system which constitutes 
its 'omnipotentiality .. "r27 The finite mind accepts what it can 
and will to the degree that its own nature has been formed as 
I a centre of life and mind. 
we have a selection ~ the organic or intelligent 
creature as well as a selection of it, and an 
adaptation of the environment as-well as to and 
by 1t.28 -
' Will is critical and creative. here "all human ways of 
I 
livingn 29 are grouped in a common relationship the result is 
a second nature. 
In re-creating its world the finite mind is only 
carrying forward the process of its own genesis, 
of having its nature communicated to it. In 
re-creating its world it is continuing the work 
whi ch began by its own creation: for its own 
nature, as well as that of its world, lies in all 
that its ~8rld, as focussed in it, is· capable of 
becoming. 
All this comes about because the spirit of the whole (indivi-
duality) is an active principle of self-determination in trans-
for.min~ the partial world of finite mind. 31 Important for 
Bosanquet in this process is intelligence in creative will ; 
27. Bosanquet, VDI., 95. 
28. Ibid., 96. 
29. Ibid .. ' 97, n. 
30. Ibid., 98. 
31. Ibid.' 106. 
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only by combining thought and will can finite minds find 
satisfaction. 
Each finite mind is, as we have previously noted, 
filled. And this givenness or filling directs the finite mind 
in its universality or nisus towards the whole . 32 This is 
an a priori experience. Influenced by this "nisus of mind to 
the whole"33 a finite mind reshapes its world by thought and 
11 will . A new creation results. The principle in Bosanquet 's 
mind is this: 
II 
A fruitful thought and course is always open; for 
the whole of the universe is accessible by some path 
or other from every complex within it. In principle , 
again, you - the finite mind -have always a clue to 
a relatively fruitful thought or act, because every 
demand of mind, pressed thoroughly home, must34 
ultimately bring you to all that mind can be. 
·lha t is Bosanquet ' s view of the concrete experience of" 
will? By this he means society, civilization, or, most broad-
ly, humanity. Its source is in the organic and inorganic en-
vironment. To create from this source is intelligent volition. 
The thinking will, working always through the 
tendency of thought to the whole , embodied in this 
or that impulse or desire, upon the complexes rela-
tively given to it, finds always a path or opening 
which leads to this or that larger continuous 
complex, and, pursuing it, makes and adopts the 
changes which the newly preseg~ed facts and com-
bination suggest and present . 
32. Bosanquet , VDI, 104. 
33. Ibid., 106. 
34. Ibid., 108. 
35. Ibid., 110. 
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In Bosanquetts organic view of the universe a road leads from 
every grouping of facts in nature "to every spiritual reality 
36 in the universe." Over this road finite mind forces itself 
to travel, and , with the exception of sin and error, "in the 
direction from less to more ."37 Here lies the creative path 
of tension between nature and the spiritual world wherein "the 
bsolute passes into and out of its externality.n38 In elicit-
ing by thinking will the spiritual from the natural world 
finite minds are molding themselves. "We are finding our self 
in the mrld as the world comes to life in our self . n 39 
How does character control circumstances? By character 
Bosanquet means "habitual will."40 Hore difficult to define 
is circumstance. By this Dr . Bosanquet does not mean purely 
natural fact; it is rather a self or "living world concentrated 
in a consciousness "which is both in and external to a finite 
41 
mind . This self or orld is 
relatively ample and complete, organized, and 
anDliated by a mind which is, ex hypothesi , charged 
with connections, and has very much in it beyond 
what it has before it .42 
Thoughtful vigilance and the habit of conscientious judgment 
on questions of character are combined in the miracle of will . 
36. Bosanquet, VDI, 111. 
3?. Loc. cit. 
38. Ibid ., 112. 
39. Ibid., 113. 
40. Ibid., 114. 
41 . TI:b i d • , 114. 
42 . Ibid ., 115. 
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Bosanquet cites the Rochdale CoBperatives and Trades Unions 
as illustrative of the way thinking will molds connected 
social life beyond the minds that inaugurated the movements . 
In finite experience the totality of life cannot be achieved 
at all except through succession . A further point is impor-
tant . In its nexus toward the whole finite mind may not be 
included or transform.ed without sacrifice . "Courage, reso-
lution, decision" work this miracle provided there is a 
"transfigured outlook.n43 
If 
,ill is thus powerless without thought in i ndividual- 'l 
i ty . That is , it must be tteq_ual to the situation" or see "life 
44 
as a whole" or ~+grasp things as a whole.''" A larger end or 
order than the finite mind must be seen if the will is to bring 
11 about external change . In any case the difference between will 
and thought is one of degree . 45 Bosanquet takes issue ith 
intellectualism which divorces will from thought . He is even 
more critical of volun~arism which has no relation between 
\Vill and "thought , the nisus towards the whole •• . •• in the form 
46 
of the concrete universal. . tt Voluntarism not founded on a 
thinking will is pluralistic , because divergent , and pessimis-
tic because satisfaction is excluded . 47 Thinking ill , hich 
characterizes individuality, has in social experience operated 
43 . Bosanquet, VDI, 120 , 121 . 
44 . Ibid . , 121 . 
45 . Ibid . , 122. 
46 . Ibid . , 123 . 
47. Ibid . , 124. 
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with a plan which tends to include the whole . 48 
Bosanquetts vie of the finite soul is, as we have 
seen, t a-fold . "The soul is a range of externality 'come 
alive' by centering in mind . " 49 As such it is a will , a 
microcosm, "creatively moulding circumstance" and "reshaping 
itself" within the a.bsolute . 5° Finite minds are also, as it 
II were , streams "of varying breadth , intensity, and separateness 
from the great flood wi thin which it moves . " 5l No finite soul 
is isolated . "An apparent individuality" 52 arises from the 
relativity of finite individuals in time . In reality there is 
no barrier between finite and absolute individuality for the 
values of the finite are conserved in the absolute . 
9. As self- existent and 
self-transcendent . 
a . Judge of its own need for hardship. 
Our duties or moral obligations come to us, not as 
independent beings, but as parts of individuality . Duties to 
God and neighbors 53 are conceived in terms of one ' s relation-
ship to the whole . Herein indeed lies a contradiction for the 
I finite self: 
48 . Bosanquet, VDI, 126 . So Hegel and Green . 
49 . Ibid . , 129 . 
50 • Lo c • cit . 
51 . Loc . cit .. 
52 . Ibid . , 130 . 
53 . Ibid ., 134. 
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I 
though ~inite, it is not merely finite, and throws 
its inherent impulse to identity of love and will 
with the universe into the shape of an impossible 
union of two independent terms. 04 
In other words , how can a finite mind which is not ideal be 
one ith an ideal will hioh is divine? Bosanquetts answer 
is that the real imperative of a rinite self is to have a will 
motivated by the whole - a whole which truly expresses finite 
selves. 
A finite self anticipates the absolute in its search 
ij for a better self, hich , in turn, is still finite. So the 
world of individuality has its claims and counter-clai~, 
"with the supreme ruler out of reach above us, and our fellow 
55 finite beings of mind and nature at ar.m's length around us.~ 
But even in this experience is ~some degree of true individu-
ality and self-completeness, and forming an earnest of a true 
56 
satisfaction other than and transcending the endless progress . 't 
This satisfaction of a finite self is found in a social whole 
'in which separate finite wills unite in the possession of 
themselves and each other.t 57 Finite mind is ignorant of its 
own real nature, but in anticipating the absolute it 
has already in s~e degree possessed itself of the 
substance of identity wi th God, man, and nature 
before it awakens to the reflective conception 
of an individuality and apartness in its life, 
eked out by relations, connections, claims.58 
54. Bosanquet, VDI, 138. 
55. Ibid., 140. 
56. Ibid., 141. 
5?. Ibid., 141. 
58. Ibid., 142. 
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As individuality is progressively achieved, man's thinking will 
so orders his finite mind in a nrelatively self-complete and 
organic world~59 as to transcend the claims and counter-claims 
of more finite existence and to express a truer identity 
wherein finite minds are ~pulse beats of the whole system.'t60 
Herein lies the discipline of a spiritual community which can 
shatter the injustice of discordant claims , and die to live a 
just and worthy life in the total good . No finite mind can, 
in Bosanquet's view, judge its own need for hardship. Some-
thing beyond the partial individuality of the finite self is 
necessary to mold and discipline it . Only the demands of 
individuality as a totality elicit the best through the 
miracle of will . 
B. As including pleasure and pain. 
Pleasure and pain are both rooted in man 's finite-
infinite nature . Tension, friction, contradiction , sacrifice, 
are involved as a finite self passes out of itself into its 
true self. But in such transcendence is life. In pleasure 
the self is maximized in self-transcendence because of resul-
tant harmony. Pain , on the other hand, is obstruction through 
contradiction. Pleasure and pain are inevitable for a finite-
infinite self which in self-transcendence is constantly shaping 
59. Bosanquet, VDI, 142. 
60. Quoted in ibid., 143 from He 0 el in Bradley,ES,l56 . 
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itself and uniting ith a not-self . :hen this unity is unob-
structed, pleasure says ''press on." Pain , on the other hand , 
means obstruction whi ch must find relief in readjustment with-
in the organism. 
Perfect satisfaction in self- transcendence ould 
61 
''carry in itself the significance of all pains." But mere 
inclusion will not account for an imperfect self united with 
a perfect self in its "struggle toward the 62 bsolute . n The 
finite self must be rearranged and transformed if obstructions 
causing pain are removed . 
II 
Pleasure is not related only to good , nor pain to evil. :r 
I 
Pain, hich is a feeling of contradictions, belongs to good 
and evil . In organisms below man, or in man 's body , pain is 
hardship of a struggling finite self in whi ch self-direction 
is being achieved . 
l, ost significant is the place of the suffering of 
63 finite self-conscious beings . " For the highest happiness 
of great men there is needed '~ide thoughts and much feeling 
for the rest of the world as for ourselves . "64 
Have finite minds any alleviation from pain? 
Bosanquet sees no hope of the cessation of tension in finite-
infinite beings, but rather an intensification of conflict. 
61 . Bosanquet, VDI, 168. 
52 • Lo c • c it • 
63. Ibid., 172. 
64 . Ibid ., 173. 
I 
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Self-conscious mastery or self-direction should tend 
to convert brute agony and dumb endurance and 
despair into a spirit~al conflict and triumph; 
to raise suffering ••• to the level of tragedy.65 
For a finite self to rule out pain might be to deprive the 
self of its greatest opportunity. 66 Indeed, in suffering 
the contradictions in religion are transcended. 67 
How is death related to finite selves? Death, for 
Bosanquet, is the final hazard in which the self seems can-
celled. But something in the self must have hold of a world 
death cannot obstru'ct. In love, courage, and other attributes 
of the real self "the finite being offers up its finiteness 
as a contribution to the true being of the universe," 68 that 
is, to individuality. 
65. Bosanquet, VDI, 180. 
66. Ibid., 181. 
6 7. Ibid. , 190. 
68. Ibid., 189. 
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B. Good and evil . 
1. Definitions. 
Good and evil , in Bosanquet ' s thought, have to do 
with the attitude of finite individuals toward the perfection 
of the whole (individuality). 
Goodness is desire for the perfection of the whole . 
The ~ood self searches for the complete satisfaction and 
finds it in the whole or absolute . Goodness is not mere 
69 
unobstructiveness; it nconcerns the creature's whole being . " 
Goodness is a greatness that goes beyond individuals and sus-
tains moral ends . 70A finite self aspiring for unity with the 
whole actually takes sides with and finds its satisfaction in 
71 
"an approval of the whole." The character of goodness is 
"the harmony of all being ; "72 goodness can be realized in 
the ~orld to the degree that harmony is achieved . Individu-
ality is the condition of finite goodness . 
le expect it (world, or individuality) to be •••..• 
the birthplace and theatre, or more - the including 
totality - of goodness, than itself the precise 
nature of ~hat we call good .73 
In goodness is thus revealed the universal values of character 
of the vrhole whi ch gives satisfaction. 74 
69 . Bosanquet, VDI, 193. 
70 . Loc . cit . 
71. Loc cit . 
72. Ibid ., 194. 
73. Bosanquet , PIV, 25 . 
74 . Bosanquet , VDI , 194. 
II 
In contrast to the good Bosanquet sees in evil a 
rebellion against or opposition to the whole. Evil is a 
violation of the harmony of the whole . As such it is "good 
in the wrong place," 75 a dread of being absorbed in the good, 
or a hostility to being organized for the true satisfaction of 
I a self. 
Bosanquet distinguishes between moral good and goods 
in general. The latter have to do with the fringes or corol-
1 laries of life. Goods in general are provincial and not 
indispensable to every individual, though they are probably 
indispensable to the whole (individuality ). These goods are 
akin to perfection though they have 
come to be considered as in some inexplicable 
way independent gifts , excellencies, values, 
desirabilities of the world , which have nothing 
to do wit~ the central perfection of the ex-
perience . 6 
Goodness, on the other hand, is fundamental for the perfect 
or unified life. It desires and approves all values, harmony, 
?? I perfection, and wisdom . The roots of moral goodness in the 
individual run deep; in moral goodness all other values and 
goods find their synthesis or wholeness , wherein is true 
II individuality. 
?5. Bosanquet, VDI, 215, and see also 193. 
? 6 • Ib i d • , 1 9 9 
??. Ibid., 198, 199, 200. 
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Goodness and gifts have an intimate connection. 
Health, for instance, is related to goodness . To attempt 
to rule out from goodness all external gifts and 
graces , physical endowments, education, age and 
country, ability to ·learn and act, we shall find 
that we have ruled out moral excellence itself.?8 
Goodness and gifts are thus interrelated in individuality; 
j the one passes into the other through the goods of 
And this is possible because the goods of life are 
rooted in a universe which transcends them. 79 
life. 
all deeply 
2. Incidents of finiteness . 
Good and evil are unintelligible as facts of nature; 
they have meaning only as they have to do with finite minds . 
The proof for such a conviction is that success or failure 
in nature is not to be attributed to good or evil. Further-
more, the operative processes of the universe are neither 
recognized nor prescribed by nature nor finite minds . But 
in the case of finite minds the whole is accessible to judg-
ment; hence ttgood and evil are unintelligible expressions 
apart from the attitude of finite minds ."80 
dents 
Evil and good , Bosanquet holds, are "perilous inci-
••• . of . 81 finiteness." Herein lie perils and hardships, 
?8. Bosanquet, VDI, 200. 
?9. Ibid., 201. 
80 . Loc. cit. 
81 . Ibid., 201-202. 
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but they are experienced in order to achieve a fuller world . 
Completeness is realized through these risks and obstructions; 
~ithout this inclusiveness finite existence would be unbear-
able and meaningless . 
In Bosanquet 's view good is a hazard, whereas evil is 
both a hazard and a hardship. The stuff from which good and 
evil are made is the same as that for truth and error. 
Desires, volitions, habits, ideas, these are 
what life consists in, and their mere positive 
natu~~ is not stamped ab initio as either good or 
bad. 
How , then, can we distinguish evil from good? Formally good 
is not evil, and evil is not good . But the argument goes 
deeper. 
Good is primarily the conflict with evil ~d the 
triumph over it; evil is primarily the rebellion 
against good . The purpose rhich is a root of evil 
in oneself may be a spur to good in another; it is 11 
not the content of the object, but the side assigned 
to it in the contradiction of attitu~~s, that is 
decisive of its g oodness or badness. 
Herein lie the hazards of both good and evil for the finite 
self. 
105 
11 But what of hardship which evil does not share with 
good? Evil is not only a contradiction of the good but also 
the disposition and interest to realize that which is contra-
82. Bosanquet, VDI, 205 . 
83. Ibid., 205-206. 
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dictory to the good. This element is rra chaos of impulses, 
all of which have their ends, and these ends, pro tanto, are 
goods. '184 ~vil brings t he finite self to be self-contradic-
tory, This contradiction has a content but "one which is 
85 
••• -in hos.tili ty to the identification of the self" ·with 
individuality. This is hardship. 
Bosanquet goes further to say that evil is a complement 
to the good . Evidence for this he sees in the dissatisfaction 
of a finite being with finite good. In rebellion an individual 
. is con_stan tly seeking to transcend itself. But to realize this 
perfection the finite being find s itself i nadequate . s evil 
shows on the self-contradictory and discordant nature of the 
finite sel~ it leads to a pitched battle within the self by 
86 
means of which harmony is possible through self-transformation. 
3. Evil and error 
in the absolute. 
3vil and error are in the absolute but not of . it . The 
absolute contains everything, including error, "but we cannot 
say that it is characterized by error ••• . as a constituent mem-
ber."87 Error and truth are "made ••. -.of the same stuff."88 
And , most significantly, error can be transformed into truth 
84. Bosanquet, VDI, 207. 
85. Ibid., 209 . 
86. See Bosanquet , VDI, 209-211. 
87. Ibid., 213. 
88. Loc. cit •. 
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by readjusting the conditions, purpose , and context or judg-
ment . further fact is that no truth is unmixed with error; 
that nralsi ty is a matte r of degree, normally reducible to 
exaggerated emphasis on some one element in the whole .~t 89 
Error can be in the absolute only by the process of completion 
or co~erence in which error disappears or is absorbed. 
So with all evil ! There is nothing in the worst of 
finite individuals which by transformation and readjustment 
90 
cannot be a part of the good itself . 
means 
Freedom is impossible without evil . By this Bosanquet 
that a spirit which has its being in transforming 
the external into the absolute must proceed by 
trial and error , and so by setting itself against 
itself . Its business •• is to initiate, to fuse 
and concentrate externally into elements of 
perfection . 91 
.. isdirected desires and activity in the finite individual lead 
often to blind alleys , but in any case to struggle with ''spiri-
tual individualityrt on the finite plane . A finite self in this 
process rises from failure , turns back from blind alleys , and 
creates itself . A victory over the insuperable antithesis 
between good and evil results from moral faith ·hich looks 
89 . Bosanquet, VDI , 214 . 
90 . Ibid ., 213 . 
91 . Ibid.' 211 . 
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to the future, to progress and modification of 
the finite , in short , to an infinite advance 92 i n which the insuperable opposition may be overcome . 
Both good and evil have their part in t he perfection of indi-
vidua lity , and this they do by '~modifying and reforming the 
93 
universe . " 
4 . Relation to objective values . 
"hat does Bosanquet think of the objectivity of 
values? Seemingly his whole system is built on the objective 
nature of values . In all ordered living they are: 
the conditions par excellence of all and any 
values , being the attainment of the rundamental 
values on which all others depend , and being 
readily recognized as akin . 94 
They are intrinsic for the whole moral life of the organism , 
and '"constituents which enter into the total harmony and per-
95 fectness which in all its fragmen ts we desire and approve . " 
92 . Bosanquet, VDI , 211 . 
93 . Ibid . , 212 . 
94 . Ibid ., 198-199 . 
95 . Ibid ., 198 . 
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C. Religion and religious consciousness. 
1. Religious consciousness. 
Bosanquet regards the religious consciousness as a 
sort of climax or consummation of life. It 
is simply the completion or recognition of the 
finite-infinite or self-transcendent nature which 
we have attributed to the 'individual." It is 
the surrender or completion of finite95elfhood in the world of spiritual membership. 
Religious consciousness of this sort would be impos-
sible without individuality. Religion for a finite self is 
a consciousness of being one of many, of being exclusive; to be 
finite is also to be conscious of one's need for completeness 
and participation in wholeness. In other words, to be a finite 
individual is to be an unstable, fragmentary, insecure indi-
vidual with troubles and hazards. Running through all the 
accidents of the finite is that which gives the finite self 
stability and security. This is the experience of identifying 
the private self ~with the perfection divined as its true in-
dividuality,ft97 and to that extent attaining perfection. 
The whole thus secures the struggling part. Religious con-
sciousness must be "a serious and complete devoutness or de-
votion, in which the whole man feels himself worthless apart 
96. Bosanquet, VDI, 225-226. 
97. Ibid.' 229. 
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from the object to which he goes out in wiLl and conviction. 98 
2 . Attachment to Supreme Value. 
Religion is attachment to Supreme Value . In the ex-
perience of devotion and worship 
the self not merely ••. passes beyond itself, 
but unconsciously and intentionally rejects 
itself as worthless, because of the supreme 
value which it attaches to the object with which 
it desires and affirms its union.99 
In the traditional religions no religious attitude can be 
entertained toward objects considered bad. On the other hand 
"there may be any degree of defectiveness in the object trucen 
100 
as good. For Bosan~uet the secret of life is that religion 
101. 
makes life worth while . Inasmuch as Bosanquet acknowledges 
the influence of illiam lallace on his views of religious 
consciousness, an .analysis of allacets .views at this point 
will be significant . 
J sweet 
lallace holds that "law is the voice of God , or the 
reasonableness of harmonious and self-completing lifett102 
103 
and that "all true personality is moral." By this he means 
that a man's nature is subordinate to universal law and so 
man is related to the "community of all times and places , 
98. 
99. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
lQ~. 
Bosanquet , VDI, 26. 
Loa. cit. 
Ibid., 235, n. 2 . Italics mine . 
Bosanquet, RI, vi-vii. 
7 allace, LE, , 208 . 
Ibid., 263. 
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eternal and omnipresent. The value of one's ow.n personality 
is measured by that of other selves. All around a f'ini te in-
dividual are forces which he did not make and cannot control. 
Personality cannot be a quality of the absolute or infinite 
for it ''can only belong to a member of a world , to one who is 
not everything, but stands in contact and relation with others 
105 
outside himself.n Personality includes the whole being-
body, intellect, feeling , and action. In personality are both 
tt inward freedom' and ft'absol.u te initiative. n 106 
Personality is the power of realizing and keeping 
in view the universal, free. and unlimited being, 
amid the particular and definite o107solated forms whi ch do threaten to overwhelm it. 
j At the heart of personality are liberty, equality, and frater-
108 
1
nity. Religion for such a personality is grounded in value. 
'ii th this view of religion, personality, and value 
Bosanquet is in accord. Ra ch human being is finite-infinite 
and conscious 
t hat he is one with some thing "IIVhi ch cannot be shaken 
or destroyed, and the value of which is the source 
and standard of va1ues.l09 
I In high-grade religious consciousness values are seen to be 
"united in a type of perfe ction . 11110 The self or person sur-
104. ~allace, LE, ~Qo. 
105. Ibid., 278. 
106. Ibid., 287, and see also 282, 284. 
107. Ibid., 287. 
108. Ibid., 294. 
109. Bosanquet, VDI, 241. 
110. Ibid.' 230. 
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renders to this perfection taken as good and possible; 
ttthere is thUs thrown into it the whole will , and the whole 
111 
attribution of value . Religion is the unity of will , 
fee~ing, and belief of ind i vidual.s with "the supreme good tt-
of · d. id l"t 112 h 1· · 1n iv ua 1 y . As sue , re 1gion 1s what a man "really 
believes in - what governs hDli from head to foot - what he 
thiliks the only thing worth having and the only thing worth 
giving . tt:ll3 
3 . Self-transcendence . 
An indispensable element in religion is self-trans-
cendence . By this Bosanquet means that a finite being yearns 
for perfection and completion but to do so is conscious that 
he must transcend his finiteness and so reaches out toward 
114 
the whole (individuality) . 
A genuine devoutness and Ioyaltyt before which the 
given self seems a little thing and lightly to be 
sacrific~d for the chosen transcendent good, is 115 found to be the ruling passion of a finite mind . 
This feeling of worthlessness with its attitude of devoted 
ti t d b j t . 1 . . 116 will and con vic on mvar an o ec 1s re .1g1ous . 
Bosanquet has stated in lhat Religion Is : 
111 . Bosanquet , VDI , 243 . 
ll2. Bosanq_uet, \ffii , 30 . 
113 . Bosanquet , EA , 10 . 
ll4. Bosanquet , VDI, 25 . 
115 . Ibid., 28 . 
116 . Ibid ., 36. . 
Or as 
112 
,I 
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~henever a man is so carried beyond himself whether 
for any other being, or for a cause or for a nation, 
that his personal fate seems to him as nothing in 
comparison to the happiness or triumph of the other, 
there you have the universal basis and structure or 
religion.ll7 
·~hat is Bosanq_uet"s distinction between religion and 
irreligion? And what bearing does this have on self-trans-
cendence and individuality? Irreligion is self-sufficiency 
I and self-satisfaction in achievement ; it completely ignores 
or is indifferent to all self-transcendence without which 
1 achievement is impossible. In contrast, religion rooted in 
the principle of self-transcendence which is "the individual's 
118 
self-subordination to supreme power and goodness . As such 
religion "will still be the most solid fact in the world."ll9 
Through self-transcendence the conscious finite-infinite self 
120 
is emancipated. Indeed Bosanquet thinks that no man is 
without religious experience but that there "must be" grades 
of it.121 To the degree that 
the finite mind •••• accepts as its true self an actual 
perfection which alone is real, and in which evil is 
absorbed and annihilated,l22 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
122. 
Bosanquet , WRI, 5-6. 
Bosanquet, ttphilosophy of Benedette Croce , 
Quar. Rev., 231 (1919), 377. 
Loc. cit. 
Bosanquet , VDI, 239. 
Bosanquet, IRI, 5-6. As in Royce 's 
Loyalty to Loyalty. 
Bosanquet, VDI, 245. 
I 
I 
I 
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religion is an experience of true individuality. Religion is 
costly for it entails suffering and hardship . But wholeness 
is the sufficient reward of religion. 
D. Freedom ~ithin individuality. 
1. Freedom and consciousness. 
Bosanquet 's theory of consciousness is a necessary 
postulate for his view of freedom in finite beings. He con-
II ceives consciousness as 
a system of content, 'come alive' according to 
certain arrangements by means of which the Absolute 
allows minor worlds, formally distinct, and of many 
degrees of fulness, to constitute its union with 
externality, whi ch union is itself.l23 
Consciousness is thus really an awareness of the insignifi-
cance of the isolated finite self and of the relation of the 
finite self "to what in truth makes life worth living . n124 
One need therefore be no more afraid of freedom than of 
swimming in water , for freedom is possible through faith in 
the absolute . Each finite individual is a sort of microcosm 
or portion of the cosmos in which al~ the various and dif-
ferentiated modes of being are initiated, thereby enriching 
I 
the absolute . Freedom for the finite individual makes this 
initiative possible. 
123. 
124. 
Bosanquet , PIV, 321. 
Bosanquet, VDI, 317. 
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2. Freedom and circumstances. 
Freedom lays in what finite selves make of their cir-
cumstances. External circumstances are not the only deter-
mining and differentiating factors; part of these factors, in-
eluding freedom, are within an individual. Freedom is not the 
1 isolation of the self from the world ; rather, freedom is the 
exercise of powers of the self toward unity and coherence as 
it converts that which is external into inward experience . 
It is the working , the 'logic ' of this relative 
totality of experience, that ••• constitutes the freedom 
of the concrete self; which thus affirms itself as a 
part of the external deed in which the Absolute sus-
tains its living whole of experience.l25 
Freedom is here an inward adaptation to logical perfection. 
3. Self-determination . 
Is the finite individual predetermined? Can one say, 
" 126 ttTou t est donne"?-
In answer to these QUestions BosanQue t appeals to 
J logic in support of a principle of self-de termination . 
All logic·al activity is a world of content reshaping 
itself by its own spirit and laws in presence of new 
suggestions; a syllogism is in principle nothing 
less, and a Par thenon or 'Paradise Lost' is in 
principle nothing more .l27 
125. 
126. 
127. 
BosanQuet, PIV, 326. 
See further under "creator of creators, 11 
Ch. V, Sect . G,7. 
Bosanquet, PIV, 333. 
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Freedom in the self is a yearning for totality; it is also 
a productive initiative and originality in remolding the 
, cosmos. A poem or other creative aet in art is a self 
struggling in self-transcendence for a higher unity. To be 
a self is to be free, and to be free is to be self-determined. 
128 A self is not "given to be enjoyed'but' to be made and won." 
4. Freedom as nisus to individuality. 
Bosanquet sees no basis for freedom except in the 
"creative, constructive, and initiative character vindicated 
I 129 for the self''" in individuality as a cone rete universal. 
Therein comes saving strength as the self freely throws itself 
130 into samething more inclusive than itself. Freedom for us 
.,1 
means the nisus to the whole, the E~w! or spirit of union, 
131 
which is at once logic and love." As finite selves are con-
vinced of their worthlessness they renounce themselves and are 
spiritually inducted into the larger whole through a higher 
freedom. Inasmuch as values for Bosan quet are ultimate in 
individuality, "determinateness mus t be fullest in the Absolute 
and in God ."132 A free man lives by his faith in the absolute. 
5. Fatalism. 
Fatalism is uimperfect determinism," as over against 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
132. 
Bosanquet, PIV, 338. 
Ibid., 320 . 
Bosanquet , WRI, 20. 
Bosanquet , VDI, 9. 
Bosanquet, PIV, 342. See also VDI, 109, 121. 
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the perfect determinism of logic. It is successive, external, 
and relative conne ction without form .l33 
It is like the reaction of an intelligent body 
in its sleep, or ••• like the effects of a split-off 
consciousness as they appear within the self from 
hich it is split off .l34 
In fatalism there is no response to the totality or whole of 
things which is the self or individuality. Freedom is there-
fore not present in fatalism for in it is not self-determina-
I tion. Fatalism shirks responsibility which in itself is the 
negation of freedom. 
133. Bosanquet, PIV, 341 . 
13 4 . Lo c • c i t • 
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E. Teleology. 
1. 1 eaning of teleology. 
By teleology Bosanq_uet means a specific "sub-form of 
individuality. '135 .1e have seen that individuality is identical 
I with the spirit of a wor ld, the whole, or universal. Teleology, 
in Bosanquet's thought, is not the purpose of finite beings, 
for purpose means that "some creature consciously wants some-
thing.~~6 Rather, teleology implies "something valuable and 
desirable, in harmony with the universe as most perfectly ex-
perienced."137 ·Teleology is form or determinateness of the 
universal working in the individuals , particulars, or details; 
it expresses the whole as an "interdependent nexus,n138 achie-
ving value. His conception of teleology as a principle opera-
ting in individuality was expressed before the ristotelian 
Society: 
that on the whole the finite intelligent being has 
the duty and position rather of coming to himself 
and awakening to his own nature and his unity with 
what we call by an imperfect analogy a greater mind 
and will , than of controlling the course of the 
universe or moulding it as an independent cause.l39 
Teleology is thus a significant but partial view of individu-
ality. 
135. 
136. 
137. 
138. 
139. 
Bosanquet, PIV, 122 . 
Ibid., 137. See also Muirhead, BHF, 106. 
Ibid. , 136, n . 1. 
Ibid., 122 . 
uoted by fuirhead , BBF, 106. 
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Bosanquet maintains that certain views of teleology 
lead to misconceptions . One of these is that teleology aims 
at the unfilled , that the ideal belongs to the future . This 
theory is deficient because completeness as well as conclusion 
is implied in teleology and fundamental to it . Individuality 
is not to be understood on the plane of temporal priority but 
"on hat there is in the individual real when it is appre-
hended in its completeness . "140 Value is not dependent on 
I temporal relations but non its relation to the ultimate whole 
or individuality."141 
II second misconception is that a value is lost when 
it is realized . Teleology as conceived by Bosanquet means 
that good is an end in itself. In the universe continuous 
1 and coherent laws govern creation. Hence true purposiveness 
is objective, not subjective , because of the teleological 
nature of the whole . 1 42 This he regards as true individuality. 
2 . Relation of means and ends . 
Means and ends , contrary to current usage , have no 
distinction between them . An end is not lastness in a tem-
poral process but (following ristotle) "the completion of 
I 
140. 
1.41. 
142. 
Bo sanquet, "l:eaning 
(1905-1906), 235. 
Ibid ., 236 . 
Ibid ., 237. 
of Teleology , " Proc.Brit.Acad. 
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a positive whole which is developing through a process, and 
143 
the cessation of the process itself. tt An end may be first 
or anywhere in the process. Means is the cost to be paid for 
144 I 
an end, and "may extend before and after and all around it." 
This substituting of a metaphysical , non-temporal wholeness 
or perfection for a psychological temporal purpose Hexpands 
into the principle of Individuality, or positive non-contra-
145 diction." Such teleological value is beyond finite minds . 
Bos1;1nquet follows Aristotle in thinking of ''end'' not 
as satiety but satisfaction. In this he differs from the 
view of conation which starts from a disturbance and closes 
with its cessation; rather "end 11 is positive in that it com-
pletes a form. Life's fruition is not in completing some 
serial process , a terminus ad quem, but in the .timeless 
h t . t. t . t 146 s d . . c arac er of posl lVe ma url y. ensuous eslre lS a dis -
turbance of the finite individual and demands satiety. Aes-
thetic enjoyment, on the other hand , is not transition onward 
toward some end; rather it is fruition in that 
the mind's direction in it is outward, not onward; 
and one moment of it, as Aristotle urges, is self -
complete, and as good as the next .l47 
End is thus connected with fruition and value at any stage 
in the process of perfection or as a result of it. 
143. 
144. 
145. 
146. 
147. 
Bosanquet, PIV, 124. 
Loc. cit. 
Ibid., 127. 
Ibid., 129. 
Ibid., 131. 
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In such a view of teleology , mechanism , i . e . means, is 
subordinate . ~eans are but parts of the process which have 
no initiative or self-organization in themselves. This pro-
cess involves individuality as its operative principle , a sys-
tem in which all differences are instrumental in the whole and 
have their identity in the universal laws of the whole. 148 
3 . Plan of the world . 
Bosanquet takes issue with those who find all plan and 
purpose for the world in "the capacity of finite consciousness 
149 
for guidance and selection . tt In the new teleology or iard 
J and others no principle or immanence conveys this plan to 
finite mind. Finite minds are masters of nature and history; 
law operating as a universal in nature has no place. 
Two degrees of teleology can be assumed in this view . 
(a) Finite mind is found only in the organic realm and ac-
counts for life , guidance , construction , evolution, and his -
tory . Or (b) all that we understand as mechanical in the 
inorganic world is an extension of finite consciousness whi ch 
accounts for all design and harmony in nature . 
Both of these deny , Bosanquet thinks, the principle of 
supreme individuality through natur e . His view is that all 
148. Bosanquet, t~Permanent keaning of the _.t\.rgument 
from Design , " Proc. rist. Soc ., 2 (1902) , 46 . ' 
149. Bosanquet , "Mean ing of Theology , " Proc . Arist . Soc. ,j 
N. S .' (1905-1906)' 235 . I 
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that has been, is, and can be, must be conceived as mind. 
But that finite minds alone account for this conviction is 
as untenable as a mechanistic theory . A universal law is 
incompatible With "'a plurality of undifferentiated points of 
150 
application . 't On the contrary a true determination is 
eternally true and to be universally applied . 
Every difference which can be instrumental within 
a whole to the realization of teleology or indivi-
duality must inevitably constitute a term in a system 
of universal laws . l5l 
' All differences a.re akin to universal truth and so are con-
nected with nthe individuality of the whole . t All plans 
for the universe are thus in a unity which prescribes deter-
minate interconnectiona of the whole . 
BosanQuet's view of individuality reconciles two 
apparently opposite views of mechanism , namely, ~that nature 
is instrumental to the development of that which is spiritualtt 
and rtthat the spiritual view is that which regards experiences 
as a mechanically intelligible wholeJ152 As to the former, 
BasanQuet denies that the mechanical can exclude the spirit-
ual . hy? The world, he contends , is intelligible as is a 
machine; a machine needs external purpose both to start and 
150 . 
151. 
152 . 
Bosanquet, "Meaning of Teleology," Proc . Brit . 
Acad . , (1905- 1906) , 23? ; and see 236 . 
Ibid . , 23?- 238 . 
Ibid ., 239 . 
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to regulate it. The penetration of universal law is but 
~the essence of spiritual inwardness, as of mechanical ex-
1 planation . 1~153 
I 
Now for the second alternative. Bosanquet grants that 
interaction appears to be mechanical . But in fine arts does 
expression come fram the soul, and the mechanical finish come 
from some other source? His answer is WNo~, for really both 
are mechanical . nMind and individuality, so far as finite, 
find their fullest expression as aspects of very complex and 
154 precisely determined me chanical systems'! A world- plan , 
I immanent in the whole , is revealed in finite mind and in 
mechanical nature . 
Thus Bosanquet reconciles the supposedly incompatible 
views by contending "that the true spiritual ideal demands 
155 
mechanical intelligibility. 11 ithout the latter the spirit -
ual would be miraculous; without spirituality , that is teleo-
logical intelligibility, individuality would be incoherent 
and mechanism destroyed. In accordance with this view members 
interact with each other in an individual whole . 1 56 
How is Bosanquet ' s principle illustrated in the case 
of a flower? A flower is no more an accident than is gravi-
tation or a solar system. Neither is a flower produced by an 
153. Bosan~uet , ~Meaning of Teleology," Proc.Brit.Acad., 
154. 
155. 
156. 
(1905-1906) , 239. 
Ibid., 240 . 
Loc. cit . 
Bosanquet, PIV, 155. 
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active purpose operating comparabl e to finite consciousness. 
Really the plan of a flower is imTianent in all the inter-
actions of nature . 
In a seed or in a flo~er you have a wonderful thing 
decisively partaking of individua~ity , definitely 
and plainly constituted by arrangements of material 
substances and their reactions according to law.l5? 
A f~ower therefore is not explained by the bare form of design, 
nor by finite consciousness. flower is said to have a p~an 
II "because reality is individual and teleological ; 158 finite 
consciousness observes this in part, but the i nd ividual char-
acter of a flower has a "far greater r ange and scope" than 
159 finite consciousness. 
I Furthermore, the implications of this plan of the world 
for finite selves is astounding . ach soul has for its basis 
a bodily mechanism . This body is individual and spiritual, 
na special utterance and revelation of the universe in its 
highest finite form. u 160 'The concrete self ••• is a orld 
lli thin a world of wor~ds. n161 Furthermore each self-conscious, 
finite individual is a part of the universe and reacts wi th 
the universe; \l i thout each finite self the universe would not 
1 be hat it is . This plan of the whole in which each self has 
its place is individuality. 
15?. 
158. 
159. 
160. 
161. 
Bosanq_uet , "L:eaning of Teleology,tt Proc.Brit. cad.J 
{1905-190 6) , 242. 
Loc. cit. 
Ibid.' 243 . 
Bosanquet, PIV, 158. 
Loc cit. , and also see ibid., 159. 
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4 . Teleology below, in , and 
above finite consciousness . 
There is a teleology below consciousness . Bodily life 
in animals and men has not been sustained by intelligence; 
neither has the body at any particular stage of evolution 
been molded by mind conscious of t ha t stage; a deeper vli sdom 
in the structure of environment determines each phase of evo-
lution . There is no conscious wisdon in natural selection. 
Furthremore, tt ,,ran t s mind and :purposes presuppose , accept, a nd 
are founded on , his actual body; the plant-mind , if there is 
162 
one , presupposes and accepts the plant-form. " Iand at the 
beginning must have been too weak to mold the body . Indeed 
the orchid has no mind to t each it t o fert i lize ; neither is 
man taugh t by mind to swallow or digest . 
Teleology involves consciousness "at a relatively high 
163 . 
level . " The conscious self is the product of a long continu-
ous evolution from unconsciousness to consciousness; it comes 
"as the climax and revelation when the underground s elf emerges 
164 into relative completeness . " Finite persons awaken to a 
I unity with a mind and will greater than theirs . 165 I.:en con-
sciously do their work and meet the conditions as understood , 
162 . 
163 . 
164. 
165 . 
Bosanquet , PIV , 154. 
Loc . cit . 
Bo san que t , "Meaning of Teleology , n Pro c . Br 1 t . 
~. , ( 1905-1906) 245 . 
l~rui rhead, BHF , 106 . 
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but this work has a relation to the whole which the men did 
lnot foresee . 
hence comes this wisdom? Certainly not from mechanism 
or epiphenomenalism which rightly explain variety and adapta-
tion by "qualitative relations between homogeneous units , n 
166 but which are "hypostasised abstractions" and not self -
subsistent and not guided by their self-consciousness alone . 
Bosanquet grants a large place for determinateness in finite 
consciousness . However, he does not regard isolated and con-
tentless finite subjects ttas guides and masters of nature and 
of history . "167 The stress by mechanism on finite conscious -
1ness denies "supreme individuality" which to finite mind ap-
"S 
pears from below as necessity in nature , and from above~evolu-
tion or providence. The truth for Bosanquet is that providen-
ce and nature provide for the finite consciousness its content 
and place in the orld of order . He sees no way to account 
for determinateness or mentality in inorganic or organic 
worlds from a quantity of isolated centers. Bosanquet holds 
! that all reality is of the nature of mind , including finite 
minds . Supreme individuality explains teleology better than 
,, 
materialism in that it regards "finite mindsn as not "the sole 
l68 
vehicles and determinants of teleology apart from ' a nature '. " 
166. 
16?. 
168. 
Bosanquet , PIV, 132, 133 . 
Ibid ., 133. 
Ibid., 135. 
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In nature is a stability accessible to reason. Hence , in 
spite of their differences, Bosanquet sees a kinship between 
intelligence and the unconscious. 169 
The plan o:f the world is imm.anen t in finite mind as o1 
well as in mechanical nature . Finite mind and individuality 
are "aspects of very complex and precisely determined mechan-
ical systems ••• The greater being must have the more perfect 
coherence, and the more perfe ct coherence must have the fuller 
1?0 
, content." Mind , so conceived, is the active form of total-
~~ ity or individuality. 1: 
Teleology is als o above finite consciousness . How much I 
do civilizations or geologic structures owe to finite minds? I 
Bosanquet would say: "Very little.n single mind has so lit-
tle to do with a movement that, in. relation to the whole , it 
may well be unconscious. The principle is really this: "Noth-
ing is properly due to finite mind, as such, whi ch never was a 
1?1 
plan before any finite mind ." Ire i ther an insect in a coral 
roof nor a Greek in the early days of Gree ce had a plan o:f the 
whole movement of which it was a part . It was all a principle 
of individuality above the limited consciousness of a fleeting 
lmoment. Herein lies, as we have previously noted, Bosanquet 's 
169. Bosanquet, rtpermanent Meaning of the 
from Design,'t Proc. rist. Soc ., 2, 
(1901-1902 ), 49, 50. 
1?0. Bosanquet, PIV, 146. 
1?1. Ibid., 155. 
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doctrine of providence , wherein »comprehensiveness and coher-
ence" are united and non-contradiction incarnated. 172 
F. Destiny of finite selves . 
Is the finite self ortal? What destiny awaits the 
finite self? The answer to these questions is for Bosanquet 
in the relation of individuals to individuality, i. e . the 
absolute. 
1. Participation in the absolute. 
First of all the individual does not need to wait 
J until after death to be a part or or a participant in the 
absolute. "The finite self, like everything in the universe, 
is now and here beyond escape an .element in the Absolute ."173 
Hence to be in the absolute is no new experience for an indi-
vidual. The reason is that neither eternity, nor heaven , nor 
perfection can be abstracted from that which is of time and 
I finite experience. An individual here and now participates 
in individuality (the absolute). 
2. Values ete~nally real in the absolute • 
• hat individuals really desire is not the prolongation 
of their existences after death but that fundamental values 
I are eternally real in the absolute . Si&ple and endless pro-
172. 
173. 
Bosanquet, PIV, 141; and see also 140. 
Bosanquet, VDI, 257-258. 
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longation of life as we now experience it may mean "unending 
senility" or a miserable existence . Such a view of immor-
tality, Bosanquet holds , neither guards against the risks 
174 of life nor adjusts the problem of infancy , youth and old age . 
Desire is always for something better , never si . ply for some-
thing more . For Bosanquet the problem of continuance is solved 
li by man 's security in the absolute . The individual is secure 
in individuality . 
3 . The substantial self 
includes the exclusive self . 
7 hen applying this view of the destiny of the finite 
self to immortality a serious problem is faced regarding per-
sonal identity. Is the continuance of the self to be a matter 
of degree? ill it be "conditioned by the stages of the per -
175 
sonali ty hich we are calling upon it to connect?" Bosan-
quet 's view is this: there is a difference between individu-
ality that is apparent, i . e. "exclusive self- feeling or formal 
individuality•l76 and the substantial self . The former is a 
self-conscious person . By the latter Bosanquet means "the 
II en tire self-maintaining content or living ·Torld which alone 
gives significance either to our exclusiveness or to our 
universality. n 177 The exclusive self has its proper place 
17 4 . 
175 . 
176 . 
177. 
Bosanquet, VDI, 273, and n. 
Ibid ., 276 . 
Loc . cit . 
Ibid ., 277. 
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in the substantial self. The desire of the self for the best 
is really the desire for true or complete individuality. 
Thus the self- transcendent impulse of the so- called exclusive 
self is the "impulse of i ndividual ity to complete itself and 
to include what belongs to it . «178 
4 . Conservation of finite individuals . 
Are the personalities of finite individuals to be 
conserved? Bosanq_uet finds _in Green's philosophy a strong sub-
stantiation for the conservation of self-conscious persons 
for: 
Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of 
personal worth . All other values ~~e relative 
to value for, o:f , or in a person . 1 
Je cannot believe in there being a real fUlfilment 
of such a capacity in an end which should involve 
its extinction , because of the conviction of their 
being an end in which our capacities are fulfilled 
is founded on our self- conscious personality - on 
the idea of an absolute value in a spirit which we 
ourselves are . l80 
But back of these statements in Green which support the po-
sition of personal survival Bosanquet finds a deeper meaning 
which points in the opposite direction. Green himself sees a 
discrepancy nbetween a given personality in human society and 
the complete realization of spiritual capacity . "l81 
178 . 
179. 
180 . 
181 . 
Bosanquet, VDI , 277. 
Green, PRO , Sec . 184 . 
Ibid ., Sec . 189 . 
Bosanquet , VDI , 278 . 
own position . Bosanquet concludes: 
The necessity insisted on throughout that the goal 
of development shall be nothing short of personal 
self- consciousness, does not , I think , signify for 
the author (Green, PRO) in the last resort an 
emphasis on the conscious continuance of you and me, 
with unbroken identity , keeping us one with an earthly 
past , within or into the ultimate being . In the 
last resort I believe that it means simply and solely 
this: that the contents , the interests , the quali-
tative experience and fo cu s sing of externality , 
which our best - i . e . our whole in its fullest adjust-
ment - and the centre of our being , for which so far 
as we understand ourselves we would readily sacrifice 
our nominal self - that all these things find their 
full development in the ultimate being , and in a form 
130 
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Bosanquet quotes at length from Green182 to substantiate his 
own position. Bosanquet concludes: 
The necessity insisted on throughout that the goal 
of development shall be nothing short of personal 
self-consciousness, does not, I think, signify for 
the author (Green , PRO) in the last resort an 
emphasis on the conscious continuance of you and me , 
with unbroken identity, keeping us one with an earthly 
past, ithin or into the ultimate being. In the 
l ast resort I believe that it means simply and solely 
this: that the contents, the interests, the quali-
tative experience and focussing of externality, 
which our best - i . e . our ~hole in its fullest adjust-
ment - and the centre of our being, for which so far 
as we understand ourselves we would readily sacrifice 
our nominal self - that all these things find their 
full development in the ultimate being, and in a form 
of experience not lower , but higher, than hat we call 
personality . In a word , then, what is held essential 
is not primarily that the goal of development should 
be~ nersonality, but that it should be~ person-
ality.i53 
Green would thus see no i nconsistency in the view that a self-
conscious personality coming from God could be continued in 
God . And with this view Bosanquet is in accord . 
5. Absolute individuality 
transcends finite selves. 
The destiny of a given finite self or personality 
is to be transcended in the absolute individuality . This 
destiny is in evidence in the finite self when one's past 
appears as an unfriendly non-self; and as progress is made 
toward perfection the Duperfection of one 1 s own past becomes 
182 . Green, PRO, Sects, 185, 187. See Bosan~uet 
VDI, 279-281 . 
183. Bosanquet, VDI, 281- 282. 
more and more manifest . In fact , approach to perfection would 
tend to include more and more t hat which would be called the 
,.,;nd of others . 184 On ' t lf · n d b · th"' ~ e s presen se 1s a secon 1r 
resulting fron friendships , and other social experiences; and 
future selves will be the result of still further enrichment 
from social intercourse . Thus the identity of the self at 
any moment would be difficult . Bosanquet concludes that 
true personality l ies in our concrete best , and 
that in desiring its development and satisfaction 
we are desiring an increase of our real individ-
uality , through a diminution of our formal exclu-
siveness . l85 
The perfection which an individual desires cannot then be 
identified vti th or measured by the incidents or conditions 
of earthly existence. 
At this point three views of immortality call ror an 
explanation in the light of Bosanquet's philosophy. These are 
subjective immortality , reincarnation , and Nirvana . Subjective 
~ortality has for Bosanquet elements of truth inasmuch as 
the remembrance of persons is never annihilated even though 
the nrune is long since forgotten . But such subjective Dnffior-
tality deais only with fragments of personality and in the ligh 
of the long history of man and of the planet can give no per-
184 . Bosanquet , VDI, 283. 
185 . Ibid . , 284; and see also 285 . 
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manent satisfaction . Reincarnation or metempsychosis is a 
nbelief in an eternal realn which conserves our values . l86 
In the doctrine of Nirvana Bosanquet sees a real desire on 
the part of large numbers of people to be absorbed in God 
anp. to be "willing to abandon what they are acc-ustomed to 
call their personality. rt187 
A vita~ point in Bosanquet ' s thinking is therefore 
manent satisfaction . Reincarnation or metempsychosis is a 
ttbelief in an eternal real n which conserves our values •186 
In the doctrine of Nirvana Bosanquet sees a real desire on 
the part of large numbers of people to be absorbed in God 
an9, to be "willing to abandon what they are accustomed to 
187 
call their personaLity. 
vital point in Bosanquet ' s thinking is therefore 
that individuaLs can care for that which transcends them more 
than for their finite seLves , and that in this attitude of 
transcendence is sem the true essence of finite selves . 
The deepest longings of the seLf are for a complete 
harmonization in which ndiscrepancies and repulsionstt are 
188 
"transmuted into forms of harmony . n For instance , the 
mother who longs for the child and not a 'tcomplete and per-
189 fected personality" does not desire the relative best . 
One cannot desire both continuance of present consciousne£s 
II and completeness in which all relative elements are compre-
1 hended . The former is an earthly individuaL; the latter is 
true individuality (the absolute) . 
• 
186 . 
187 . 
188 . 
189 • 
Bosan~uet, VDI , 270 . 
Ibid ., 271 . 
Ibid ., 286. 
Loc . cit. 
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G. Individuality as absolute and personal . 
Individuality may be either an atom or a world . 
Neither can be divided . Bosan~uet ' s view is the latter for 
ultimately •tthere can .be only one individual , and that the 
· d · · d 1 the Absolute . "190 J.n J.VJ. ua , 
1. Finite selves in the absolute. 
The absolute includes all finite selves in a complete 
whole . The absolute •tis the high- water mark of fluctuations 
in experience,"191 and not a being foreign to fluctuating fi-
ni te experience . 
In principle •.•• the Absolute is only the totality 
of a hold on reality whi ch permeates in its degree 
all the conscious creatures of the creation, and 
uses all its externality . l92 
Even impotence must find its place in an all- inclusive abso-
l t t f l ·t 193 E l"f th . u e or sys em o rea J. y . lvery J. e us experJ.ences 
194 the absolute for it is in the absolute . ttThe mere indi-
vidual no1here exists."195 On the other hand , complete pos-
session of selves is the absolute . 196 In the absolute, finite 
selves , though relatively independent, are adjectival , not 
substantive . 197 
II 
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191. Ibid ., 378, and also 374 n . 
192 . Ibid ., 382 . 
193 . Ibid., 260 . 
194 . Ibid., 378 n . 
195 . Bosan~uet , SP , 97 . 
196 . Ibid .' 93 . 
197 . Ibid ., 90, 95, 97 . 
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Finite individuals as predicates are really ~orlds 
within the absolute . 198 Finite se l ves, by willing the uni-
versal , are free from self- contrad i·cti on : therein is freedom 
and independence . Not only is the unity of sel ves in the 
absolute found in continui t y but in lateral unity of the ex-
periences of communal or co-existent identity . No one can 
love or hate as he wishes . Love , social morality , or religion 
are but 
.an introduction to a higher individuality , of which 
the plural persons are instruments l i ke the carbons 
of an arc light . They are contacts which draw1e~ the for ces of the universe , not on themselves . 
For Bosan~uet a finite sel~ or personality is a temporal ex-
istence whereas a finite individual extends his temporal 
reality through his influence and so gives npermanent q_uali-
fications"200 to the 0orld . 
Our brief existence is the temporal appearance or 
some character of the whole, such as , in any case , 
constitutes a very great part of the finite indi-
vidual t s reality as experienced in the world . For 
what ap~ars as a passage in time , the Absolute has 
need to express itself through us as very subordinate 
units ••• The Absolute lives in us a little , and for 
a little tLffie ; when its life demands our existence 
no longer , we yet blend with it as the pervading 
features or characters , which we were needed for 
a passing moment to emphasize , and in which our 
reality enri ches the universe . 201 
198 . 
199 . 
20 0 . 
201. 
Bos anquet , SP , 99 . 
Ib id., 109 . 
Ibid ., 111. 
ro id., 112 . 
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2 . Non- temporal . 
"The bsolute is non- temporal . " 202 Tenporal cons cious-
ness at its lowest is mere su ccession ; sequence _can only g ive 
II the i r:1perfect and incomplete . Time might be thought of as 
I dropping on a smooth area , and so , distributed , grows and 
II organizes itself . High- grade history presents not a succes-
sion of occurences 
but a systemati c unity , casually connected together , 
and logically and ethically in the closest proximity 
to ourselves . 203 
Through succession new material may be added to our world . 
II But in the higher diale c tic of mind , as in art , relig ion , and 
philosophy , spirit almost conquers time . Bosanquet sees 
1 "the evanescence of Time in all the higher intellectual 
· processes . " 204 . Time is not a del us ion but a form of reality 
I 
t! forged in experience . It is a part which implies ''a truly 
I 
II 
concrete whole , " and which finds its perfection in that of the 
whole . 
3 . Logical whole . 
The absolute is individuality in that it is the logical 
whole . It is a conclusion which transcends the premises . 
Logic , which Bosanquet calls the "spi rit of totality" and 
205 
"the impulse toi'l'ard unity anO. coheren ce , tt is the yearning 
202 . 
203 . 
204 . 
205 . 
BosanQuet , VDI , 257. 
Bosanquet , SP , 117 , and see also 116 . 
Ibid .' 118 . 
Bosanquet , PIV, 23 , 340 . 
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of the parts for the whole to which they belong . Logic is 
also seen in the search by the absolute for completion in 
finite experience . Only in the absolute being is present 
"the awareness of a whole reshaping itself according to the 
full significance of the constituent contents." 206 
This logical whole included all differences, but has 
no place for contradictions . Individuality as absolute is 
this same principle of non-contradiction or logical perfec-
tion . 
This then is the nerve of logical determination, 
viz . the removal of error or contradiction by means 
of a positive union in which data or premises destroy 
each other's defects, and gives rise to a new to-
tality whieh transcends its factors . 207 
Life as well as metaphysical thought works with i mperfect 
data and premises in perfecting the whole , that is , individu-
1 ali ty . 
I 
4 . Concrete universal . 
Individuality in the absolute is a concrete universal 
which includes both likenesses and differences. Differences 
can be united by reference to a whole of parts, an organism, 
a world , or a cosmos . Bosan~uet especially favors the idea 
of the world or cosmos in which each menber by his peculiar 
I differences contributes to the world-unity. 
206 . 
207 . 
Bosanquet, PIV, 382. 
Ibid ., 264 . 
See also 263 . 
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Such a di versity recognized as a unity , a macro-
cosm constituted by microcosms , is the type of 
the concrete universal . 208 
In this concrete universal "truth may be defined as the whole . " 
The ascent or transition from incompleteness to completeness , 
or from diversity to unity is like ascending a hill _by various 
l paths; the top is reached whether thought , feeling , or vrill 
is the starting point . This world or whole of the concrete 
universal is individuality , in which beauty and ugliness , 
largeness and smal lness , appear so on the basis of fragmentary , 
not world judgr:1.ents . In the 11most self- contained world which 
209 finite minds can attain to from any given point" there will 
always be a discursive element . Intuitivel y , thought , in the 
concrete universal , is not an orphan running to and fro ; it is 
l at home with itself . 
Form , interdep enden ce , significance , self-completeness 
are characters as of thought at its best , so of vital-
ity at its highest . This is the general character 
by which the concrete universal gives us the clue to 
the individual. 210 
In the absolute is ''the concrete unit of life . n 211 Further-
ll more , all finite selves in the concrete universal need the 
212 
absolute ; one must also say that "the Absolute needs us . " 
II 
208 . Bosanquet , PIV , 38 . 
209 . Ibid ., 56 . 
210 . Ibid ., 59 . 
211 . Bosanquet , Proc. Ari st . Soc., 1, N. S. 
(1 900 - 1901 )' 86 . 
212 . Bosanquet , SP , 222 . 
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5. Bosanquet's view of theism. 
Bosanquet sees in the "strict Theismn of tradition a 
limited a nd finite God which fails to satisfy him. This God 
owes his existence, he thinks, to the mystical experience of 
man. It is the product of the imagination and as such is 
con ceived as Father, Creator, Providence. This God of the 
imag ination is not a universe; it is finite. 213 
11 God is identified with the finite struggle against 
evil. The God of Theism cannot be perfection for evil is 
ll not annihilated. Good and evil are "noted" in t he God of 
traditional religion. 214 
This God of Theism is isolated from nature and finite 
souls. H . t t"t th t •t• 215 f e is JUS one en 1 y among o er en 1 1es. I 
independent, God and one's neighbors are not related. 216 
II Is the God of Theism real? Bosanquet thinks not. God 
in Theism is but "an appearance of reality." 217 It is a being 
ll which man builds in his own image, and separates from himself; 
the infinite is construed in terms of the finite. 218 Theism 
in the orthodox form would be destroyed, Bosanquet thinks, by 
11 a doctrine of imnanence for then God would not be guiding the 
I universe from without, and apart from men. 
213. Bosanquet, VDI, 244. 
214. Ibid., 251. 
215. Ibid., 244, 245. 
216. Ibid., 134. 
217. Ibid., 255, and see also 256. 
218. Ibid., 134. 
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219 Or tta measure of i nnnanence't is necessary for a grace system, 
for ethical improvement , and for co pensation after death . 
I But the Theist cannot grant compl ete i mmanence or his system 
will fall . 220 
6 . Theism and the problem of evil • . 
Theism, as BosanQuet understands it, identifies God 
ith the struggle against evil . Such a God cannot be per-
fection or the absolute in which all evil is absorbed . In 
fact evil is not annihilated by the God of the theists; 
nevertheless God is interested in the triumph of good and 
so he is the Lord of finite minds . God is not an absolute 
! but "the representative of the universe hen considered as 
221 
overcoming evil by good . " 
God, we may say , is for us the world-consciousness, 
to which all consciousnesses are contributory , 
in respect only for a certain nisus or characteristic, 
viz . ~ts2~~titude to or in the genesis and absorption Of GVll . 
7 . Creator f creators . 
BosanQuet 's central attack on theism is his vie~ of 
'' creator of creators. " His argument is this: personal 
God who wills human wills must also will the whole content 
of human wills . 
219 . 
220 . 
221. 
222 . 
BosanQuet , VDI , 135 . 
Loc . cit . 
Ibid ., 250 . 
Ibid ., 250-251 . 
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It is a contradiction to say that God , being a 
person separate from man , wills that man should 
have a will; but that man can use the will as . 
he pleases . To will a will is to will its detail . 223 
Bosanquet finds g ood evidence for his position in 
224 
Vatke, Mens chliche , Freiheit . Vatke's argument is this: 
Two views of freedom confront men . One is that the human 
will is free; that a man determines his life from wi thin, 
and that without co~peration from God . To think that one can 
have God the author of freedom, and at the same time, to 
identify human and divine wills is self-deception . Self -
1 determination is scarcely God ' s s e lf-determination . 
There is a second view of freedom, namely , that deter-
l mination by God and by men is really the same quality . The 
\ very condition of freedom lies in the particula rity of the 
self . There is no difference between the plan of freedom 
I and the practi ce of freedom . r:o help comes to men if God 
l limits himself by creating free personalities . The existence 
of freedom is the exercise of freedom; to try to· establish 
I 
a border line between t he divine plan for freedom and the 
human experience of will is futile. If God should remove 
his parti cipation in human activity, the very existence of 
what we call human freedom would be destroyed . 
223. Bosanquet , VDI , 136 . Italics mine . 
224 . P . 401; quoted by Bosanquet, VDI , 136- 13? . 
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Bosanquet , as Vatke, sees in the argwnent of Theism 
ll for the creator of creators a failure "to recognize the unity 
f h d . . .11 225 J.t ti i t gh o uman- ~v~ne- -~ ; coupera on s no enou • This 
position Bosanquet takes in order to preserve freedom . Free-
dom , he contends , is only possible when ttthe divine will is 
genuinely one with that of finite beings , in a single person-
226 
ality . To create creators (as in Theism) is for Bosanquet 
self- contradiction. In his view of religion the will of the 
fin ite is absorbed in the perfe ct , good , and so real will of 
,I the universe . There can be no volition which is not "techni-
cally transcendent , n for in the finite - infinite nature of 
self- transcendence the partial self is affirmed against the 
good and infinite whole or individuality ith which the frag-
227 
mentary self is identified . 
8 . The absolute as divine individuality . 
Bosanquet , for reasons stated under Theism , refrains 
rather consis tently from the use of the word God when speak-
ing of the absolute . Yet a few references indicate that if 
the term God could be used free from association i7i th its 
traditional and restricted meaning he would regard God and 
I 
absolute as identical . e have noted that human and divine 
wills are united in finite mind . This will is individuality . 
225 . 
226 . II 227 . 
P . 401 ; quoted by Bosanquet , VDI, 136-137 . 
Bosanquet , VDI , 244 , n. 1 . 
Ibid ., 245 . One exception is cited, namely, 
a finite supreme being . n . 2 . 
II 
I 
II 
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Evil, which in the finite is rebellion , is transformed in the 
divine will or absolute . 
Certain passages are more definite as to Bosanquetts 
vie of God . He says he is prepared, among other possibili-
228 
ties, to believe in a God . . hen thinking of a higher self 
to be obeyed by himself and others he says that this is "in 
God . tt But where shall God be fotmd? Bosanquet suggests that 
God is found by being identified with the best . He is found 
ever~vhere and nouhere; everywhere in suggestions 
and broken lights ; nowhere complete;. but in some 
religions completer than in others . ~29 
Some trained judgment of the good is one's criterion for 
judging completeness , hannony of will , and supreme values . 
In this way God is found . 
Bosanquet regards the human- divi ne unity as infinite . 
So if God = the Absolute , He must i n clude man , as the abso-
lute includes everything . " This is especially difficult, 
he th:imks , if God is thought of as personal , although ttto a 
great degree we treat God ' s will and man 1 s as one . "230 . 
Nevertheless , Bosanquet does not tidentify God with the 
Absolute" because all meaning transcends irnmediacy . 231 
Bosanquet admits neither "personal relations with the divinett 
no r the identity of the divine with the absolute; the latter , 
228 . 
22.9 . 
230 . 
231 . 
Muirhead , BHF , 44 . 
Ibid ., 203 . 
Ibid.' 243 . 
Ibid ., 265 . 
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however , is more possib~e . Bosanq_uet's objection to 
"personal intercourse 'Ni th ultimate reality" is that "per-
sona~ intercourse must be with what is one among others and 
1 u~tima te reality must be what is all-inclusive . 232 
I 
Bosanquet thus favors absolute as the all- inclusive term for 
it is always and everywhere active , and that wi thout limita-
tion or contradiction. 233 
Bosanq_uet does have a mystical. strain which transcends 
the immediate , and this mysticism gives him a clue to God as 
if God were individuality . He says that man 
Again: 
can find no final satisfaction till it completes 
itself in the knowledge and thought of God , in 
union with whom alone the individual comes to be 
that which he real ly is . 234 
1e must know what is right , what we call God ' s will, 
by finding it in our own will . And we must do 
what is right, what we call God ' ~ 'gill , because 
we find that it is our own will . 3 
Bosanquet would see God rs Kingdom coming wherever men are 
doing their best for human society. 
'i' hen two or three. are gathered together , . coBperating 
for a social good , there is the Divine Spirit in 
the midst of them. 236 
232 . 
233 . 
234 . 
235 . 
236 . 
tmirhead , BHF , 212 . 
Ibid., 271- 272 . 
Bosanquet , SP , 359 . 
Ibid.' 339 . 
Ibid ., 344.. 
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Inclusive of every experience is man ' s experience 
with the absalute . 237 Perfect satisfaction is in this can-
t . 1 238 ere e unJ.versa • Goad and evil are unnated in the absolute 
I far they are absorbed in 
is not needed except far 
240 
is ultimate reality; 
its perfection; in fact the absolute 
th bl .1 239 e pro em of evJ. • The absolute 
God , an appearance of reality. 
But the absolute is nat a separate being after the model of 
a man as in traditional Theism . The absolute is the supreme 
I 
being, the infinite spirit experienced by the finite t"in love 
241 
and in the will to perfection . ~ Stab ility and security far 
finite individuals are realized in the reality and value 
experienced in the absolute as individuality . 
23? . 
238 . 
239 . 
240 . 
241 . 
Bosan~uet , PIV , 29 . 
Basan~uet , VDI , 226. 
Ibid ., 249, 250 . 
Ibid . , 255; Bosanq_ue t , 
Basan~uet , VDI, 256. 
p' 328 . 
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CHAPTER VI. 
BOSAN~UET'S INFLUENCE UPON PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 
A. Upon British thought. 
Bosanquet•s influence in England is that o~ a specula-
tive thinker in the. ~ater nee-Hegelian movement. Metz1 gives 
first place to Bradley and McTaggart as metaphysicians but 
follows immediately with Bosanquet and others. Metz pictures 
the swift decline of the ideal.istic movement since the death 
ot Bosanquet (1923}, Bradley (192.4'), McTaggart and ard (1925 J. 
Nevertheless he sees this period as the age when the British 
mind, wedding itself to those of Kant and Hegel, ,Produced a 
mighty revolution and renewal of thinking, which even yet 
lives on as a quickening and fructifying force in the very 
different philosophy prevalent in Britain to-day.' 2 Green 
prepares the ground but the systems of Bradley, Bosanquet, 
McTaggart and others bring his work in to maturity. Further-
more, these men were later Hegelians who ttextended and trans-
formed the German thought too much ••• to regard them as medi-
ating its content to the British mind with anything like 
pur1ty.n3 
1. HPB, 255. 
2. Metz, HPB, 258. 
3. Ibid., 287. 
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1. Sir Henry Jones (1852-1922). 
Jones marks the difference between the older and newer 
forms of Hegelianism. He it is who feels that criticism must 
be levelled at the distortions and falsifications of older 
Hegelians by Bradley and Bosanquet. Particularly, is he sharp 
against Bosanquet, wno in reality is far nearer Hegel than 
Bradley. Jones is a monist but sees in Bosanquet not mnnisn 
but dualism, as for example, finite and infinite, appearance 
and reality, reaative and absolute. Jones further opposes 
the absorption of self in the absolute. "Jones thus substi-
tuted for Bosanquet•s self-transcendence, self-realization 
4 
and self-protection." Active and pragmatic as he is Jones 
thinks Bosanquet too contemplative and quietistic. In his 
efforts to separate Bosanquet•s view of the ideal and the real 
into two worlds he misunderstands Bosanquet who links both 
worlds into one. 
2. Clement c. J. Webb, (1865- ----). 
The absolute idealism of Webb aims chiefly to revise 
the view of Bradley and Bosanquet with special emphasis on 
religious experience and Christian theology. Webb would wor-
ship the absolute as God for to him they are identical. 
4. Metz, HBP, 304. 
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5 Just before Bosanquat's death he wrote to Webb regarding God. 
He said that if God is the absolute, he must include every-
thing, and this is impossible if God is personal. Another 
vital point of suggestion is discovered in Bosanquet's 
correspondence with Webb. Webb had referred to Kpersonal 
6 intercourse •••• with ultimate reality." Bosanquet objects 
to this for it would mean "one among others," whereas ulti-
mate reality for Bosanquet is not all-inclusive. Bosanquet 
does suggest 't-the basis of all personal relations" as a better 
7 phrase. On this and the preceding Webb seems somewhat con-
~i~ed in his own view. 
On one point, at least, Bosanquet•s thinking leaves a 
deep impression on ebb. The problem under discussion is 
that of faith and works. Bosanquet writes that his view is 
grounded in the New Testament; that works which make for 
progress are only possible where there is religious faith. 
The paradox, 'to be realized because real' is not 
a phrase, but the real power of life. Surely the 
relation is everywhere known and received as real, 
at least where Christianity is known ••• You 
only get the fUllest work ~here you have the 
deepest and highest faith. 
Later Webb answers Croce9 by using the preceding quotation 
from Bosanquet as if he is both fully 1n accord with Bosan-
5, Muirhead, BBF, 24lff. 
6. Webb, GP, 239. 
7. Muirhead, BHF, 212. 
8. ~uoted in Muirhead, BHF, Z42. Letter to Webb dated 
H:an. 15, 1923. 
9. CBP, II, 352. 
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~uet's views on faith and is expressing a new appreciation 
of Bosanquet's re~igious conviction. 
3. Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (1856-1931). 
Pr~ngle-Pattison tried to bring together the philoso-
phies of Bradley, Bosan~uet, McTaggart and Ward into one sys-
tem. Pringle-Pattison reacts against the absolutism o~ 
Bradley and Bosanquet by reviving Theism and exalting persons. 
Persons, whether God or men are impenetrable.. Pringle-Pattison 
divides Hegelianism into absolutist and. personalist. Of'" the 
tour philosophers previously mentioned Bosan~uet is the chief 
contributor to Pringle-Pattison's metaphysic; and it is through 
Bosanquet that he clarifies his own ideas.lO In the second 
series of Pringle-Pattison's Gifford lectures Bosanquet is 
called by him "'perhaps the most representative in. this country 
of an idealistic or spiritual ph1losophy.n11 
What are the evidences of direct in~luence? Pringle-
Pattison defends Bosanquet's Theory of Judgment in Studies 
. 
in Logical Theory (1903} edited by John Dewey. In his book 
Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays Pringle-Pattison 
says: 
Bosanquet has taught more persuasively than any 
living writer the unity of experience and the fallacy 
of all dualistic conceptions •. 12 
10. Pringle-Pattison, LOG, Chaps. 12, 14, 15. 
ll. II,l52. 
12. Muirhead, BBF, 113. 
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In ~909 Pringle-Fa tti son proposes Bosanquet 's name for tvl'o 
series of the Gifford lectures. This is accepted in Jan., 
1910, much to the joy of Pringle-Pattison who telegraphs 
his congratulations. After Pringle-Pattison's lectures have 
been given Bosanquet is sent the proofs of The ~dea of God. 
Their practical attitudes are not far apart. In fact Pringle-
Pattison states that if he should write again on the destiny 
of the soul he would have Bosanquet's chapter open before him. 
In Pringle-Pattison's Gifford lectures (in 1912-1913), 
following Bosanquet's last series, Bosanquetts influence is 
best discerned. Pringle-Pattison is impressed with Bosanquet' 
13 
notion that a finite sel~ is to be made and on, that con-
tingency and struggle are the lot and even the glory of indi-
viduals;14 that ~anence and continuity are metaphysically 
sound; 15 that secondary and tertiary (beauty and sublimity) 
qualities are as essential as primary; 16 that "relevancy 
17 
rather than uniformity" is basic in law; that the transitio 
from finite to infinite is apprehended through concrete con-
tent; that the individual draws its life from the universal 
and is organically one with it; and that ideals are most r~al~ 
He even accepts Bosanquet•s adjectival theory of finite selves 
when set in contrast to the substantival theory and defined 
13. Pringle-Pattison, IOG, 413. 
14. Ibid., 416. 
15. Ibid., 99. 
16. Ibid., 122, 127. 
17. Ibid., 186-187. 
18. Ibid., 262, 251, 308. 
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as the ~denial of unrelated ends."l9 
But Pringle-Pattison has his objections to crucial 
points in Bosanquetts theory. He says that the absolute, 
as well as finite selves, is to be made and won; that finite 
selves may be as much of an end as the absolute; that selves 
rather than vanishing in the absolute are building up their 
true unique selves by growth; and that the divine and finite 
wills are not in a single personality. 20 
In summarizing his chapter on nrdealism and Pan-
psychisn" Pringle-Pattison concludes With a statement entirely 
in accord with Bosanquet. 
It is sufficient for the purpose of Idealism that 
nature as a whole should be recognized as compli-
mentary to mind, and possessing therefore no abso-
lute existence of its own apart from its spiritual 
completion; just as mind in turn would be intellec-
tually and ethically void without a world to furnish 
it with the materials of knowledge and duty. Both are 
necessary elements of a single system.21 
4. A. E. Taylor {18&9- ----). 
Bos&.nquet 
Taylor, one of Bradley's closest friends, succeeded 
in his chair at St. Andrews University. 
Taylor, especially in his earlier works, is closer to 
Bosanquet's views than Pringle-Pattison. He grants Bosanquet's 
point that the complete individual is the all-embracing experi- j 
19. 
20. 
Pringle-Pattison, IOG9 274. 
Ibid., 413, 262, 294. 
Ibid., 106, 189. 
I 
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ence of reality wherein is harmony and coherence. There is but 
one perfect individual; "subordinate individuals can never be 
wholly and entirely individual in themselves.~22 Selves are 
contradictory if isolated from reality. Discord is lost in 
an absolute whole. 23 Individuality has degrees; there is no 
meaning in higher or lower individuality if ultimately .indi-
viduality is not ·one. 24 Taylor agrees w1 th Bosanquet that 
ideas must die to be projected into the future. 25 Taylor 
described Bosanquet as ~Green's distinguished continuator," 26 
and that he can only contemplate the Value and Destiny of the 
Individual •with admiring envy.n 27 
In spite of the many agreements with Bosanquet, Taylor 
disagrees with him on several points. ith Pringle-Pattison 
Taylor criticizes Bosanquet's theory of soul-making as an 
illusion. He sees in Bosanquet's discussion of elaims and 
countePclaims a convenient argument for his view of the un-
reality of human personalities. In The Faith of a Moralist 
(1930) Taylor does not hesitate to go beyond Bosanquet in 
28 describing God as ~the absolute and final good, and 
ttthe concrete unity of all good in its aource." 29 He further-
more says that the 'supreme good' takes on the tull eharacter 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
2.8. 
29. 
----
Taylor, E. M, 113. 
Ibid.' 11.5. 
Ibid.' 113, 117. 
Taylor, FM, I, 333. 
Ibid., I, 143. 
Ibid.' 308. 
FM, I, 105. 
Ibid. ,xi. 
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30 
of a living, spiritual, and personal God," and that God ra-
tionalLy and purposefully governs the world, while allowing 
31 for ttcreated moral agents.tt 
5. Reinhold F. A. Hoernle (1880 - ----). 
Hoernle is Bosanquet•s assistant at St. Andre s· and 
one of his closest friends. Like Bosanquet (MECP) Hoernle 
tries the synoptic method as he draws from many sources. 
However, he owes more to Bosanque t than to any writer. His 
extensive correspondence with Bosanquet keeps him in close 
contact with his thought. In his writings Bosanquet's thought 
is featured; especially is this txue in his Idealism as a 
Philosophy, wherein much o~ the book centers in Bosanquet's 
absolute idealism. 
Many are the influences of Bosanquet on Hoernle but 
; 
only a few will be chosen. Hoernle sees in Bosanquet one 
of the idealists drawing on Kant, Fichte, and H~ge.;t to comb.at 
the empiricisa of Mill, the naturalism of Spencer, and the 
positivimn of Comte. Rosanquet's view is the version of ab-
solute idealism selected by Hoernl~. Matter is seen to be 
as real as mind; this is partly Berkeleyan and partly realism. 
Through Kant and Hegel so inte~reted he sees the poverty of 
empiricism. Through Bosanquet Hoernle shares Mills' enthu-
30. 
31. 
FM, I, 159. 
FM, II, 42.3. 
See also ibid., 208. 
See also ibid.~ 421. 
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for humanity but not his religion of humanity. Bosan-
quetreaches an active form of totality through four steps: per-
ception, active thought, universal principles, wholeness of 
experience. Significant for Hoernle is Rosanquet's method 
ot proceeding from nature, to mind, to the absolute. From 
early humanism, with mind as the culmination, Bosanquet ar-
rives at his view of the absolute as expounded in the Gifford 
lectures (PIV, VDI}. , In the absolute Hoernle finds not blood-
less categories or thought but the problems of the day, as 
for example, tensions, harmonies, struggles, victories, high 
ater fluctuations, a ceaseless transmutation of toil to 
happiness, hardship to happiness, discord into harmony. Here 
is the give and take of minds in a total spiritual achieve-
ment, in a ftworld of spiritual membership.ft32 Here Hoernl~ 
finds no cushion tor a moral holiday. 33 In this view of the 
absolute, facts, value, the real, and the ideal are one. The 
absolute gives all life its content. Hoernle is sympathetic 
to Bosanquet in avoiding the identification of God with the 
absolute. God is indeed a high degree of truth, but not the 
hole of reality.34 I ith Bosanquet Hoernle combats the idea 
of putting God off into another world when the absolute is 
here and now. 1ithal Hoernle regards Bosan~uet as thoroughly 
32. Bosanquet, VDI, 14?. 
33. Hoernle, IAP, 249. 
34. Ibid., 313. 
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Christian, especially in his mature vie or the atonement as 
the suffering of one born by all. Hoernle finds in Bosanquet 
ftthe best of logic and the best of life.n35 
No other modern philosopher, we may safely affirm, 
has set himself so ambitious a task or eane so near 
to success in carrying it out.36 
B. Influence on continental thought. 
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Christian, especially in his mature view of the atonement as 
the suffering of one born by all. Hoernle finds in Bosanquet 
"the best of lmgic and the best of life."35 
No other modern philosopher, we may safely affirm, 
has set himself so ambitious a task or eome ·so near 
to success in carrying it out.36 
B. Influence on continental thought. 
Bosanquet's influence on continental Europe was very 
slight. Little attention has been given to him in the philo-
sophica1 writings of France and Germany. Reference has al-
ready been made in Chapt·er I to Pfannenstill' s (SWedish} 
interest in Bosanquet's political philosophy. 
Bosanquet's clearest contribution was to the neo-
Idealism of Italy. Although he had visited Italy frequently 
and had studied the language it was during the last years of 
his life that he as in close communication with Italian 
philosophers. After criticizing Croce's Aesthetics he read 
widely in Italian thought. Convinced of the need of an ex-
change of British-Italian thought Bosanquet arranged with 
ind and Italian Journals for articles arid book reviews in 
a mutual exchange of views. Bosanquet, himself, was deluged 
with books and lengthy correspondence. He was able not only 
to read but to write articles in Italian. With due modesty 
35. Hoernle, lAP, 315. 
36. Ibid., 267. 
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Bosanquet recommended Bradley's philosophy to Italy. In many 
ways, he was a philosophical bridge between Italy and England. 
Bosanquet was in direct contact with the younger philo-
sophers in Italy. Croce's works were read and criticised. 
Camillo Pellizzi studied in England and on his return corres-
ponded with Bosanquet. Gentile asked. Bosanquet to write an 
article for his journal, Giornale· Cri tico, on Carlini's 
La Vita della Spirito. The issue raised by Bosanquet was 
the basic difference between their philosophies, n~ely, 
nature as constituted, created and past, vs •. mind or spirit 
37 
as constitutive, creative, future. Bosanquet was accused 
of identifying idea~ism with naturalism. His answer to this 
38 
charge appeared in Giorna~e Critico in March, 1923. Carlini 
published replies to Bosanquet's criticisms and corresponded 
with Bosanquet. Carlini offered Bosanquet a definition of 
God as nthe absolute subject and the absolute object.n39 
Most intimate ot all the younger men was Signor Lello 
Vivante. Bosanquet's first letter to him was dated March 5, 
~920. Books were freely exchanged with him as with the other 
Italian philosophers. Vi vante acknowledged the influence of 
'Bradley and Bosanquet in his book, Del~a intelligenza nel~' 
expressione {~92Z). After exchanging ideas Bosanquet said: 
37. Muirhead, BHF, 255-256. 
38. And so after his death. 
39. Muirhead, BHF, 293. 
15·6 
----~==tt=-============-=:=-====-=--====~=== 
I have a strong feeling that we are really in truth 
fighting on the same side; and that your attivita 
and my nisus to the whole are different aspects of 
the same impulse and experience.40 
Under the date Sept. 22, 1922 Vivante wrote to Bosanquet this 
pointed request: ni shall be quite pleased if you run the 
41 glowing iron of your criticism ••••• into my thought.n 
A~ter Bosanq~et's death the editor of Giornale added 
these words to the announcement of Bosanquet' s death': 
We are particularly grieved, seeing that we lose in 
him a warm friend of our philosophical movement. In 
England he was ranked with justice amongst the most 
living and fertile writers in philosophy; to the 
problems of which even at an4~dvanced age he devoted a youthful activity. 
c. On American thought. 
1. Early and scattered influences. 
For half a century after illiam Harris (1835-1909) 
migrated to st. Louis in 1857 that city was a Hegelian center 
in America. Hegelians in America as in England were called 
objective idealists. These held 
a form of idealism which was b~oadly indistinguishable 
from realism and ~~s destined to make a regular 
alliance with it. 
Among the regular contributors to Hegelian thought in America 
was Bernard Bosanquet. 44 Hegelian echoes on this side of the 
4 . Muirhead, BHF, 268. 
41. Ibid., 289. 
42 • Ibid., 303. 
43. Townsend, PIUS, 128. 
44. See Philos. Rev., 2.6 (1917), 4ff. 
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45 Atlantic were John Dewey's article on "Speculation" and 
J. E. Creighton's on Two Types of Idealism..'t46 But in 
,I St. Louis The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
., 
harped on the 'concrete' universal and found it 
embodied in the objective order of society and 
nature.47 
A realism was developing in America under c. s. Pierce 
and Josiah Royce which was allied. not with n~ivRte nRvnhn-
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45 Atlantic were ~ohn Dewey's article on "Speculation" and 
J. E. Creighton's on "Two Types of Idealism."46 But in 
St. Louis The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
harped on the 'concrete' universal and found it 
embodied in the objective order of society and 
nature.4? 
A realism was developing in America under c. s. Pierce 
1 and Josiah Royce which was allied, not with private psycho-
1 logical and biological .experience, but with public experience 
of mathematics, Platonism, and logic (hypotheses, investiga-
tion, and verification). With this realism Bosanquet was in 
accord and to it he was making his contribution. 
William ~ames was familiar with the work of Bosanquet 
and other neo-Hegelians, especially T. H. Green. But ~ames 
could not bear the thought of Hegel's absolute, for in a 
Wblock" universe no freedom would remain for individuals. 
He therefore chose the other horn of the dilemma and tollowed 
the immediacy of~psychological experience. 48 Concrete f r 
James thus meant particular; but the Hegelian meaning of 
49 
"contextual and connected" was unconsciously found in his 
introspection. Fundamentally philosophy was "for the consol-
ation of the individual soul."50 James had a place for monism 
45. See Baldwin, DPP. 
46. Philos. Rev., a6 (1917), 5lff. 
47. Townsend, PIUS, la9. 
48. Ibid.~ 140. 
49. Ibid., 142. 
50. Ibid., 143. 
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provided the finite self was not engulfed in the infinite. 
If 3~es had been more of a logieian and less of an 
empirical psychologist he might have be&n led on 
from this point to a logic~! realism like that of 
c. s. Pierce or Bosanquet. 
George H. Howison and Thomas Davidson, both in the 
St. Louis movement, could not accept the theory of Hegelian 
universals. Opposition especially developed against pantheism 
in order to save individuals from being last in the absolute. 
~osiah Royce and ~ames E. Creighton succeeded in presenting 
Hege~ianisa in elearer light but not with popular acceptance 
of their views. 
Between 1890 and 1920 attempts were made in England 
and America to purge idealism of misinterpretations. Bosan-
quet, finding the term mentalism associated with personalism 
and pluralism, suggests the name ~speculative philosophy" 
for idealism. This corresponds appropriately to The 
journal of Speculative Philosophy in America. 
2. Influence on Mary hiton Calkins. 
Mary Calkins ~ists Bosanquet among the nee-Hegelian 
52 
monistic personalists . " In her description of the monistic 
personal idealism she is, for the most part, quite in accord 
I with Bosanquet's views. Contrasting pluralistic personal 
r 
I 
I 
'I I 
51. Townsend, PIUS, 146. 
52. Calkins, PPP, 561. 
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idealism and monistic personalism she says: 
The pluralist conception is of the universe as 
consisting, fundamentally, of a related totality 
of distinct selves. The monist contends that, 
underlying and including all the many selves, 
there is one absolute self which, by its oneness, 
constitutes their relatedness; and that these 
lesser selves - accordingly - are only relatively, 
or partially, distinct.53 
The absolute on this basis is unique, all-inclusive, one-of-
many. ~li ss Calkins described monistic personalism as assert-
ing that 
the all-including self is absolute person, that he 
is one in the sense of being unique self ~~sides 
being one as includer of the many selves. 
The one se1f includes many selves in ultimate unity. 
Other views which Miss Calkins may well have accepted 
from Bosanquet as well as Royce are: compatibility of self-
hood and absolutism; thought, feeling, and will in Self; evil 
not a defect in the absolute; absolute necessary for indivi-
1 duals to preserve their individuality; distinctions of the 
absolute as within and not beyond himself. 
Although Mlss Calkins regards Bosanquet as a monistic 
personalist, certain differences appear. Miss Calkins, as 
does Royce, holds that the absolute self must have all the 
qualities which make · a finite self a self, including conscious-
ness. The absolute is one person, a single personality that 
53. Calkins, PPP, 420. 
54. Loc. cit. 
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is u~ttmate. 55 She, as Royce, makes bold to use the ter.m 
person, thereby avoiding Bosanquet's use of the term indivi-
duality as applied to ~he absolute. 
3. Influence on ~osiah Royce. 
Royce and Bosanquet were thinking out their systems 
in different continents but ~ong very simi~ar and closely 
parallel lines. Their works could not have been unknown to 
each other, although Royce's references to Bosanquet are 
confined to logic. 
Royce and Bosanquet both start with the experience of 
the finite individual, but with the view that ideas point to 
a reality beyond the finite. What Royce stresses as meaning 
or interpretation Bosanquet describes as comprehension or 
interconnection. In Royce al~ life begins with experience 
but rtthe nisus toward completion is the rirst observation 
56 
which Royce makes ahout experience. ft Whether or not this 
comes from Bosanquet, it shows Bosanquet and Royce in complete 
agreement at this point. 
Rogers57 regards the individual as the central problem 
in both Bosanquet and Boyce. Their interests differ, he 
thinks, in that Bosanquet tries to show that a finite self 
55. Calkins, PPP, 439, 440. 
56. Townsend, PIUS, 166. 
5?. EAP, 286. 
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is not a true individual; Royce, on the other hand,attempts 
to show how reality is focussed in finite selves and has 
significance there. 
Logic and metaphysics are inseparable in the philosophy 
of both men. The science of order or universal law pervades 
all. Bosanquet and Royee both see in reality the concrete 
universal as a substitute for the excluded middle, that finite 
mind o~ never reach absolute knowledge but can be in the di-
rectfon of final mastery, that logical analysis is preferable 
to psychological introspection, that the fra~entariness of 
mind is completed in the objective orld, and that life is a 
process determined from the inside where the whole is embodied 
in the finite. Royce agrees with Bosanquet in demanding that 
totality ~ust be present in the work of our thought, - that 
is, as the ultimate test of truth.'t58 The past, the present, 
and the fUture "are united in one organic pattern of meaning-
59 ful process." 
Does Royce depart from Bosanquet's view of the absolute 
by attributing to it consciousness, or personality? For 
Royce the absolute is self-eonscious Will. But in what sense? 
~This whole time-process is in some fashion spanned by one 
insight which surveys the unity of its meaning.~so 
58. Royce, I, I, 508 n.i. 
59. Townsend, PIUS, 178. 
60. Royce, PC, II, 271. 
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A community is not iqentieal with society; rather it is an 
ideal union of wills in which individuals have their part. 
Royce differs from Bosanquet in that he says: "For m.e, at 
present, a genuinely and loyally united community which lives 
a coherent life, is, in a perfectly literal sense, a person." 61 
The community as person may be the Christian church. Further-
m.ore, the absolute in Royce's theory is none other than the 
Christian's God. In h~ past, present, and future are coher-
ently knit together. Bosanquet's absolute is individuality 
as a general will in whiQh no one person sees and guides all. 
4. .Tames Edwin Creighton (1861-1924). 
Creighton is greatly influenced by Bradley's Principles 
of Logic (1883) in which Bradley distinguishes between idea 
as m.eanings and ideas of content. This Creighton never ac-
cepts for he se&s _a false externality between thought and 
object. Bosanquet's Logic (1888} satisfies him completely. 
Here is truth as individuality or wholeness. His first presi-
dential address before the Philosophical Society is an exposi-
tion of his view of thought as a concrete universal. Inclusive 
wholes or "concrete totality of mind'" can he found in the 
humanities only. He sees that individuals are only so '~y 
reason of their unique standing as part of a total individu-
51. PER, 67. 
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ith this argwnent fram Bosanquet Creighton per-
sistently seeks to answer Pr~gmatists. 
In Creighton's answer to nee-Realism he adopts Bosan-
quet's views. Realists hold that truth is a quality of single 
propositions. Creighton asserts that truth belongs to systems 
of logic and structures of experience. A perfect individuality 
for Creighton, following Bosanquet, is a complete universal 
with both identity and difference, value and significance.63 
5. G. atts Cunningham. 
Cunningham is very much attracted by the coherence 
theory which he sees closely associated with Hegel and de-
fended in recent times by Bradley, Bosanquet, and Royce. Of 
the last Cunningham says: ~rn point of view he is ~losely 
allied to Bradley and Bos~nquet. Like them, he was much under 
the influence of Hegel.n6 4 
Cunningham finds in Bosanquet 's PTS an interesting 
though involved discussion of the group mind and the problems 
involved in such a concept. Cunningham says of group mind that 
it is not a mind; it is rather the interconnection of 
individual minds, their interfunctioning and inter-
penetration. It is the product of separate individual 
minds actimg conjointly.o5 
62. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
Sabine, ''The Philosoph¥ of .James Edwin Creighton,"' 
Phil. Rev., 3 (1925), 248. 
Creighton, SSP, 248, 282. 
Cunningham, PP, 123 n. 
Ibid., 315. 
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In this definition he is quite in accord with Bosanquet 
who has no group mind separate from the group or superior to 
them in their total interconnection. In Bosanquet's theory 
of group mind Cunningham sees the only basis for democratic 
66 
sovereignty. 
Cunningham recognizes Bosanquet's History of Aesthetic 
as an ttadvaneed surveyn of the field. On examination or 
Cunningham's theory of beauty, that the ttbeautitul object is 
. 67 the unified ObJect," one sees close affinity between Cun-
ningham and Bosanquet at this point. 
Hegelian tradition came to Cunningham's rescue when he 
entered the Sage School at Cornell under Creighton. Early in 
his career there he wrot a monograph entitled Thought and 
Reality in Hegel's System (1910), wherein he expressed two 
convictions that greatly resemble Bosanquet's views of reality 
as seen functioning throughout the process. 
The final immediate of thought ••• must be said to be 
the absolute real, and is neither an abstract particu-
lar nor a blank universal, but the universal filled, 
the particular completed by its own ideal construction, 
in a word, the individual; this final immediate of 
thought is one in the dual sense of being both system-
atic and all-inggusive, and perhaps may be termed 
self-conscious. 
Hege11an principles for him were enriched by the study of 
Bradley, Bosanquet,and Royce. 
66. Cunningham, PP, 335 n, 337 n. 
67. Ibid., 362. 
68. Adams and Montague, CAP, I, 257. 
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One point bothers Cunningham; that is a vie of the 
absolute as a statio whole which has no nisus in its perfec-
tion. hat he really fears is a suicide of thought in 
Bradley's view. Bosanquet may well have substantiated or even 
helped create Cunningham's conviction that "the nisus of 
thought was toward the 'whole,' that the whole as experienced 
always implicates its own transcendence, and that reality is 
what thought, functioning within the given, compels us to 
affir.m.n69 Cunningham cannot agree with Royce who holds 
{so Cunningham thinks) that in God's all-inclusive conscious-
ness events can be seen only in a finite succession. In this 
criticism he inclines to Bosanquet's position if it can be 
intelligible. Of this Cunningham is in doubt. 
After studying Bergson, Cunningham expresses his con-
viction as to creative finalism, a view which he thinks in 
har.mony with his tradition, including his study of Bosanquet. 
He says: 
Creative finalisn views reality as an organic process 
which is through and through teleological. Its funda-
mental nature is to create ends, to produce tendencies, 
and to govern itself according to its own creations. 
These ends are progressivly defined and revised with 
the advancing process in which they operate; they 
never can be finally and completely defined, and the 
process is, therefore, unending.?O 
Cunningham follows Bosanquet in thinking of the given 
69. Adams and Montague, CAP, I, 258. 
70. Ibid., 261. 
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as prob1ematic, for thinking is but an interpretation of the 
prob1ematic· given. Herein is system with relevancy; herein 
is the nisus to completion of self-transcendence. In a self-
sufficient system truth is absolute. 
Was Cunningham an absolutist? If so, to what extent? 
For him the absolute is the real. Following Bosanquet. he 
sees in thought the ~active force" of system. ~r hold with 
Bosanquet that the nature of thought is to affirm truly." 
Cunningham subscribes in general to Bosanquet's thought of 
reality as a systematic whole and "identical with an all in-
clusive experience. " 71 One principle in Bosanquet's absolu-
tism CUnningham cannot accept, namely, .ttreali ty cannot without 
contradiction be conceived as changing." 72 Even this point 
Cunningham grants is not true of Bosanquet's incomplete process 
wherein is seen a rational nexus which is activity and so ne-
cessitates change. Cunninghma holds to eternal novelty, pro-
cess, concretion, in the infinite as opposed to Bosanquet's 
position (in MECP, 177) wherein Bosanquet seemingly supports 
Zane's denial of motion. 
Cunningham's trouble with Bosanquet is that he sees 
two views, one the static, which he rejects; the other is 
that the whole is ·realizing itself in temporal series by 
creation. 
71. CUnningham, "? + 5. 12," Phil. Rev •• 31 (1922), 
500. 
72. Loc. cit. 
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The chief difference is regarding thought and its 
relation to reality. Cunningham thinks that Bosanquet is 
with Bradley in looking upon thought as relational and dis-
cursive, constantly pursuing reality, yet never taking a rinal 
leap to totality or the absolute. Cunningham, following Hal-
dane, sees thought as descriptive o~ the absolute itself. He 
confesses: 
If Professor Bosanquet can show that what thought 
through its necessity ultimately demands about the 
totality of ,things is an eternal and abstract 
identity untouched in its profound depths by the 
vicissitudes of the temporal order, rather than 
a concrete identity and coherence (organization 
I should prefer to call it) which grows and changes 
and develops itself from level to level through 
the time-phases of its differents - if he can show 
me this, then for myself I am content to acknowledge 
my blunder in elementary logic ~nd pitch my tent 
towards the ineffable Absolute. 3 
What I take to be the chief difficulty is that Cunningham's 
vie which he ackriowledges from Haldane is also from Bosanquet 
and that the bloodless absolute hich would equate Bradley's 
and Bosanquet's view is ~possible in that Bosanquet's absolute 
bas not simple identity but difference in a concrete universal. 
Furthermore, Bosanquet does not follow Bradley in his view of 
appearance of the absolute. Here Bosanquet is in accord with 
Haldane and Cunningham in regarding appearances of the absolute 
as descriptive of the absolute itself. 
73. Cunningham, "7 + 5 = 12,~ Phil. Rev., 31 (1922), 
503-504. 
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One further in~luence should be noted. Cunningham 
74 gives an exposition of Bosanquet's teleology. He points 
out that two alternative interpretations appear in Bosanquet. 
On the one hand is a purposive order ith ends and means in a 
series. Another view is that there is a nexus of relations 
within a whole leading to completion or perfection. This 
second view is individuality. Cunningham notes that in 
Bosanquet' s la.ter works this latter meaning of individuality 
is found. Between these extremes of teleology Cunningham 
observes a third view- "the Absolute through time,n taking 
75 
the place of tttime in the Absolute" or ttthe Absolute in time." 
Even in this third alternative Cunningham seems to be follow-
ing Bosanquet's lead. 
6. Katherine Gilbert. 
Mrs. Gilbert wrote a monograph on Maurice Blondel's 
75 
Philosophy in Action in which she criticized Blondel for 
his abstract dualisms which are not consistently on Bosanquet's 
level of concreteness and individuality.' 77 
In Mrs. Gilbert's artie le, tt The One and the Many in 
78 Crocets Aesthetic,~ she approaches the discussion from the 
74. Cunningham, "Bosanquet on Teleology as a Meta-
physical Category," Phil. Rev., 32 (1923),612ff. 
75. Ibid., 623. Bosanquet MECP, 613. 
76. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,l92 . 
77. Wright, Book review, Philos. Rev., 34 (1925), 201. 
78. Philos. Rev., 34 (1925), 443-456. 
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point of view of Bradley's ~Theory of the Association or 
79 
Ideas, and Bosanquet's interpretation of Croce's philoso-
phy. She indicates Bosanquet's hostile attitude toward Croce 
inasmuch as Croce threatened to shatter the unity of mind. 
She also shows that Bosanquet ~appreciates at its full value 
the impulse toward simplification and purification~ which are 
in Croce. 
A quite di~erent influence on Mrs. Gilbert•s thinking 
is revealed in her article, "Humor and Bosanquet's Theory or 
Experience.n80 She refers to Bosanquet's writings as the 
most considerable account of experience,~ and to his position 
"not at the center of the universe, but at one focus of an 
ellipse."81 Typical of Bosanquet's treatment of the good life 
1 are severity and tension and not due attention upon "cheer, 
release, and abandon~ in perfection.82 
For Bosanquet the highest virtue is a responsible and 
momentous condition, and that to light-heartedness 
he concedes but little room in his description of 
the blessed life.83 
rs. Gilbert would add to all the other dominant virtues of 
Bosanquet's philosophy the spirit of comedy, convinced that 
humor has as much a part in individuality as those virtues 
stressed by Bosanquet. Her chief criticism of Bosanquet•s 
79. PL, 299ff. 
80. Philos. Rev., 31 {1922), 352-368. 
81. Ibid., 35a, 253. 
82. Ibid., 354. 
83. Ibid., 355-356. 
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view is that he cannot grant satisfaction in individuality 
without tension; comic greatness she thinks takes on more the 
spirit of harmony than of tension. But even wit~ this vie 
Gilbert rinds accord in Bosanquet who cannot picture Falstar~ 
in hell. 84 
It should be pointed out in this connection that Bosan-
•: quet, 1n his comments on Mrs. Gilbertts paper on humor, calls 
attention to the psychological fact that tragedy is not com-
plete ithout humor for it is near to tears. He also suggests 
that comedy, is not dissolved when it passes into a higher 
stage of dialectic. 85 
To show again the influence or Bosanquet on her think-
ing Mrs. Gilbert develops a. theory of reason from his govern-
ing ideas. Reason is comprehensiyeness. In this it may be 
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in contrast to science and so miss the point of chief interest. 
The truth is that precision of description is served 
rather than hindered by recognition of the significance 
ot the totality, the . oint of chief interest, the 
telling part, quality or value of any such unit as a 
living organisn, work of art, or historical movement. 
The laws which connect part with part within these 
holes and the ·exact nature of ·the details can only 
be understood in the light of an insight into what 
the whole thing comes to.86 
To enter into the meaning of sin, freedom, redemption, perfec-
II 1 tion, is to rind not abstractions but concrete universals. 
84. Bosanquet, PIV, 17. 
85. So Hegel. See Bosanquet, TLA,93, and 
"Croce's Aesthetic." 
86. Gilbert, "The Principle of Reason in the Light 
of Bosanquet's Philosophy," Philos. Rev., 
32 (1923), 605. 
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Mrs. Gilbert refers to Bosanquet's Civi~ization of Christendom. 
to show that goodness requires a spiritual resource greater 
than an individual. So the church has been kept safe in 
fleeing from abstractions to individuality as a whole of 
reality. 
172. 
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CHAPTER VI I. 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF BOSAN UET'S 
PHILOSOPHY OF INDIVIDUALITY.! 
A. Meaning of the individual. 
Bosan~uet's t o alternative definitions of individualit 
are not the only possibilities. He ins is ts2 that the two ex- I· 
tremes of individuality are these: either the atom theory 
that an individual is so small that it cannot be divided 
further, or "a great individuality," as for example, a work 
of art which is so complete and unified that it cannot be 
separated into parts. Another, and more plausible theory, 
is that individualities are persons uni~uely possessing 
thought, feeling, and will in a world of soul-making. uThe 
self is organic, mental, monadic, and active, and ••••• the 
organic principle is the governing one."3 This view is 
superior to that of Bosanquet in that all four qualities are 
retained in Brightman's view of the self. The self is organic 
in that all experience is interconnected with the whole; the 
1. See previous constructive discussion of finite 
mind, supra, 34ff, 8Sff. 
2. See Bosanquet, PTS, 74-75; supra, 46. 
3. Brightman on "The Finite Self," in Barrett, CIA, 
192. 
,, 
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self is a concrete, monadic, peculiar " self-existent unity;"4 
the self "is conscious experience" 5 of time-transcending 
wholeness; furthermore, the act of self-determining choice 
from its given conscious content grants to the self a conscious 
experience both of itself and its world. Such personalities 
make up a system of growing individualities with God as the 
grDund of their inter-relation. 
5 In Bosanquet's theory of transcendence the direction 
is always toward the absolute, or greater individuality. It 
is doubtless true that God or the absolute is in all things 
urging individuals on to perfection or completion; equally 
true is the impossibility of entities standing by themselves 
and isolated from all the rest. Beyond the points in common 
with Bosan~uet's theory another view of self-transcendence 
commends itself in preference to that of Bosanquet. It is 
this. Each self transcends in some respects each and all 
other selves. More significantly, dependent selves transcend 
each other. No person can be completely known by any other 
person. There is in each self-conscious self a unique indi-
viduality that is not entirely duplicated in the society of 
persons. Each person stands transcendent in his own right 
and can never be completely absorbed into an absolute. 
4. Brightman on "The Finite Self, tt in Barrett, 
CIA, 172. See also 173. 
5 • Ib i d • , 17 4 , 19 3. 
6. See supra,ll2ff. 
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Furthermore, human selves and God transcend each 
other. God, according to this theory, does not transcend a 
human self because he is the whole of which each self is a 
part; in htmself God has a uniqueness which can never be 
completely shared by other selves. God is the purposer of 
which man is the purposed creation. As regards God, a self-
limitation is placed upon him in the creation of persons, 
a limitation which God himself cannot transcend. In this view, 
in contrast to that of Bosanquet, there is in each person a 
privacy of inner content which God cannot experience as the 
7 person does. 
B. The individuality in society. 8 
Even Bosanquet's use of the term individuality in 
connection with society has its limitations • . Individuality 
is a reality (so Bosanquet) where people group sufficiently 
to form a general will. As individuality develops in a state 
or institution, more and more self-consciousness or spiritual 
world~indedness is effectively registered. The greater the 
degree of individuality the greater place for mind or spirit 
or will in Bosanquet's philosophy. But whose mind or will? 
Can it be that of an absolute which is i mpersonal and un-
conscious? In any case, and even with Bosanquet's view of 
7. See Bowne, PER; Knudson, PP; Brightman, ITf; etc. 
8. See chapter IV for constructive discussion. 
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the concrete universal, there is the danger of effacing the 
boundaries of persons in society. 
Bosanquet's regard for the state as a concrete uni-
versal in which both identity and difference are recognized 
and where each individual has his station and duties resembles 
at many points Hocking's co-agent state. By this he means 
a state that "is based on the unanimous action of free indi-
9 
viduals," and in which each serves the state according to 
"his own interest or capacity.~10 In the thought of both 
Hocking and Bosanquet the state is the extension of every 
man's will. In fact Hocking comments favorably on Bosanquet's 
theory in that it is based on considerate, and not impulsive, 
ill, and says that for Bosanquet the state is this common 
rational impulse given external form."ll 
However, there are certain differences which may be 
pointed out between these two points of view. A co-agent 
state enhances rather than d~inishes individual initiative. 12 
Individuals are theihitlators and states prolong this activi-
ty. In this a much larger place is given to freedom than in 
Bosanquet 1 s theory. Hocking's view is not less organic but 
lays less stress on the totality which urges the finite selves 
on to transcendence and more emphasis on the ncommotive 
9. Hocking, LEI, 150. 
10. Ibid. , 157. 
ll. Hocking, MAS, 47. 
12. Hocking, LEI, 164. 
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function." Hocking says of Kant, Green, and Bosanquet, that 
in their philosophy of society "the state must limit itself 
to external, that is, to physical action.n13 There can be 
no enforcement ot morality or religion without the inner life 
of the private self; therein is true justice, with the state 
I as its shell. "Initiative, energy, interest ••••••• all have 
,I their sources in the intrinsically free life of the mind. ttl4 
jl In Bosanquet the state is more real than the individual; 
Hocking sees in individualism "something more real than the 
15 
state." More intrinsic worth for the individual is found 
in Hocking than in Bosanquet inasmuch as 
Individuality is not a fixed membership, as of an 
organ in an organism, but a continued living tension 
between various possibilities of belonging.l6 
13. Hocking, MAS, 157. 
14. Ibid., 158. 
15. Hocking, LEI, 4. 
16. Ibid., 22-23. 
,, 
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C. Religious consciousness. 17 
First as to devotion: does Bosanquet mean that all 
devotion is religious? Does his view or devotion parallel 
Royce's conception or loyalty to loyalty? Is devotion the 
feeling or membership in a coherent whole? The answer is 
affirmative in each case. But granting that religious ex-
perience in Bosanquet's view is related to a rational and 
18 inclusive metaphysical system some implications should be 
stated and criticised. Certainly tt'dumb devotion ••••• is not 
re~igion.tt19 
Not all devotion is religion; not even all devotion to 
one's best self and highest aspirations. Or, rather, 
such devotion is religious only when those aspirations 
are regarded as points or contact with the eterna1.20 
Religion, if it is devotion to a coherent whole of truth, is 
subjective and formal, not objective, personal and vital. 
The sense of oneness with the who~e tends toward pantheism 
or extreme mysticism rather than toward an "active and ethical" 
religious experience. 21 
There are further objections to the worship of indi-
viduality as a whole or being. Granted with Bosanquet that 
religion has a concern with value, what does an objective 
reference mean in worship? The values that come to man in 
17. For previous treatment see Ch. V, section C. 
18. See Brightman, RV, 153-154. 
19. Ibid., 245. 
20. Ibid., 109. 
21. Ibid., 155. 
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worship are not silnply the result of man's being absorbed in 
a totality, or concrete universal, or perfection, or completion 
or logical whole. Values in worship also arise from the en-
richment that comes to man as a personality in the presence of 
a God who understands, and who prizes specific ends. 
Moreover, an experience of coOperation "with God in 
the conservation and increase of values 22 is not the experi-
ence of selves completely subordinated in the absolute. The 
objective reference in worship is not from a part to a whole, 
as in Bosanquet, but to a valuer-valued process in which the 
personality of a finite individual has an actual relation to 
God but does not lose his individuality in an absolute in-
dividuality. Even with all the catholicity of Bosanquet's 
idea of religion, it seems more true to say that ftworship 
is the complete personality of man directed toward and res-
ponding to the presence of God." 23 In such devotion to the 
Supreme Self which is other than the worshiper's own self, 
the highest religious value is found. 
az. Brightman, ITP, 321. 
23. Brightman, RV, 235. 
D. The problem of evi1. 24 
The main criticism to be made or Bosanquet's view of 
evil is that it is an illusion of incompleteness, incoherence, 
and imperfection. One of Bosanquet•s chief stumbling blocks 
to Theism is over the problem of evil in which is seen a 
dualism between the higher and lower natures of the finite 
selr. In order to solve the problem Bosanquet postulates the 
absolute or individuality in hich evil is included but trans-
I 
I 
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D. The problem of evi1. 24 
The main criticiam to be made or .Bosanquet's view of 
evil is that it is an illusion of incompleteness, incoherence, 
and imperfection. One of Bosanquet's chief stumbling blocks 
to Theism is over the problem of evil in which is seen a 
dualism between the higher and lower natures of the finite 
self. In order to solve the problem Bosanquet postulates the 
absolute or individuality in hich evil is included but trans-
muted. Three constructive solutions of the problem of evil 
ill be compared with Bosanquet's theory to show weaknesses 
in his system. 
Over against Rosanquet's absolute individuality as a 
solution to the problem of evil we may for contrast place 
Tennant's theistic approach to the same problem. Moral good-
ness for Tennant is reciprocation to God's love by persons; 
goodness cannot be created, but is the outgrowth of freedom 
in the experience of free agents. 25 Tennant postulates this 
world as the best possible. It is "best in respect of moral 
orth, or of instrumentality thereto. 25 It is of most worth 
to both God and man. God is limited by the laws of thought so 
that "the mode of God's being and activity" is "the sense of 
eternal truths.n27 The best possible depends on what God is, 
a4. For constructive statement, see supra,l02ff. 
25. Tennant, PT, II, 185. 
25. Ibid., 186. 
27. Ibid., 188. 
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for instance, love and not hate. "God is limited by his very 
determinateness, not an indetenninate absolute in whom all 
28 differences are lost. In this best possible world of 
Theism risks of sinning are involved. To be free to do good 
alone is not freedom for persons. 
In this best possible world are free agents ho in turn 
are creators and co-workers with God in building a moral world. 
acceptable than Bosanquet's solution of the problem. 
Another interesting criticism of Bosanquet is that of 
Robinson. 29 He first comments on Tsanoff's "gradational view 
of the nature of evil. 30 By this is meant a hierarchy of 
values wherein evil is a degradation which pulls down the 
higher. Good on one level may be evil on a higher one. At 
each level good is that which is appropriate; evil, on the 
contrary, is that which is inappropriate. God is the "apogee 
of value;" he is infinitely perfectible. In this theory 
Robinson sees combined B'osanquet' s view of evil as transmuted 
into good and Royce's idea of redemptive struggle in God. 
28. Tennant, PT, II, 188. 
29. Robinson, ILP. 
30. Tsanoff, NE, ch. 4. 
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In order to retain intrinsi~ values Robinson proposes 
a theory of evil which he thinks remedies not only the defects 
in Bosanquet and Royce, but in Tsanoff. Evil in Robinson's 
view is the opposition of instrumental to intrinsic values. 
All individuals have intrinsic values which are unified enti-
ties in God. Thus this world is indeed a vale of soul-making 
in which God's process is a redemptive one in his effort to 
~ I , unify all personalities in himself. Renee God is ~eternal 
perfectability,"31 but not evil. The solution of the problem 
of evil is the transnutation of inst~ental values into the 
perfection of God's intrinsic values. 
A third approach t .o the problem of evil is that of 
The Given. 32 The problem is: this: How can one believe in 
an omnipotent, conscious, supreme being in view of the vast 
amount of evil in the world? Instead of renouncing Theism 
(as Bosanquet) for an unconscious absolute in which the illu-
sive tensions of good and evil are resolved, many find a more 
convincing solution for the problem in Brightman's theory of 
a finite God. This view accounts for the surplus blackness~33 
of evil in the world hy positing in God himself an irrational 
Given which he did not create, which retards him, with hich 
he must constantly struggle, but which is controlled by God's 
31. Robinson, ILP, 136. 
32. See Brightman, PG, FG, and PR. 
33. Brightman, FG, 172. 
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intelligent Wil.l. At the heart of the universe are hazard, 
hardship, and a cross. Nevertheless Godts creative activity 
II is making the best possible universe. In this theory ultimate 
real.ity is not impersonal. and unconscious; rather, God is a 
cosmic friend who in spite of 1imitations is wholl.y good. 
II i th his exampl.e persons with ere a ti ve minds achieve the good 
I 
• l.ife by taking up their cross daily and overcoming evil. with 
the aid of a God who understands. 
E. Destiny of individuals. 34 
Pringle-Pattison considers Bosanquet's arguments 
bearing on the destiny of individuals as inconsistent. 
Pringl.e-Pattison points out that Bosanquet would have this 
universe a place for realizing val.ues, but that these val.ues 
35 
can only be found in an unconscious absolute. Even though 
Bosanquet would think of this world as a vale ot aoul~making 
36 
and the mol.ding of souls as the main business of the absolute, 
I yet the product vanishes in a non-personal absolute. It is 
II 
but mere temporal appearance. The whole is empty of persons, 
and not a complete whole of experience. 
A. E. Taylor offers much the same criticism of 
Bosanquet. 37 This world is indeed a vale of soul-making 
34. For constructive argument see supra, 128 ff. 
35. Pringle-Pattison, II, 321. 
36. Bosanquet, at als, LFI, 1?3. 
3?. Taylor, FM, I, 308. 
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through struggle and surrender. But for what'? "The resolutio 
of moral personality into nothing.~38 Personalities are 
seemingly made to be lost in the very act, a position hardly 
to be tolerated. More true would it be to say that a self 
growing and becoming enriched by surrender is still one's own 
self. So also is the self to he won. In fact the selves who 
have made the all-important surrender to God are but the same 
184 
through struggle and surrender. But for what? "The resolutio 
of moral personality into nothing. ''"38 Personalities are 
seemingly made to ·be lost in the very act, a position hardly 
to be tolerated. More true would it be to say that a self 
growing and becoming enriched by surrender is still one's own 
self. So also is the self to b·e won. In fact the selves who 
have made the all-important surrender to God are but the same 
selves with content enriched. 
F. Individuality and value. 
Leighton grants that idealists will go with Bosanquet 
in viewing individuality as having its differentia ""in the 
most comprehensive organized harmony." This may be not only 
with oneself but "with others, with the world, and with the 
39 
universe." 
But Leighton takes issues with Bosan~uet in his insis-
tence on self-transcendence and inclusive unity wherein belief 
in persons as private, unique individuals is rejected. Formal 
personality in Bosanquet's thought is not permanent, nor is it 
of value in ultimate Being. Leighton thinks that for Bosan-
quet to start with Green's conviction that values are in and 
for persons and then to think of persons as transmuted in the 
38. Taylor, FM, I, 308. 
39. Barrett, CIA, 140. 
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timeless Absolute is inconsistent nonsense. 4° For values to 
be real, persons must be enduring, with "the Ultimate or 
Supreme Reality ••••• a personality creating principle and 
therefore richer in nature than any finite person. tt41 
Bosanquet's "contradiction is due to riding the idea 
of system, totality, comprehensiveness, and harmony to death. 
Individuality is stretched to mean literal inclusiveness of 
other individuals. Comprehensiveness and harmony are taken to 
imply that all finite individuals must literally be included, 
and therefore swallowed up, in one all-devouring Individual -
the Absolute. And so . the only true and really real Individual 
is the Concrete-Universal, the absolute all-containing and all 
digesting System."42 For personality to be merely an adject 
ive o~ the absolute is to destroy the concreteness of the whol • 
43 
"No real self is merely part of another self;tt if so ideal-
ism dies at its own hand. 
Most serious for Leighton is the outcome of values. 
He affirms that "if Individuality and Value have cosmic status, 
the Supreme Reality must possess selfhood or Personality and 
44 this must be its highest character.'' If, however,the Sup-
reme Reality has not the powers of self-consciousness and self 
activity in full actuality it is sub-personal, and lower in 
40. Barrett, CIA, 142. 
41. Loc. dit. 
42. Loc. cit. 
43. Ibid.' 145. 
44. Ibid., 148-149. 
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value quality than selves. There can be no change, no ree~ing, 
no certainty, no ground or individualities and values unless 
the Conservator of values has personality; this ground of the 
spiritual community must be '"a member of the world or which 
all finite selves are members.'t45 
Better adapted to all the demands of thinking is, 
46 I for Leighton, cosmic pluralism, in which there is unity but 
also opportunity for freedom. In cosmie pluralism interaction, 
intersurrering, intercommunication, interchanges take p~ace 
between the members of the world. Individuality in this 
sense, as opposed to Bosanquet, is both quantitatively plural 
and "qualitatively various.'t47 By man's active mind, values 
and institutions are being created in a ~personality-in-
community creating process.~48 The ulttmate individual must 
be "continuously immanent in the cosmic order.u "The hole, 
in its highest and most significant sense, is a community or 
49 
minds." Values can never be conserved in the part-whole 
view of the self but only in a who~e as a community of minds 
50 in which the ultimate individual is "continuously immanent." 
Let us take another approach. In Bosanquet's thought 
Nature seems to be organic to ends that are spiritual. But 
45. Barrett, CIA, 150. 
46. Ibid., 159. 
47. Loc • cit. 
48. Ibid., 163. 
49. Loc.cit. 
50. Ibid., 162. See also 163. 
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the process is also de-individuating in that individuals 
become of less and less importance. Leighton's final choice 
is between materialism and personal idealism; he chooses 
the latter. 51 
G. Creator of creators.52 
One of the most sweeping criticisms of Bosanquet's 
theory grows out of his opposition to the Theistic doctrine 
of the creator of creators. His argument is that a personal 
God, who is omnipotent and yet is the creator of creators, 
is contradictory and self-destructive for "to will a will 
is to will its details.• In reality he is attempting to 
53 
answer a dogma with a dogma. Matthews has pointed out 
that no Theist would accept Bosanquet 's statement that 
"man can use his will as he pleases.n 54 However Bosanquet 
has truly said of the Theists that they believe that God 
"produces the free as free. 55 Mat :the s challenges Bosan-
quet's point that God could not will freedom for another. 
Bosanquet's description is true if man is a machine with all 
parts willed by its maker. "But will exercised in spiritual 
material is conditioned, when it is an enlightened will, by 
the will for freedom. '156 Examples of this would be a states-
51. Barrett, CIA, 166-167. 
52. For constructive discussion see chap. V, sect.G,7. 
53. Brightman, PG, 169. 
54. Matthews, SCP, 220-22l. 
55. Ibid., 221. 
56. Loc. C>it. 
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man creating a nation or a father wisely planning for his 
child. In the former case the nation must choose to be best 
as it is persuaded by the statesman's sagacity and insight. 
So also the father, who wills freedom for his son, stands 
aside in decisive moments in order for his son to will the 
good life. In fact, Matthews contends that the opposite of 
Bosanquet's theory is true for ~the higher acts of will 
57 include the creation of freedom as part of the end willed.~ 
Is Bosanquet right in thinking that the God of Theism 
contradicts himself in creation? The Theist in Matthews' 
thought, does indeed believe 
that all events are ultimately to be traced to God, 
that without His allowance and concurrence they could 
not be, that all power to do or to will is derived 
from Him; but it does not hold that God is the direct 
agent in all action, or that every occurrence is the 
manifestation of His w111.58 
Matthews sees no contradiction between freedom and dependence 
in the case of immaterial created systems. Their parts inter-
penetrate and yet each part has its own life as a member of 
the spiritual community. 
H. The absolute.59 
A recurring criticism of Bosanquet's absolute is that 
consciousness is not found in it. In reality, this seems 
57. Matthews, SCP, 222. 
58. Ibid., 223. 
59. For constructive argument see supra, 43ff, 134ff. 
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to be the only p~ace in his system where consciousness is 
absent; and even in his view many minds may be in the 
absolute, but not one mind as of a personality. 
What of the problem of the one and many in Bosanquet's 
system? Bosanquet's monism or singularism regards the 
absolute or world as "one individual being, of which all 
persons and things, universals and values, are parts.'r60 
This rationalistic view of the absolute arises from the logic 
of truth as a coherent hole, and apart from which nothing 
exists. Over against this view is pluralism which looks at 
reality as composed of many individuals, each of which has 
freedom for self-determination. Bosanquet seems to have 
felt the need for synthesis, especially in his view of the 
abso~ute as a concrete universal, and in which both identity 
and difference are present. 
But several difficulties with this point of view arise. 
Coherence does not lead to monistic individuality unless 
epistemological monism can be shown to be true. n 61 Further-
more, to be a true synthesis there must be included this truth 
in pluralism: 
In conscious life there seems to be a unique indivi-
duality that no one else can experience or possess as 
I possess it; not even an absolute mind can include 
me, just as I am, as part of itself.62 
60. Brightman, ITP, 216. 
61. Ibid., 218. 
62. Lee. cit. 
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To include both unity and plurality in the universe a syn-
thesis is best found, says Brightman, in a theistic monism 
in hiah the wi~l and person of some supreme being or pe~son 
is the ground of unity and is compatible with the many per-
sons whose experienceslay claim to uni~ueness. Both thought 
and experience are united in theistic monism, whereas self-
consciousness and will are both absent from Bosan~uet's 
absolute. 
Tennant takes issue with the view that the absolute 
is not a divine personality., Absolutism, as in Bosanquet, 
re~ses to identify the God of Theism with the absolute 
"because personality, even as applied to God, must bespeak 
somewhat of limitation and relationship with what is other 
than Himself.n:63 
Indeed, God in Tennantts thought is both personal and 
l~ited. God is both an intelligent and an ethical ground 
54 
of the world. Tennant abstains ~from attributing to God 
perfection in the sense of complete actualisation of all 
potentiality.~65 God is limited in that he is non-infinite." 
Neither is He the abso~ute as all or whole for 'tthe created 
world is not Himself, nor His modes, but His utterance or 
d d "56 ee • God is limited in power and love, but knows and 
53. ·Tennant, PT, II, 155. 
64. Ibid., ~68. 
6~. Ibid., ~69. 
56. Tennant, PI, II, ~73. 
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creates the world. The very creation of creative creatures 
limits God's foreknowledge. 
God is ••• beyond surprise, and His purpose beyond 
frustration; but as that purpose is to allow His 
creatures soma initiative and to associate them 
to Himself as fellow-workers, it leaves room for 
contingency and for non-omniscience as to parti-
cular forms which tree action will take. 57 
Muirhead sees truth in the principle of the absolute, 
which cannot be incompatible, he thinks, with human per-
sonality. In the absolute is the principle of totality and 
relationship. 
If there is anything to which modern thought is 
everywhere coming, it is this conception of hole-
ness, integrity, or individuaLity, to be attained 
by things, not by maintaining themselves in an im-
permeable shell of private particularity, but by 
opening themselves to the influences that seem to 
come to them from without, and reforming themselves 
with the material which they think appropriate.58 
Call this ground of reality hat we will Muirhead is thus 
more sympathetic ith Bosanquet than is Tennant for he 
(Muirhead) sees the absolute as individuality and as emanating 
from Platonic idealism in which is the reality of spiritual 
values. To bear in a world of persons values from beyond, 
as from some Platonic universe, is the individual's highest 
search. Thus personality has a two-fold aspect: it is the 
achievement of value in the self; at the smne time values 
57. Tennant, PI, II, ·175. 
68. Muirhead, PTP, 434. 
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have come to us from another world. Muirhead thus sees 
preserved in the absoLute the great PLatonic tradition of 
the estern world as interpreted by Hegel and the neo-
Hegelians. 
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VIII. SUMMARY. 
The problem of the· dissertation is to examine and 
define individuality in Bernard Bosanq_uet' s philosophy o.f 
religion and social philosophy; to note some of" his sources; 
to trace the development of his thought; to show the chief" 
influences o~ his thought in Europe and America; finally, 
to attempt an evaluation of his theory of individuality. 
Two surveys are made of Bosanquet. One is of his 
life through its significant periods. A second survey is that 
o~ the historical development of his thought as it moved from 
logic to metaphysics. 
Bosanquet's definition of individuality in its early 
stage is that of finite mind. Other definitions are associ-
ated with logical completeness, perfection, the concrete uni-
versal, and finality as the absolute. The last includes all 
the others, for it is a universe, all-inclusive and non-
contradictory, containing both identity and difference. 
In social philosophy Bosanq_uet defines individuality . 
either as an atom or "a great individuality." The former is 
so small it cannot be divided; the Latter is a whole which 
cannot be disintegrated. The second is the view developed 
by Bosanquet in his social theories. 
The sources of Bosan~uet's social ideals are traced 
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through the Greak city-states, and the thought o~ Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle. Among later writers who have been 
especially in~luential in shaping Bosanquet's views are 
Rousseau, Hegel, and T. H. Green. 
Individuality in Bosanquet's social philosophy takes 
the for.m of the general Will . This does not come about by 
association but by an organic process of group interests, 
connections, and experiences. In the general will are found 
individual minds working with one another in a group, and 
creating a life for each and all. This is basic for his view 
of individuality. 
Liberty is "the condition o~ individuality.n Liberty 
is an affirmation of a larger whole than a finite individual 
and so makes a "transition from the private self into the 
great community of reality." Herein is a feeling of indivi-
duality; the self is' conscious o~ itself, its relation to 
others; and even its opposition to others. In freedom are 
connections to even higher wholes. Deter,minateness is the 
central principle of liberty. Most effective in achieving 
liberty is thoughtful ill. 
The state, in Bosanquet's thought, is an organism, 
a corporate being incarnating the general will. In the stata 
canmunity consciousness comes into being. The state may thus 
be called a whole or individuality; its function is to realize 
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the best selr.n The two most essential functions of indi-
viduality in a state are comprehensiveness and rationality. 
The state is a true concrete universal in which claims and 
obligations are interdependent. Even rewards and punishments 
enter Bosan~uetts theory as a part of individuality. They 
are organic. Punishment, if retributory, is the guilty person 
realizing his own will. Punishment is to promote rights 
instrumental to life at its best. Rewards have a diminishing 
place in Bosan~uet's system for the good · will of intelligent 
citizens is its own reward. 
True patriotism in the state functions for the good of 
all. ars can then arise only hecause of intrinsic values of 
life by which the common life of a people is purged and uni-
fied. 
Insoc:ialinstitutions Bosan~uet'"s principle of indi-
viduality appears as Parliament, Trade Union, family, property, 
charity; neighborhood, class. The logic of the social whole 
demands the highest degree of individuality and specialization 
hich one is ~ualified to fill. All of life is thus the re-
ciprocity of uni~ue services. Society is a living thing, an 
organism, and all persons of good ill, Bosanquet hopes, will 
co~perate for the best of life. 
Individuality is also central in Bosan~uet's philosophy 
of religion. First or all this is seen in finite selves; 
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nature sculptures the body and a society of selves the mind. 
But finite mind also molds and shapes itself by "the miracle 
of ill." Finite mind is not only self-existent; it is also 
self-transcendent. Its need for hardship comes from beyond; 
so also do suffering and pain. Good and evil have to do 
with the attitude of finite individuals toward the perfection 
of the whole. Good is a hazard of individuality, whereas 
hazard and hardship both follow from evil. A finite self 
feels its need for completeness. It seeks thus to identify 
its experience with true individuality, and thereby attain 
stability and security. 
Teleology is a sub-for.m or partial view of individu-
ality. There is no separation of means and ends in indivi-
duality. The plan of the world (individuality) is seen below 
consciousness in nature, in the consciousness of individual 
persons, and also above consciousness in civilizations or 
geologic structures. 
Most significant is the discussion of individuality as 
absolute. In the absolute is the high tide of finite fluctu-
ations. In the absolute as concrete universal the truth is 
the whole. 
Theism of the received type will not satisfy him. 
God is in the struggle against evil; he can therefore not be 
the absolute for in the latter is no notice of good or evil. 
196 
-= 
Bosanquet attacks the Creator of ereators. His argument is 
this: A personal God who wills human life and wills, must 
also will the contents of those wills. Inclusive of all 
experience is that of man with the absolute. 
In spite of the decline of idealism Bosanquet•s 
influence lingers on. In British thought Pringle-Pattison, 
A. E. Taylor, and Hoernle are prominent among th~se whose 
writings reveal influence from Bosanquet. In Italy an influ-
ential group of younger men were in friendly contact with 
Bosanquet; among these was Gentile. America, also, had her 
devotee·s of Bosanquet in Creighton, Cunningham, and Katherine 
Gilbert. 
The dissertation concludes with a critical evaluation 
of Bosanquet's philosophy of individuality. (1) Finite 
selves are truly c·onnected with the whole, but, contrary to 
Bosanquet, they possess thought, feeling, and will in a unique 
experience which cannot be totally transcended. {2) Hocking's 
co-agent state conserves the best in Bosanquet's view of the 
state as a concrete universal. It also enhances the initia-
tive and intrinsic worth of individuals which Bosanquet's 
theory tends to minimize. {3) In worship man finds value, 
noV~bsorption in a whole ( SC? Bosanquet} , but in the enrich-
ment of the worshiper in God's presence. Furthermore, 
objective reference is not from a part to a whole, but to a 
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valuer-valued supreme self in which a finite self retains his 
distinctive relation to God. (4) Three solutions of the 
problem of evil (Tennant, Robinson, and Brightman) are stated 
to show the inadequacies of BO>sanquet' s view of evil as an 
illusion of the rebellious lower se~f and as a bane to Theism. 
(5) Bosanquet is criticized for being inconsistent in that 
an unconscious absolute molds persons to be lost in the whole. 
Bosanquet's theory of man's destiny is compared with that of 
Pringle-Pattison and A. E. Taylor. (6) The true value of 
persons is not in their adjectival character; better (so 
Leighton) is the cosmic pluralism of a community of minds. 
(7) W. R. Matthews points out that to create creators is not 
to Will all the details for wise creators include freedom as 
a part of the plan that is willed for the spiritual community. 
(8) Finally, criticisms are made of Bosanquet's conception 
of unconscious absolute individuality as a synthesis of the 
one and the many. Muirhead is more sympathetic than Tennant 
with Bosanquet for he sees in the absolute P~ato's influence 
transmitted to the Western world through Hegelianism. 
" 
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~Ierber t Lee 1-evvJ.r:an was ..::;orn in Dover - Ii'oxcroft , i -aine , 
July 12 , 1890 . In 1907 he was :::radrated from the Je.nf·orth 
(": "aine ) ~~i[:::• School . His first church was j_n Orient , ::aine , 
in 1912 . He entered Colby Coller;e , ·:a terville , : ·aine , in the 
fall of 1914. rvhile in colle~,e he served as pastor in ==artlantf, , 
Ca:r.1bridce , and arlrraan . t ll l t . . d I co e::;e le was ac lve ln ebat ns ,
1
, 
football , :--~usical clubs , and was president of tl'e Y. ·~ . C . '_ ., II 
the senior class , and the student council. ~Ie ~mte_•eu tLe 
1ili t~_!'y E:ervice in l9:j..8, anc_ was a ssi~ned to Camp Jackson , 
So . Ca:."'olira , a.nc1_ Cau:J Zachary Taylor, _en tuchy . The de:::,!'ee 
of A. B. was received in absent i a from Colby in 1918 . IIe 
entered Andover 1ewton Theolo~icel School in 19 19 , and was 
cra~uated with the r . D. in 1922. An S . T . l~ . de~ree was 
received from the same institution in 1927 . Durinz; his 
se lnar-y course :be was pastor in Worcester , ~:assachusetts . 
Since 1922 he tas been head of the newly forned Depart'Jent 
of ~eli:,ion and director of reli:.ious activities at Colby 
Colle:::.e . :-ilrin: the year 1935-1936 he was s ranted tl-:e first 
Sabbatical leave from Colby . The time ~as spent at Boston 
university . Durinr:, the smm1er of 1929 he studied at the 
Llni versi ty of Chica::o, and r1ur::..n:::: the Sl)_l;lner terms in 1935 , 
1936 , and 1937 he vras at Boston Univers:ty • .f;Jnonc several 
res~onsibilities have been these: advisor to the Youth 
Council as well the Student Christian Lovement in :1aine , 
.. 
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<.~::rector of t" e J. ulne Council of .,el.:. ious :=duc:::.t:o ... , 
cl:air:nan of L1e .. eli:::ious :=ducat' on Cor:u::i ttee for a::.ne ' 
ch"irr:J.al" of t,1e con . .i ttee on cr.,d::t courses in reli :on 
:or t'e scrools rd c'-mrc':le.s of -aine , and c·la:":.l~ran of tle 
co:mrdttee on the J.ev.:.sion of Outl·ne under t e lational 
Association of fibl.:.cal Instr cto::-·s . ::e is t' e uthor of 
11 2o"""..e ... resent :!)a~ T:rer-ds .:.n the on-v-ersion :=xper~.ence 11 
(Crozer "'uartcrl;r, ,\_)rll , 1927), 'l.nd "The ~~fluence of t'1e 1 
I 
3ool· of 'isdom on t e l e 1 resta .ent" ( Crozer _uarte_El_:.r , 
Jul"- , 1931) • 
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